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OFFICIAL HISTORY  
OF  
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

PART V.

SHA HO.

PREPARED BY  
THE HISTORICAL SECTION  
OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

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## THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

### PART V.

### SHA HO.

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The issue of this narrative of the battle of the Sha Ho has not been delayed to enable reference to be made to the account given in the Russian Official (Military) History of the Russo-Japanese War which has just appeared. Any alterations or amendments that may be found necessary to this narrative (Part V.) will be incorporated in Volume II. of the Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military) under preparation.

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
## DIARY OF EVENTS.

5TH FEBRUARY TO 31ST OCTOBER, 1904.

- 
- 5th February.—Diplomatic relations broken off by the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg.
- 8th February.—Japanese squadron arrived at Chemulpo, escorting three transports with four infantry battalions. Japanese squadron under Admiral Togo attacked Port Arthur. Two Russian battleships and one cruiser torpedoed.
- 9th February.—Naval attack on Port Arthur renewed. One Russian battleship and three cruisers injured. Russian cruiser *Variag* and gunboat *Koreetz* destroyed at Chemulpo.
- 14th February.—Naval attack on Port Arthur. Russian cruiser torpedoed.
- 16th February.—Japanese 12th Division began to disembark at Chemulpo.
- 24th February.—First attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.
- 27th February.—Japanese 12th Division completed disembarkation at Chemulpo.
- 6th March.—Admiral Kamimura bombarded Vladivostok.
- 13th March.—Japanese Guard and 2nd Divisions began to disembark at Chinampo.
- 21st–22nd March.—Naval bombardment of Port Arthur.
- 27th March.—Second attempt to block Port Arthur.
- 28th March.—Japanese Guard and 2nd Divisions completed disembarkation at Chinampo.
- 21st April.—Japanese First Army concentrated at Wiju.
- 27th April.—Reconnaissance for third attempt to block Port Arthur.
- 30th April–1st May.—Battle of the Ya-lu.
- 2nd–3rd May.—Third attempt to block Port Arthur.
- 5th May.—The Japanese Second Army began to disembark at Pi-tzu-wo.
- 19th May.—The Japanese 10th Division began to land at Ta-ku-shan.
- 26th May.—Battle of Nan Shan.
- 28th May.—General Stakelberg ordered to march to the relief of Port Arthur.
- 7th June.—The Japanese First Army began to advance from Feng-huang-cheng.
- 8th June.—The Japanese 10th Division occupied Hsiu-yen.
- 14th–15th June.—Battle of Te-li-ssu—General Stakelberg defeated by Japanese Second Army under General Oku.
- 27th June.—Japanese 10th Division captured the Fen-shui Ling.
- 29th June.—Japanese First Army seized the Mo-tien Ling.
- 6th July.—Marshal Oyama left Tokio for Manchuria.
- 17th July.—Unsuccessful attack by Count Keller upon the Mo-tien Ling.
- 25th–26th July.—Battle of Ta-shih-chiao. General Zarubaiev, with the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps, defeated by the Japanese Second Army under General Oku—Newchuang occupied by General Oku's cavalry.
- 27th July.—Japanese Third Army captured the "Position of the Passes" in the Kuan-tung Peninsula.
- 30th July.—The Russians in the Kuan-tung Peninsula retired into the defences of Port Arthur.
- 31st July.—Battle of Yang-tzu Ling—Yu-shu Ling. Japanese First Army defeated the Russian "Eastern Force."
- 3rd August.—The Japanese Second Army occupied Hai-cheng.
- 19th–24th August.—First general assault upon Port Arthur.
- 23rd August–5th September.—Battle of Liao-yang.
- 9th–17th October.—Battle of the Sha Ho.
- 30th–31st October.—Second general assault upon Port Arthur.







## CHART:

5-11-10-11

The Chinese Communist Party has been successful in its efforts to liberate the people from the oppression of the Nationalist Government. The Chinese Communist Party has been successful in its efforts to liberate the people from the oppression of the Nationalist Government.

\* See Part I, 2nd edition  
 contains an additional 40  
 was dated 29th Septemb  
 \* See Strategical Map 5.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

## THE SITUATION AFTER THE BATTLE OF LIAO-YANG.

So soon as Marshal Oyama realized that no useful result was likely to be achieved by a further pursuit after the battle of Liao-yang, he set himself to prepare for a fresh trial of strength at the earliest opportunity. More than one-sixth of his force had fallen during the fighting, and reinforcements were hurried out from Japan to fill his ranks. To meet the strain upon her resources and to provide for the requirements of the future, Japan found it necessary to modify her military law. The term of service in the *Kobi Hei-eki*, or second reserve, was increased from five to ten years, and in the *Hoju Hei-eki*, or conscript reserve, from eight and two-thirds to twelve and one-third years.\* The lines of communication of the armies in the field were readjusted, and the construction of bridges over the Tai-tzu

The Japanese  
communications.

was pushed on rapidly. After the capture of Liao-yang the Second Army undertook to transport all wounded to the rear and collected the trophies of battle. On the 8th September, the first "push train" reached Liao-yang and on the same day the first junk laden with supplies reached Hsiao-pei-ho† from Newchuang. Two days later another junk sailed up the Tai-tzu as far as Huang-chia-ling-tzu, and from that date until the river was frozen over the Second Army was supplied almost entirely by water. By the 30th September, the gauge of the main railway line as well as of the branch line to Newchuang, had been adapted to Japanese rolling stock, and on the following day the first train steamed into Liao-yang. On the 3rd October, the railway was in proper working order, and the management of the line was handed over to the Fourth Army, while the district to the west of it was assigned to the Second Army. The line of communication of the First Army from An-tung through Hsia-ma-tang was still maintained. A light railway had been laid as far as Feng-huang-cheng, but from the beginning of October General Kuroki began to draw some of his supplies through Liao-yang. The use of river transport, and the completion of the railway did so much to simplify the work on the lines of communication, that it was even found possible to make a regular issue of *saki* and cigarettes once every ten days. Meanwhile the want of a good map was causing some anxiety. The best that was available was on a scale of

\* See Part I, 2nd edition, p. 21. These alterations gave the military authorities an additional 46,548 men for service in Manchuria. The ordinance was dated 29th September, 1904.

† See Strategic Map 5.



rather more than three miles to an inch, and as it had been compiled from Chinese maps and from the reports of scouts it left much to be desired. To this lack of accurate information the exposed position of the Umezawa brigade at Pien-niu-lu-pu was to some extent due,\* and as the country became better known, the more difficult did the situation of the flank detachment appear. Collisions with Russian patrols were fairly frequent, and by the middle of September bodies of cavalry and horse artillery appeared daily in front of the Japanese outposts. By this time, however, the railway bridge over the Tai-tzu had been repaired, and five other bridges were soon in working order. So rapidly was all the work in rear of the army carried out that by the 16th the whole of the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies, with the exception of the 10th Division, was moved across the river. The

Distribution of the Japanese forces, September 17th. First Army then extended its right so as to include the mountainous country east of the Yen-tai mines, and at the same time the Guard Division was brought up into the front line. The Japanese armies were then distributed as follows:—

*First Army*, from the hills east of Chien-tao through Ta-lien-kou to Ying-cheng-tzu.

*Fourth Army*, from Lan-ni-pu to the vicinity of Nan-tai, two miles west of the railway.

*Second Army*, from Ta-pa-tai-tzu to San-tai-tzu.

These movements were completed on the 17th September, and on that day the Umezawa brigade was heavily attacked by a force which was estimated at a brigade of infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, and a battery.† The fighting lasted all day, but towards evening the Russians drew off in the direction of Sung-shu-chu-tzu. Further indications of a hostile concentration towards the east were not long wanting. A large force was reported to be moving from Fu-shun‡ to Sung-shu-chu-tzu, and Russian cavalry was believed to be advancing down the Tai-tzu towards Chiao-tou‡ and Pen-hsi-hu. To meet this threat a regiment of infantry and two batteries were sent from the 12th Division to General Umezawa, and General Nishi, who was in command of the lines of communication, was instructed to send all the men who could be spared to strengthen the garrisons of the two threatened villages. On the 22nd and 23rd September the Russians became still more active, and during the next few days the pressure upon the Japanese right increased so much that, on the 28th, Marshal Oyama ordered the First Army to draw in its left to Hsia-tai-tzu and to assemble

\* Apparently at the time when the Umezawa brigade was ordered to Pien-niu-lu-pu the Japanese head-quarter staff believed that that village was much nearer to the right of the First Army than was actually the case. *German Official Account*, Part 5, p. 11.

† This force, whose real strength is not known, was under the command of General Rennenkampf. He had recovered from the wound which he had received on the 13th July, and had resumed command of the cavalry on General Kuropatkin's left.

‡ See Strategic Map 5.

a strong force in rear of its eastern flank, ready to afford prompt assistance to the troops at Shang-ping-tai-tzu if called upon. At the same time the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, under His Imperial Highness Prince Kanin, whose leading troops had reached Liao-yang on the 17th September, was moved to Ta-yao-pu, where it arrived on the 31st and came under the orders of General Kuroki. The Fourth Army also took ground to the east, and extended its line of outposts so as to cover the district vacated by the First Army. The 1st Cavalry Brigade moved to Niu-chu,\* whence it reconnoitred both banks of the Hun, and by the 2nd October, the positions of the Japanese armies were as shown on Plate I. The Second Army had thrown out detachments to Ta-tung-shan-pu, Liu-wo-chia-tzu,† and Hsiao-kuan-yin-ko, the Fourth and First Armies had advanced posts at Wu-li-tai-tzu and on the hills north of the Yen-tai coal mines respectively.

The reorganization of the Japanese lines of communication and field armies was not completed any too soon, for ever since he had conducted his troops safely across the Hun Ho General Kuropatkin had pushed on his preparations for taking the offensive. The possibility of being unable to retain Liao-yang had always been contemplated, although the Russian commander's assertion that the last battle had ended in "a pre-arranged retreat" must be regarded as something of a euphemism. The desirability of relieving Port Arthur was, however, constantly weighing on his mind. Moreover the Baltic fleet was about to leave Libau, and if only the Port Arthur fleet could be saved until Admiral Rozhdestvenski reached the China Sea the Japanese position would be very different. But if anything was to be done to assist General Stessel there was no time to be lost, for winter was approaching and it would soon be impossible to move troops in any large numbers. Yet another reason urged General Kuropatkin to act quickly. The long retreat from the Ya-lu to Mukden had had a depressing effect upon his troops, and it was thought that if one success could be gained they would go into winter quarters in a far happier frame of mind than would otherwise be possible. Then, when the coming spring made active operations again possible the remembrance of early defeats would have been effaced, and the troops would go forth to battle with full confidence in the result.

In preparation for the intended advance, great efforts were made to increase the numbers and to improve the fighting efficiency of the army; and throughout the month of September nine or ten trains reached Mukden daily. The greater part of the 1st Siberian Corps was still scattered in small detachments, and General Kuropatkin's request that it should be added to his command was refused by the Viceroy; on the other hand, the last details of the 1st Corps had arrived very soon after the retreating army had crossed the Hun Ho, and before the end of the month the 6th

\* See Strategic Map 5.

† Also called Liu-tiao-sai in some accounts.

Siberian Corps was concentrated at Kung-chu-ling.\* On the 20th., General Kuropatkin was informed by the Viceroy that the whole of the field forces in Manchuria were no longer to be under his control, but that a 2nd Manchurian Army was to be formed and was to consist of the 6th and 8th Siberian Corps, the 61st Infantry Division, and the 4th Division of Don Cossacks. The command was given to General Grippenberg; but until the remainder of the force should reach the front the 6th Siberian Corps was placed under General Kuropatkin, subject, however, to the condition that it should not be split up, and that it should only be called upon to operate within a strictly limited area. In addition to this corps, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Mountain Batteries, one East Siberian sledge company of engineers, one East Siberian balloon company, and a bridging battalion joined the field army. Very few drafts arrived to replace wastage and the Liao-yang casualties,† but on the other hand large numbers of men were gradually discharged from the hospitals and again took their places in the ranks.

In actual numbers, therefore, General Kuropatkin was better off at the end of September than at any previous period of the war; not only was his own army stronger than ever, but he had a greater preponderance of strength over his opponents. The *moral* of his troops was still good, for in spite of repeated retreats the men felt that they had never really been beaten, and that the Japanese had but little to show in return for heavy lists of casualties beyond the ground upon which their victories had been won. The loss of material had not been very great, and much of it had been quickly replaced. With their usual talent for field fortification, the Russian engineers had placed the line of the Hun Ho in a formidable state of defence. The bridge-head, which was held by the Xth Corps, was heavily entrenched and was flanked by batteries on the right bank. Special positions were prepared at Fu-shun, Fu-ling, and Sha-ta-tzu under the direction of General Velichko, who had been responsible for the fortifications round Liao-yang, and many roads were built to act either as lines of supply or of retreat as occasion might demand. An entirely new military road from Harbin to Mukden, thirty feet wide, running parallel to the railway was nearly complete. From the town of Mukden a vast system of cart tracks radiated fan-wise to the front, and along the lines occupied by the corps head-quarters and reserves was another new road, which near the centre of the position was eighty feet wide. From this main artery other smaller roads branched off towards the troops in front.‡ The comfort of the men was thoroughly cared for, and on the 29th September, General Kuropatkin reported to the Viceroy that "The fortification of the positions at

Condition of the  
Russian army.

\* On the railway, about 150 miles north of Mukden.

† General Kuropatkin states that during July and August the drafts received amounted to only 4,200 men. *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, Vol. II, p. 241. The same rate seems to have been kept up through September.

‡ Even the so-called Mandarin Road was unmetalled and became almost impassable after heavy rain; these new roads were the merest tracks.

Mukden and Fu-shun is completed. The roads to the east of Tieh-ling will be finished in a few days. In our front we have twelve bridges over the Hun Ho, of which eleven have just been built. Four bridges have been built across the Liao Ho at Tieh-ling; and they, together with the roads eastward from that town, have completely obviated the difficulties of the Tieh-ling defile. Being thoroughly prepared for defence the troops are now actively completing arrangements for assuming the offensive. A supply of uniforms has been obtained from Harbin for nearly all units. The rifles have been thoroughly examined and put in order, and the field guns, of which many suffered considerably from wear and tear in the recent battles, have been renewed as far as possible, but some batteries will still have six guns only. A supply of artillery ammunition, sufficient for another stubborn and prolonged engagement, has been procured. Of rifle ammunition there has never been any lack. The entrenching tools which were lost in the fighting during the hot weather cannot yet be fully replaced. A monthly supply of provisions comes from Harbin, Chang-tu-fu,\* and Tieh-ling. The supply of bread is sufficient, but there is not enough sugar, and very little jam and other luxuries. There is no trouble in procuring meat at present, but some difficulty is anticipated. Forage has also been obtained easily, and the condition of the horses is generally satisfactory. Fuel is causing some anxiety, but when the natives have got the *kao-liang* crops this difficulty will disappear.† The transport is now in regular working order, and supplies can be delivered even to the advanced cavalry detachments. The health of the troops is very good; the men look fit and well; they have thoroughly recovered from their exertions, and the ranks are filling up."

Within less than a month from the end of the battle of Liao-yang, therefore, General Kuropatkin was well provided with both men and material, but like his adversary he was suffering from ignorance of the country in which he was about to operate. A careful survey of the Liao-tung Peninsula had been made before the outbreak of the war, but the excellent maps on a scale of two versts to the inch ( $\frac{1}{340000}$ ) which had been published, went no farther north than Liao-yang. Beyond that point the only information available was based on an unreliable map on a scale of twenty versts to an inch and on rough road reports. To remedy the deficiency a sketch map on a scale of four versts to an inch was hurriedly prepared in Mukden; a second edition was issued to the troops in September, and it was to this map that references were made in General Kuropatkin's subsequent orders. Repeated requests had been sent to St. Petersburg asking that competent surveyors might be sent out, but it was not until the end of September that a party of thirty-five draughtsmen was dispatched to be attached to the staff of the Viceroy. Meanwhile numerous reconnaissances were carried out in the mountains to the east and

\* About 35 miles north of Tieh-ling.

† In Manchuria, as throughout a large part of China, the stalks of the *kao-liang* form the staple fuel of the people.



awakened the suspicions of the Japanese, who promptly reinforced their right flank. Information that hostile infantry was moving eastward led General Kuropatkin to infer that another attempt was to be made to turn his left. Further reconnaissances were then sent out, and collisions between the outposts became more frequent. September passed without any important action on either side, but so soon as the 6th Siberian Corps had reached the front General Kuropatkin had nothing further to gain by postponing his offensive movement. The Russian army was then occupying a front over thirty miles in length, and on the 28th September, the day before making the report to the Viceroy which has already been quoted, General Kuropatkin drew up a fresh distribution of his troops and issued secret orders\* for the advance.

The army was now organized in two wings and a reserve †

*Western Force*, under Lieutenant-General Baron Bilderling—

Xth Corps, Lieutenant-General Sluchevski.

XVIIth Corps, Lieutenant-General Volkov.

Major-General Grekov's cavalry.

In all some 64 battalions, 40 squadrons, 190 guns, and 2 battalions of engineers.‡

On the right flank of the Western Force was Lieutenant-General Dembovski's detachment, composed of 12 battalions, 16 squadrons, 32 guns, and 2 battalions of engineers.

*Eastern force*, under Lieutenant-General Baron Stakelberg—

1st Siberian Corps, Lieutenant-General Gerngross.

2nd Siberian Corps, Lieutenant-General Zasulich.

3rd Siberian Corps, Lieutenant-General Ivanov.

Major-General Samsonov's cavalry.

In all some 73 battalions, 34 squadrons, 16½ guns, and 3 battalions of engineers.§

On the left flank of the Eastern Force Lieutenant-General Rennenkampf was in command of scattered detachments under Major-General Liubavin, Major-General Ekk, and Major-General Petrov which amounted in all to 13 battalions, 16 squadrons, and 30 guns.§

*General Reserve*.—

4th Siberian Corps, Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.

Ist Corps, General Baron Meiendorf.

Major-General Mishchenko's cavalry.

\* These orders are given in full in Appendix A.

† See Appendix D.

‡ Accounts vary considerably as regards the number of units comprised in the Western Force. Minor discrepancies cannot in every case be reconciled, but the main difference is caused by the fact that in some cases the whole, and in some cases a portion, of General Dembovski's detachment is counted as forming part of General Bilderling's command. General Dembovski, however, received orders direct from army head-quarters until the evening of the 13th, when he was placed directly under General Bilderling.

§ Discrepancies in the various accounts arise from the fact that General Rennenkampf's detachments are sometimes counted in with the Eastern Force.

In all some 56 battalions, 20 squadrons, 230 guns, and 2 battalions of engineers.

Behind the General Reserve was the 6th Siberian Corps,\* under General Sobolev, which was at first intended to act as a kind of rear guard. It consisted of thirty-two battalions (of which eight remained behind in positions between Tieh-ling and Mukden), ninety-six guns, and one battalion of engineers, and to it were attached six squadrons.

In addition, one battalion of infantry was placed in Mukden as garrison, and two special detachments were to protect the flanks of the advance. Of the latter that on the right under Major-General Kossakovski, consisted of  $6\frac{1}{2}$  battalions, 9 squadrons, and 16 guns, while Colonel Madritov on the left disposed of 1 battalion, 2 squadrons, 2 detachments of mounted scouts, and 2 guns.

Including the 6th Siberian Corps,† the total strength of this great force was 194,400 rifles, with 760 guns and 143 squadrons. The strength of the different units varied considerably; the number of men in a company was seldom more than 160, and in the 213th (Orovai) Regiment, an extreme case, it was between 120 and 130.

The orders for the first two days were explicit. At the end of the second day the main bodies of the three corps with the left wing were to be on the line Tai-chia-miao-tzu—Fei-tsun-pu—Pa-chia-tzu, with the advanced guards at Liu-chien-hu-tun—Yingpan—Sung-shu-chu-tzu—Wang-fu Ling. On the same day the right wing was to reach the line Lin-sheng-pu—Sha-ho-pu, and to push advanced guards out to Ying-shou-tun—Hung-pao-shan—Chien-liu-tang-kou. Both main body and advanced guard were to entrench the positions they took up. On General Bilderling's right, General Dembovski, moving down the west bank of the Hun Ho was to reach Ho-chia-chang-tzu with his main body in two marches, and with his advanced guard was to seize the river crossing at Chang-tan, where a bridge was to be built and fortifications were to be thrown up on either side of the river.

The duty of the western detachment was primarily to act as a containing force and to guard the Russian communications from a possible counter-attack. For the time being General Bilderling was not to advance south of the Sha Ho, but when the time should come to do so he was to demonstrate with a view to drawing upon himself the main forces of the Japanese. He was to act with energy at every opportunity, but his enterprise was to be tempered with discretion. Each day the line taken up by the advanced guard was to be quickly prepared for defence, and on the following day these hasty entrenchments were to be converted into a "position" by the main body. Meanwhile, General Stakelberg on the east was to fall upon and crush the Japanese

\* This corps, with the exception in some cases of the brigade left north of Mukden, is reckoned in several accounts as part of the General Reserve.

† The established strength of the rank and file of the Manchurian army at this date was 328,233; the actual strength was 275,739.

First Army. Having carried out the programme laid out for the first two days he was to envelop the Japanese right and to seize Pien-niu-lu-pu and the passes at Kao-tai Ling and Ho Ling; thereby compelling the Japanese to fall back to the Yen-tai mines and cutting their communications with Pen-hsi-hu. He was not to push his advance across the Tai-tzu, but was to rest content with securing its right bank. The interval between the wings was to be filled by General Mishchenko's Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade, and the general reserve of the army under General Zarubaiev was to follow about six miles in rear of the centre, ready to throw its weight in any direction. At the date when these orders were issued the strength of the Japanese armies, including *Kobi* brigades, was estimated by the Russian Staff to be 182 battalions of infantry, 53 squadrons of cavalry, and 648 guns. The 8th Division, which had not yet arrived, was believed to be with the Fourth Army under General Nodzu, and the fighting strength by which General Kuropatkin might be opposed was put down as 144,000 bayonets, 6,360 sabres, and 648 guns. Of these troops, two divisions were believed to be west of the railway between Ho-kung-pu and Shen-tan-pu; four divisions in the area Chang-tai-tzu—Sha-ho-tun—Liao-yang; two divisions near the Yen-tai mines; and two divisions on the line Pien-niu-lu-pu—Pen-hsi-hu.

A cypher telegram sent out on the 1st October informed the various commanders that the advance was to begin on the 5th, and on the following day the commander-in-chief published an address to the troops explaining the reasons for his prolonged retreat, reminding them that the honour of Russia was in their hands, entrusted to them by the Tsar, and telling them that they were now to go forth to victory. Hitherto General Kuropatkin's intention had been at least nominally a secret, although the probability of an advance at an early date had been fully discussed in the camps for some days. Now, however, there was no reticence, and rumours soon began to filter through to Europe, whence, it is only reasonable to suppose, they quickly reached Marshal Oyama's head-quarters. On the 4th October, the final orders were issued. In the meantime information had been received that the whole of General Oku's army was massed west of the railway and it was therefore thought advisable that, instead of advancing to Ho-chia-chang-tzu on the 6th, General Dembovski's main body should halt at Fan-chien-tai and reconnoitre towards Chang-tan. The advanced guard was to cross the river at Ta-wang-kuan-pu and to build a bridge there. A second bridge was to be built at the village of Su-hu-chia-pu which was to be fortified and turned into a species of advanced base. Subsequent operations were to depend upon the information which was received as to the movements of the Japanese, but if all went well General Dembovski was to cross to the left bank of the Hun Ho and join General Bilderling. In all other respects the original instructions remained unchanged, but General Kuropatkin again impressed upon the commander of his right wing the importance of operating with a view to drawing upon himself as large a part of the Japanese army as possible, and

thereby reducing the power of resistance to the blow which was to come from the east.

The battlefield upon which the Russian army was about to attempt to wipe out the memory of past defeats, and to restore the lost prestige of the Russian nation, is remarkable for the variety of its natural features. In its broader aspect it reproduced the principal characteristics of the field of Liao-yang, but in a more marked degree. It is bordered on the west and north by the Hun Ho, on the south by the Tai-tzu, and on the east by the head-waters of the tributary streams between two of which, the Shih-li Ho and Sha Ho, the greater part of the fighting took place. Like the scenes of several earlier fights, this area is traversed from north to south by the railway, which is carried on an embankment ten to fifteen feet high, and by the Mandarin road, still running parallel to one another and marking the eastern limit of the plains. West of the railway the country is perfectly level and abundantly sprinkled with villages. The houses are built for the most part of sun-dried bricks, and many of them stand in yards or gardens which are enclosed by mud walls four to nine feet high, and twenty to twenty-eight inches thick. When frozen these walls are bullet-proof, but at other times they can be pierced by the modern small calibre bullet at a range of nine hundred yards or under. They were, however, easily strengthened, and the villages were readily placed in a state of defence. In a district devoid of commanding features they naturally became the centres of defence and attack, particularly those which covered the easiest river crossings. In and round most of the villages were trees which hid the actual buildings, and in many cases graveyards within a hundred yards or so of the walls provided welcome cover to the attacking troops. Occasionally the plain swells almost imperceptibly but nowhere is there any favourable position for artillery. The whole plain is highly cultivated, but when the battle was fought the harvest was nearly over and the sharp pointed millet stalks, protruding some inches above the ground, while giving no cover, were a source of considerable annoyance to infantry at night and impeded the movements of cavalry at all times. In many places a man lying down had a field of fire for a thousand yards obstructed only by scattered copses of fir or poplar or possibly by a Chinese burial ground. In other parts of the field, where the millet was still uncut or was stacked in the fields to dry, troops could move over the flat plain absolutely unseen; so much so that during the operations of the first three days the commander of the Second Army, the divisional generals, and sometimes even the brigadiers were forced to rely almost entirely upon reports for their knowledge of the movements of their own men.

The only serious obstacles to manoeuvre were the streams and rivers which ran in winding courses from the hills on the east towards the Hun Ho on the west. All have muddy or sandy bottoms, are difficult to ford, and flow some twelve to fifteen feet below the level of the plain. Beneath the banks there was usually sufficient space on either side of the water for infantry to march



in file or fours, or for the concealment of reserves. Crossing places for wheeled traffic were to be found near the villages, but the descent and ascent were often so steep that the passage of guns and wagons was neither quick nor easy.

For a mile or two to the east of the Mandarin road the general character of the country is but little altered, except for a chain of low sandy knolls, too narrow for artillery positions but useful as observing stations, upon one of which General Oku and his staff established themselves in the later stages of the battle. East of the line from the Yen-tai mines to Putilov hill the country rapidly becomes more mountainous, and in the neighbourhood of Pien-niu-lu-pu large bodies of troops are confined strictly to the bridle paths. In this wild region the hills are bold and precipitous, movement off the tracks is difficult even for infantry, and for the other arms, impossible. Such was the country through which General Kuropatkin proposed to deliver his main attack.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE AND THE JAPANESE CONCENTRATION  
FOR BATTLE.

(Maps V/1 and V/2.)

THE movement which was to win back for Russia all that had been lost during the last eight months began on the 4th October. On

The advance of  
the Russian  
armies.

that day the left wing troops broke up their camps, and before night General Mishchenko occupied Hsia-liu-ho-tzu after driving out a small party of Japanese who belonged to the advanced detachment of the 2nd Division. For some days previously the suspicions of the Japanese had been aroused by increasing activity in their front, particularly in the neighbourhood of Chang-tan, and on the right bank of the Hun Ho where a body of three hundred cavalry had been seen. Further to the east a more formidable force was located whose strength was reported to be two thousand cavalry with six guns. It was evident, therefore, that some important development was taking place, but for the present the information at Marshal Oyama's disposal was not sufficient to warrant any change in his dispositions. On the next day the Russian right wing was set in motion, and by the evening of the 6th General Dembovski's detachment was at Ta-wang-kuan-pu, and the Xth and XVIIth Corps were on the line which had been appointed in the orders of the 28th September. The main body of the XVIIth Corps moved in two columns. On the right the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Division was at Ta-liang-tun, on the left the 35th Division was at Lin-sheng-pu. The 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division formed the advanced guard and was at Liu-san-chia-tzu, and Hung-ling-pu, with an advanced detachment at Liu-tang-kou and advanced posts on the Shih-li Ho.

Colonel Stakhovich with a mixed detachment\* was at Chung-lu-yen-tai, and the greater part of the Ural Cossack Division under General Grekov was echeloned in rear of the right of the XVIIth Corps and kept up communication with General Dembovski on the Hun Ho.

The arrangement adopted by the Xth Corps was the exact reverse of that adopted by the XVIIth, for the main body moved in one column but was covered by two advanced guards. On the right the 2nd Brigade of the 31st Division with three batteries and a squadron of Cossacks was at Hung-pao-shan under General

\* Five squadrons 52nd (Nyejin) Dragoons, 1st Battalion 11th (Pskov) Regiment, and two guns.

Ryabinkin,\* and was covered by an advanced detachment† at Hsin-chuang under Colonel Solomka. The left advanced guard, 1st Brigade, 31st Division, under General Mau,\* was at Ho-shang-kou with advanced parties at Tung-shan-kou and Pei-san-chia-tzu. The remainder of the corps, *i.e.*, the 9th Division, 9th Artillery Brigade, two squadrons of cavalry, and a company of engineers, was near Sha-ho-pu.

The left wing under General Stakelberg had also succeeded in carrying out its programme. On the left was the 1st Siberian Corps; the 2nd Siberian Corps‡ was in the centre; and on the right was the 3rd Siberian Corps. The advanced guards were at Tsai-chia-tun, Ying-pan, and Wang-fu Ling. The Siberian Cossack Division, which was acting independently under General Samsonov, had pushed as far south as Kao-kuan-sai, and was in touch with General Rennenkampf at San-chia-tzu on the Tai-tzu.

On this day, two small reconnoitring detachments from the Japanese First Army succeeded in reaching Tu-men-tzu and San-

kuai-shih Shan, but a comparatively strong force of a brigade and a battery which attempted to occupy Shuang-tzu Shan was forced to retire without achieving its object. All day long reports kept coming in to First Army headquarters from which it was clear that a general advance of the enemy had begun, and that the brigade at Pien-niu-lu-pu was in considerable danger. The time had now come when a choice had to be made between withdrawing the exposed brigade, or advancing to its support with the remainder of the First Army.

It was, however, impossible for General Kuroki to advance unsupported, and taking into consideration the whole strategical situation he decided that General Umezawa must fall back in the direction of Pen-hsi-hu as far as Li-shu-ti-hsia.

So far General Kuropatkin's plans had met with a considerable degree of success. The communications of the Japanese First Army were threatened and the right flank detachment was in danger of being cut off. Moreover, beyond the fact that the greater part of the Russian army had crossed the Hun Ho on its southward march but little was known to the Japanese. This was the moment selected by the Russian commander to suspend his advance, and to begin the construction of one of those defensive positions which played so important a part in his strategy. Instead of pressing his advantage General Kuropatkin ordered the western force to spend the whole of the 7th entrench-

\* General Ryabinkin's own brigade was the 1st Brigade, 9th Division, but for some reason he was placed in command of the 2nd Brigade, 31st Division. General Mau was the commander of the 31st Division, but his command during the greater part of this battle consisted only of his 1st Brigade.

† Two battalions 123rd (Koslov) Regiment, four guns, three sections of Cossacks and some mounted scouts. The outpost of the XVIIth Corps at Sha-ho-pu had been replaced on the 5th by troops belonging to the Xth Corps.

‡ For the composition of this corps see Appendix D. The 1st Siberian Division, which properly belonged to it, took no part in these operations.

ing the position it had occupied on the previous day,\* and the advanced guards were instructed that in the event of an attack the Japanese were to be met on the line Mang-chia-fen—Ning-kuan-tun—Pan-chiao-pu—Chung-lu-yen-tai. During the day two squadrons of Ural Cossacks, which were sent forward from the advanced guard of the Xth Corps, encountered some Japanese near the village Ku-shu-tzu. Two companies of infantry, a scout detachment, and four guns came to the assistance of the Russian cavalry. The Japanese then retired but were supported by a battery south of Chou-kuan-tun. A Cossack patrol sent information that four battalions of infantry were advancing to the attack, and the Russians promptly fell back to Hsin-chuang and General Ryabinkin reported that his advanced guard was opposed by a Japanese brigade with at least two batteries. The eastern force was hardly less inactive. The advanced guard of the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division moved forward to Chang-chi-sai and the Hsin-kai Ling, and General Samsonov moved to Li-chia-wo-peng. The reserve of the army, the 1st Corps and the 4th Siberian Corps, advanced as far as Liu-fan-tun and Erh-tao-kou, and the 6th Siberian Corps was ordered to cross to the south side of the river and place itself in rear of General Bilderling's right flank. Except for these comparatively insignificant movements the whole army remained halted throughout the 7th.

In this way, twenty-four valuable hours were wasted, and they were sufficient to enable General Umezawa to effect his retreat unmolested. His orders to retire reached him on the morning of the 7th, but as his outposts were in touch with the Russian advanced guards he decided that it would be wiser to remain at Pien-niu-lu-pu until nightfall. Under cover of darkness he was fortunate enough to slip away without a shot being fired at him, and reached Li-shu-ti-hsia early on the 8th. Thence he threw the 1st Guard *Kobi* Regiment and two guns into Pen-hsi-hu, which had hitherto been garrisoned only by a battalion of the 39th *Kobi* Regiment, and distributed the remainder of his very weak force between that village and the Tu-men-tzu Ling. As a further protection to his right wing General Kuroki moved the 12th Division from Ta-yao-pu to Shang-yin-chiang-pu, and the Guard Division began to concentrate near Chang-hai-tun, two and a half miles north-east of Ta-yao-pu.

Meanwhile the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies also had time to concentrate in preparation for the storm which was evidently brewing in the north. The reports which had been received from the First Army, from Chinese spies, and from Europe

Marshal Oyama's  
orders for  
concentration.

\* "On this day the captive balloon 'Field Marshal Gurko' which was attached to the Xth Corps was carried off by a gust of wind. At first it was carried southward towards the Japanese lines, but getting into another current it disappeared in a north-easterly direction, much to the secret delight of the staff officers who were detailed daily to go up in it, but were never able to see anything. Some time later a balloon was seen travelling over Lake Baikal, where it caused considerable alarm, as it was at first believed to belong to the Japanese." von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei*, Vol. II, p. 56.



made it abundantly clear that an important movement was on foot; but since it was also known that the Russians were throwing up field works there could not even yet be any certainty as to their future movements. On one point, however, Marshal Oyama's mind was made up, and that was that he would not passively await attack. On the morning of the 7th October, therefore, he issued his orders:—

- (1) Information from various sources seems to show that the Russians are preparing to attack.

The enemy in front of the First Japanese Army began to advance on the 4th, and on the 6th he was on the line from the height north of Kang-ta-jen-shan to Mang-chia-fen.

In front of the Fourth and Second Armies the enemy reached the line Pan-chiao-pu to Ta-tai (N. of Ta-tung-shan-pu).

The strength of the enemy is uncertain, but about six divisions are in front of the First Army.

- (2) I wish to concentrate as much as possible, so as to be able to assume the offensive at any time if required.
- (3) The First Army is to concentrate on the line from the coal mines to Mien-hua-pu.
- (4) The Second and Fourth Armies to concentrate as close as possible to the line they are now occupying on the right bank of the Tai-tzu.
- (5) The 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades, head-quarters of the 1st Artillery Brigade, and the 14th Artillery Regiment which is at present attached to the Fourth Army should be ready to come under my direct command.

These orders had been anticipated to some extent by the First Army, and within half an hour of their receipt General Oku had issued to the divisional commanders of the Second Army the necessary instructions for carrying them into effect. During the day the 6th Division was drawn in from the centre of his front line and placed between Shang-kang-tzu and Ya-lao-i-tan, and the remaining divisions were extended to right and left so as to cover the ground vacated by the 6th Division. By the evening General Tsukamoto, the commander of the 4th Division, had the 7th Brigade holding a front of about three miles from Chang-chia-wo-peng to a bridge a mile west of Hou-ko-chen-pao, with an advanced post of one or two battalions and two squadrons of the 4th Cavalry Regiment at Hsiao-kuan-ying-ko. The remainder of the division, including a captured battery of 6-inch howitzers, was at and near Ho-kung-pu. To the east General Oshima, the commander of the 3rd Division, posted the 6th Regiment between the right of the 4th Division and the village of Hou-ko-chen-pao, and the 17th Brigade continued the line as far as Hsiao-pa-tai-tzu where it was in touch with the left of the 5th Division. The 3rd Artillery Regiment was at Liu-chia-huang-ti and Hsi-ma-feng-tai, and a battery of captured field guns was at Hung-chia-huang-ti. In front of this division a battalion of infantry and a section of

the 3rd Cavalry Regiment was at Hsiao-tung-shan-pu, where it was attacked during the day by a force of about a battalion and a battery and forced back to Kang-chia-tai. Before night, however, the Russians withdrew, and the Japanese advanced detachment then reoccupied the former village.\* The divisional reserve, which consisted of the 33rd Regiment and one battalion of the 18th Regiment was near Yo-chia-pu. The 13th Artillery Regiment was at Ya-lao-i-tan.

Further east, the Fourth Army, to which the 14th Artillery Regiment was attached, kept up communication with General Kuroki's troops; and the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades, the 15th Artillery Regiment, the 4th Regiment of Foot Artillery, and the 2nd Independent Battalion of Foot Artillery were assembled under Major-General Uchiyama on the left bank of the Tai-tzu, where they acted as a general reserve to the three armies in front.

Under ordinary conditions Marshal Oyama might have been considered fortunate to have been permitted to complete his dispositions at his leisure, but General Kuropatkin did not even yet consider that the circumstances justified a further advance. The 6th Siberian Army Corps, less a brigade of the 55th Infantry Division and two batteries which had been left behind to garrison the Mukden and Tieh-ling positions, had crossed the Hun Ho and was now near Lan-shan-pu; but as the commander-in-chief was without news of his left wing, the right wing was again ordered to stand fast and to continue the work of fortification, particularly on the line held by the advanced guards between Chien-liu-tang-kou and Hung-pao-shan which was to be occupied by the main body if attacked. The position fortified on the 7th was then to become a secondary one. So deeply imbued were the Russian commanders with the theory of a war of positions that the commander of the XVIIth Corps caused a third line of defences to be constructed between Yen-tao-niu-lu and Shi-li-ho to cover the work on his new "main position."

The 4th Siberian Corps and the Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade were now brought up to close the gap between the right and left wings of the army, and General Mau's detachment which had previously acted as the left advanced guard of the Xth Corps, was placed under General Zarubaiev and strengthened by the addition of four battalions† of infantry. When this was done General Kuropatkin's infantry presented an unbroken front to the enemy, but at the end of the fourth day of the advance the leading troops of the Russian right wing were not more than twenty miles south of the Hun Ho.

Turning to the Russian left wing, it will be seen that although the troops had rested on the 7th their movements on the 8th were

\* Russian patrols also reported the presence of Japanese at Erh-tai-tzu and Ta-tung-shan-pu.

† von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei*, Vol. II, p. 58. *The Battle on the Scha Ho*, originally published by the *Militär-Wochenblatt* and translated into English by Mr. Karl von Donat, gives six battalions.

not characterized by any great vigour. The day was devoted to closing the main bodies of the various corps upon their advanced guards with a view to delivering an attack upon Pien-niu-lu-pu with overwhelming force on the 9th, and to render success more certain the advanced troops were strongly reinforced with artillery. Unfortunately for General Stakelberg his prey had already escaped him, but he had the satisfaction of being able to occupy General Umezawa's abandoned trenches without firing a shot. This success was not, however, reported to General Kuropatkin, an omission which was to have a malign influence upon the operations of the morrow. By nightfall the Russian advanced guards were placed as follows:—1st Siberian Corps at Su-ma-pu-tzu with an advanced party pushed forward to the south-west; 2nd Siberian Corps at Wei-tzu-kou; 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, with all the artillery from the left column of the 3rd Siberian Corps, at Hou-lu-tzu-kou; 6th East Siberian Rifle Division at Tsai-chia-pu-tzu and Li-chia-wo-peng. General Samsonov's cavalry moved eastwards towards Hsiang-shan-tzu, sending a flank detachment to the Ho Ling.

The only point at which the Japanese were able to offer even a feeble resistance to the Russian advance was at the village of Wei-ning-ying, which was occupied by General Rennenkampf after a smart action. On leaving San-chia-tzu the Cossacks, under General Liubavin, crossed to the left bank of the Tai-tzu with the intention of taking the Japanese in reverse, while General Petrov, who commanded the infantry advanced guard, marched to the attack along the right bank, followed by General Ekk with the main body. At first sight the village appeared to be unoccupied, but on the Cossacks attempting to recross the river to take possession they were met by a smart rifle fire. A footing was soon gained upon the opposite bank, and a battery of Frontier Guard Artillery which accompanied the cavalry came into action under cover of some mud walls. The flank of the defence was then successfully turned, and on the infantry appearing upon the height to the east the Japanese were forced to retire, but not until they had inflicted considerable loss upon the Mokshan Regiment.\*

On the evening of the 8th October, General Kuropatkin was still ignorant of the occupation of Pien-niu-lu-pu, and at 7 a.m. on the 9th, General Stakelberg received a telegram telling him to confine his operations to the capture of that village. Not long afterwards a second telegram reached the head-quarters of the Eastern Force, from which it is evident that General Kuropatkin had no intention of hurrying on the advance. "If the enemy," so ran the message, "should evacuate his forward position on the 8th, or during the following night, I still do not consider that our preparations, particularly with regard to the co-operation of General Rennenkampf and of the 4th Siberian Corps,

General  
Kuropatkin's  
caution.

\* Colonel Kvitka, *Journal d'un Cosaque du Transbaïkal*, p. 281, etc., has an account of this action. He attributes a great part of the Russian success to the artillery of the Frontier Guards, but states that they expended 96 rounds out of the 170 which were carried in the limbers.

are sufficiently advanced to justify us in attacking the main position on the 9th; I therefore decide upon the 10th as the day for the attack upon the principal position. If we meet with great difficulties, either from the country or from the resistance of the enemy, it will be wise to devote several days to these attacks." The same caution characterized his instructions to the western group. The commanders of the Xth and XVIIth Corps were informed, through General Bilderling, that the decisive attack by the eastern group was to take place on the 9th and 10th, and that: "The commander-in-chief considers that the main bodies of the Xth and XVIIth Corps should occupy the line of the advanced guards, and that the latter should be pushed forward a little further in order to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the troops which are opposing our left wing. This movement to be completed to-day if the troops are ready, and in that case the advanced guards should move to the Wu-li-chieh—Fan-chia-tun line, but should be careful not to become involved in serious fighting." At the utmost, therefore, the main bodies of General Bilderling's two corps were to move about three miles further south, and their leading troops were not to go more than two miles. It is certainly difficult to see what influence so half-hearted a measure could have upon the Japanese plans, and it is questionable whether the commander-in-chief, who was clearly not well posted in the progress of events, was well-advised in attempting to exercise so close a control over General Stakelberg's movements.

However, the commander of the Eastern Force concluded that in continuing his advance he would be acting in accordance with the spirit of his latest instructions from headquarters, and decided to carry out his original intentions to seize Cheng-kou Ling, Tu-men-tzu Ling, and Ta Ling with the 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps, leaving the 2nd Siberian Corps in reserve. General Samsonov with his cavalry was to move directly upon Pen-hsi-hu; General Rennenkampf, who had been placed temporarily under the orders of General Stakelberg, was to operate to the south and south-east; and the corps cavalry was to keep up communication with the western group.

Notwithstanding the slowness of the Russian movements and General Umezawa's success in escaping from his dangerous situation at Pien-niu-lu-pu, General Kuroki still had considerable cause for anxiety. The Russian cavalry had crossed the Tai-tzu, the line of communication was in danger, and the important villages of Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou, with their stores of food and material, appeared to be at the mercy of the enemy. Pen-hsi-hu had been reinforced; but Chiao-tou, where there was no more than a company of infantry, must almost inevitably fall if the enemy chose to make a dash for it. In the meanwhile the commandant of the latter village was doing his best with the small force at his disposal. Three roads led from Pen-hsi-hu towards Chiao-tou, and at each of the passes by which they crossed the hills he posted ten of his men. He also armed all the available military coolies with captured rifles, and with this



extemporized garrison he calmly awaited attack, fortified by the knowledge that reinforcements were hurrying to his aid and that if anything were to delay the Russian movements all might yet be well. A draft for regiments at the front was on its way from Lien-shan-kuan, and General Nishi had dispatched a staff officer with three hundred men scraped together from the line of communication. The 5th *Kobi* Brigade, which had recently landed at Antung, was making forced marches to assist in the defence. Neither of these last two parties could arrive for some time, but help was also coming from the First Army. At 9.20 a.m., General Inouye was ordered to leave such troops as might be necessary in his present position\* and to hasten with the remainder of his division, the 12th, to drive back the Russians in the direction of the Ta Ling; and at 2 p.m., when further reports of Russian activity came in, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was sent off to Chiao-tou. When this order was received at brigade head-quarters at Mien-hua-pu, the 16th Regiment was absent on a reconnaissance, but the 15th Regiment, less one squadron, and the machine guns, started off to the help of the garrison, followed some hours later by the remainder of the brigade.

However, General Rennenkampf had no immediate intention of attacking Chiao-tou, and on the morning of the 9th he con-

General  
Rennenkampf's  
advance against  
Pen-hsi-hu.

tinued his advance against Pen-hsi-hu. At dawn, the cavalry under General Liubavin recrossed to the south bank of the Tai-tzu, headed by the Argun Cossacks, while the infantry advanced down the north bank against Shih Shan and Ming Shan.

General Rennenkampf superintended the operations from the neighbourhood of Wei-ning-ying. The slender garrison of Pen-hsi-hu was far too weak for the length of front to be held, and could not hope to do more than delay the hostile advance. On the summit of Ming Shan was a detachment of thirty men who were cut off from help and had practically no way of retreat. From this point, as well as from Shih Shan, the field of fire was bad, but the approaches were steep and rugged, and as these two heights commanded the remainder of the position it was important to deny them to the enemy. Between the two peaks short isolated trenches had been hastily thrown up in skilfully selected sites, and the two guns were posted about the centre of the line. In rear of the position the ground fell sharply, but as at first the Japanese were almost without reserves, the cover afforded was comparatively valueless. Weak piquets were posted on the hills south of the river, but on the approach of the Russian cavalry they retired across a bridge of boats into Pen-hsi-hu. From the high ground west of Hsiao-ku-shan-tzu the Cossacks then commanded the interior of the Japanese defences, and two guns which were brought into action by General Liubavin were able to take the hostile artillery in reverse. It was perhaps fortunate for the Japanese that the ammunition with the Frontier Guard battery was

\* Four battalions of infantry, one troop of cavalry, and one battery of artillery were left in position east of Mien-hua-kou.

soon expended, and that in consequence the cavalry took no part in the action for the greater part of the day. At night the main body retired about a mile and a half eastward leaving two squadrons on outpost duty near the bridge. Some patrols which had been sent towards Fan-chia-pu-tzu and Chiao-tou also returned after cutting the telegraph wires, but without having encountered the enemy.

Meanwhile the Japanese infantry on the north bank was very hard pressed by the column under General Petrov. A Russian force, estimated at a battalion, worked its way along the river bank and attacked the extreme right flank of the defence, which was sharply drawn back to overlook the Tai-tzu. Other troops advanced directly against Ming Shan, and by 8 a.m. the attack was general. The Japanese everywhere held their ground with great resolution, and shortly after 2 p.m., just as fresh bodies of the enemy were seen marching from the direction of Kao-tai-tzu,\* seven companies of infantry and two guns from General Umezawa's brigade came to their assistance. The dominating point of the position was Ming Shan, and from it the defenders refused to move until 5 p.m., when seven wounded men, all that remained of the gallant thirty, managed to get away. The loss of this commanding hill necessitated the evacuation of the trenches for some distance to the north-west. Almost at the same time Shih Shan fell, and as the numbers of the Russians were increasing every moment, it looked as though the whole position was certain to be taken by a night attack. However, at 8 p.m. the 14th Regiment and a battery of mountain guns arrived from the 12th Division, and took over the defence of the front line from the exhausted troops which had held it all day. The remainder of the division, with the exception of the troops left near Mien-hua-kou reached Hua-lien-sai at 6 p.m., when General Inouye assumed command of the Umezawa Brigade.

All day long, while the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu† was defying General Rennenkampf, the slender forces on the Ta Ling and Tu-men-tzu Ling were holding their own against ever-increasing masses of the enemy. By nightfall the main body of the 3rd Siberian Corps reached Chao-kou-kou, whence two battalions with six mountain guns had already been sent forward to assist in the attack upon Shih Shan. A second detachment under Colonel Druzhinin had been sent across the Tai-tzu at Wei-ning-ying to hold the fords, and the 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had marched from Kao-tai-tzu to support the cavalry in the centre. On crossing the Ho Ling General Samsonov had come under fire from the Japanese who were holding the heights on the other side of the valley, and even when supported by infantry he found his further progress barred. The attack does not appear to

\* Probably two battalions of infantry with six mountain guns which are known to have been dispatched from the 3rd Siberian Army Corps to assist General Petrov.

† The losses of the 1st Guard *Kobi* Regiment on the 9th were 34 N.C.O.'s and men killed, and 4 officers and 64 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. The losses of the battalion of the 39th *Kobi* Regiment were 7 killed and 27 wounded.

have been pressed with great determination, and the Russians entrenched themselves in a position south of Hsiang-shan-tzu, where the cavalry was relieved during the night by part of the advanced guard of the 1st Siberian Corps.\* That corps, which

was commanded temporarily by General Gerngross, had marched out in the morning in two columns, with the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and a battery thrown out on the right as a flank guard and to gain touch with the 4th Siberian Corps. The left column, 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, under General Kondratovich, on reaching Pien-niu-lu-pu, sent forward two advanced parties. The 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and eight guns moved on Hsiang-chan-tzu under Colonel Muskhelov, and the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and eight guns marched on Ta-wang-kou under Colonel Lisovski. South of Hsia-ta-kai Colonel Lisovski's force was fired upon by a Japanese battery which, in turn, was shelled by the guns with Colonel Muskhelov. The 33rd Regiment was stopped by the hostile artillery, but the 34th, after passing through Hsiang-shan-tzu, continued its march to the southward until it was able to relieve the cavalry. The main body of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division halted for the night at Hsia-shih-chiao-tzu. Meanwhile, the western column† had left Su-ma-pu-tzu with the intention of reaching Nan-shan-pu; but being practically without maps, it became involved in the extremely intricate country and eventually found itself at Hsia-ping-tai-tzu, in rear of the eastern column. The flank guard under Colonel Kotiuzhinski had been more successful. After passing through Feng-chi-pu it assisted a detachment of the 4th Siberian Corps to turn some Japanese, probably from the 2nd Division, out of Hei-niu-tun, thence, covered by the corps cavalry under General Grekov,‡ it continued its march through Hsia-liu-ho-tzu and halted at Pa-chia-tzu. The cavalry bivouacked at Mien-hua-pu. As the Russians advanced two companies of the Japanese 4th Guard Regiment fell back before them upon the main position, leaving observation posts to watch and report their further movements. The 2nd Siberian Corps, which was in reserve, occupied Pien-niu-lu-pu. While General Stakelberg was continuing his advance towards the passes, the leading troops of the 4th Siberian Corps and General Mishchenko's cavalry came up into the centre of the Russian line. During the day General Zarubaiev pushed forward General Mau's detachment to San-kuai-shih Shan, and after the skirmish at Hei-niu-tun sent other advanced troops to Hsia-liu-ho-tzu; both detachments were covered by the mounted troops, which pushed as far south as Pan-la-shan-tzu, after driving in a Japanese outpost on the Temple Hill.

On the Russian right, the action of the Xth and XVIIth Corps

\* The 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

† 1st, 2nd, and 3rd East Siberian Regiments, with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the 1st East Siberian Reserve Artillery Brigade.

‡ Not to be confused with the General Grekov who commanded the cavalry with the Western Force.

was greatly restricted by the orders which had been received from the commander-in-chief. On hearing that General Mau was to protect the advance of the 4th Siberian Corps on his left, General Sluchevski ordered the commander of his right advanced guard to proceed to Fan-chia-tun at noon and to assist General Zarubaiev with artillery fire. His help was not required, since the enemy offered no serious opposition, and before evening General Ryabinkin was able to report that Colonel Solomka had occupied Ku-shu-tzu and the height to the west with the 124th (Voronej) Regiment and had seized Chou-kuan-tun with his vanguard. One battalion of the 123rd (Koslov) Regiment was at Fan-chia-tun, while the remaining three battalions and the artillery of the brigade reached Hsin-chuang followed by the 9th Infantry Division which halted at Hung-pao-shan.

Similarly, to the west of the Mandarin road the position of the XVIIth Corps underwent very little change. The 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Division brushed aside a few weak detachments which were holding Ho-ti-kou, Wu-li-tai-tzu, and Erh-tai-tzu; and by the evening its mounted scouts, supported by parties of infantry, were at Shuang-tai-tzu and Meng-hü-lu-tun. The 1st Brigade of the 3rd Division was at Lang-tzu-tai. The 35th Division, with its 1st Brigade at Liu-tang-kou and its second at Liu-san-chia-tzu, devoted the entire day to strengthening the fortifications between Pan-chiao-pu and Chien-liu-tang-kou. As before, General Bilderling's right flank was guarded by General Grekov and Colonel Stakhovich, whose troops reached Ta-tung-shan-pu and threw an advanced party into Hsiao-tung-shan-pu, whence a mixed detachment from the Japanese 3rd Division and the cavalry brigade retired gradually to Ta-pa-tai-tzu. Russian cavalry outposts penetrated as far south as Kang-chia-tai. Still further west, General Dembovski's detachment remained at Ta-wang-kuan-pu holding both banks of the Hun Ho. The reserve of the army formed two important groups. The 6th Siberian Corps was round Lan-shan-pu in rear of General Bilderling, and behind the newly-formed centre was the 1st Corps at Liu-fan-tun. General Kuropatkin's head-quarters were still at Erh-tao-kou.

Except for the 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade, the Japanese troops maintained an expectant attitude throughout the 9th October. All along the front their outposts fell back slowly, followed cautiously by the enemy, but nowhere did the fighting amount to anything more than a desultory skirmish. At all points the outposts on either side were in close touch, and at 9 a.m. the commander of the Fourth Army warned General Oku that as the enemy had reached the line Erh-tai-tzu—Wu-li-tai-tzu in considerable force, he expected to be attacked on the morrow.

Marshal Oyama's  
orders for the  
10th October.

Half an hour later the Japanese 3rd and 4th Divisions were advised by telephone to be in position by dawn on the 10th. The 6th Division was to assemble by 6 a.m. between Shang-kang-tzu and Ya-lao-i-tan, and the 13th Artillery Regiment was to be at the north end of the latter village. These orders

were issued as a precautionary measure with a view to repelling a possible attack, but Marshal Oyama had already made it perfectly clear that he meant to assume the offensive on the earliest opportunity. The movements of the past few days had brought the two forces into such close contact that the Japanese commander could not afford to wait any longer, and at 11.30 p.m. the expected orders reached the head-quarters of the Second Army.\*

- (1) The Russians in front of the Japanese First Army have greatly increased in strength since last night. They have begun to move towards our right flank and rear in a strength not less than three divisions. The force which halted on the Mukden highway consisted of about one division, which suddenly increased in numbers during this afternoon, but has not come south of Pan-chiao-pu.† To the west of the Mukden highway the enemy has advanced to the line Li-ta-jen-tun‡—Liu-tang-kou,‡ and in this direction his principal force seems to be on the line Liu-tang-kou—Ta-tai.
- (2) I have decided to attack the enemy before all his troops have crossed the Hun Ho, so as to occupy the line Kang-ta-jen-shan—Li-ta-jen-tun.
- (3) The Umezawa Brigade to attack the enemy at Shang-shih-chiao-tzu, while the main body of the First Army, after awaiting the advance of the Fourth Army to the vicinity of Wu-li-tai-tzu, to attack to its front and advance towards Feng-chi-pu.
- (4) The Fourth Army to advance at dawn on the 10th and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Mu-chia-kuchia-tzu and Chien-huang-chia-tien.
- (5) The Second Army to co-operate with the left wing of the Fourth Army and advance towards the line Pan-chiao-pu—Ta-ping-chuang, with its main body on the right flank. A careful watch to be maintained in the direction of Chang-tan.
- (6) The following troops to assemble by 10 a.m. on the cultivated ground south of Lo-ta-tai. 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades, and the 1st Artillery Brigade.‡
- (7) I will leave Liao-yang at 10 a.m. on the 10th for Sun-chang-tzu, south of Lo-ta-tai.

\* The First Army received these orders at 10 p.m.

† Evidently referring only to the main bodies.

‡ The 15th Artillery Regiment only. The 13th Regiment was with the 6th Division, and the 14th Regiment with the Fourth Army.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

## MARSHAL OYAMA'S COUNTER-MOVE. THE BATTLE JOINED.

(Map V/3.)

On the morning of the 10th October, the battle of the Sha Ho entered upon its second phase, and the gradual development of Marshal Oyama's plan affords an interesting study. For some days he had been striving to penetrate his enemy's designs, and he had announced to his army that he would not consent

The second  
phase.

to be thrown upon the defensive even by superior numbers; but the situation was not yet sufficiently clear to enable him to decide where to deliver his blow, and for the present it would appear that his intention was merely to confuse his enemy's plans, leaving his own future movements to depend upon the later developments. This line of conduct was exactly calculated to achieve the end at which it aimed. Japanese methods, to some extent the outcome of national characteristics but still more to scientific study, were to be pitted against the methods of Sevastopol and Plevna. Liao-yang afforded the latest example of the Russian conception of warfare, but it was precisely the kind of battle which Marshal Oyama declined to fight. By the Japanese plan of battle the 12th Division and General Umezawa's *Kobi* Brigade were to be left to oppose the advance of the entire Russian left wing, under Generals Rennenkampf and Stakelberg, which amounted to six infantry divisions with some fifty squadrons of cavalry and two hundred field guns; while, with the exception of the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades and the 15th Artillery Regiment which were held in reserve, the whole of the rest of the three Japanese armies, in all seven infantry divisions and one *Kobi* brigade, were to advance straight against Generals Bilderling and Zarubaiev, whose united forces amounted only to six infantry divisions, with their cavalry and artillery. In contrast to the two brigades retained by Marshal Oyama under his own hand, General Kuropatkin had the 6th Siberian and the 1st Corps in reserve, in addition to the strong detachment under General Dembovski which must also be regarded as a flank guard available for use by the commander-in-chief, whenever he might require it.

While the Japanese were moving forward to meet the enemy half-way the Russian army continued its advance in the same cautious manner as before. The want of maps, the rough country, and the bold attitude of the enemy combined to make General Stakelberg believe that he would not be justified in moving until he had reconnoitred the range of mountains which lay

General  
Stakelberg's  
difficulties.



before him and had collected at least some reliable information about the passes. To the east, therefore, the whole of the 10th was to be devoted to reconnaissance, but early in that morning General Stakelberg received an order which showed that the commander-in-chief was quite ignorant of the difficulties by which his subordinate was confronted. Leaving General Rennenkampf at Pen-hsi-hu to guard the crossing of the Tai-tzu, General Stakelberg was to push forward his left wing along the Tai-tzu and to establish himself on a line from Chiang-kuan-tun to the heights east of Chien-tao (about a mile north-east of the Yen-tai mines). That is to say, the Russian Eastern Force was expected to reach a line fifteen miles or more to the west of and beyond the formidable hills which the Japanese were holding. These instructions drew from General Stakelberg the following reply\* :—" Your order No. 10053 received. The enemy are in a strong position from Pen-hsi-hu to Tang-chia-pu-tzu, facing N.N.E., with strongly fortified posts on the Cheng-kou Ling, Tu-men-tzu Ling, Ta Ling, and the three passes on the Pen-hsi-hu—Wei-ning-ying road. I have to-day (10th October) ordered reconnaissances to be made of frontal and flanking roads, and to-morrow I propose to attack the Japanese forward positions. Apparently you have not received the report in which I described the situation of my troops. I cannot carry out the enveloping movement which you have ordered until after the capture of Pen-hsi-hu ; and that will not be possible, even under favourable circumstances, before the 12th or 13th. The maps in my possession show nothing but a blank space along my line of march, with only one road running from east to west (namely, the road from Pen-hsi-hu to the Yen-tai mines). From the map the country through which we must pass would appear to be as flat as a pancake, but in reality it is extremely hilly and hardly passable for field artillery. The lack of roads on the map prevents my detailing them to the various columns, but I will at once reconnoitre and see what I can find out. As an example of our difficulties, the road by the Chao-hsien Ling from Ta-wang-kou, through Pa-chia-tzu to Shang-liu-ho-tzu is an impassable swamp for artillery and train. I await further instructions. If there are any maps of this part of the country in possession of the General Staff, I request that I may be provided with one." This dispatch was written at midday and as it was held to be of particular importance it was carried to General Kuropatkin's headquarters by Lieutenant-Colonel Andreev of General Stakelberg's staff, who was also instructed to give the commander-in-chief any further verbal information which might be of use. The reply was received at 8.40 p.m. " I have received the dispatch brought by Colonel Andreev. My orders still hold good, but the time of execution I leave to you. You must not lose a day, except under the most urgent necessity, especially as you are opposed only by a weak force." While awaiting General Kuropatkin's reply, General Stakelberg issued

\* von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei*, Vol. II, App. 21.

his orders for the attack upon the passes to be renewed on the 11th. The 1st Siberian Corps was to drive the enemy from the Cheng-kou Ling and Tu-men-tzu Ling, while the 3rd Siberian Corps, to which General Samsonov's cavalry and General Rennenkampf's command were attached, was to capture and fortify the three passes on the Wei-ning-ying road. Thence a strong force was to be sent northward to get into touch with the 1st Siberian Corps. The 2nd Siberian Corps was to move as far forward as Hsiao-shih-chiao-tzu.

The first result of General Stakelberg's decision not to move on the 10th was that Chiao-tou was saved. So hopeless had the position appeared to General Kuroki at one moment that towards evening on this day, an urgent message was sent after the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with orders not to attempt to reach Chiao-tou but to remain at Kan-sha\* on the Tai-tzu, so as to guard the rear of the army. But Prince Kanin had travelled quickly, and at 7 p.m. on the 10th, long before this order reached him, he entered the village to find it had been left undisturbed by General Liubavin's Cossacks who had spent the day watching the fighting round Pen-hsi-hu from the south side of the river. The second result was that the troops which had captured Shih Shan the previous evening were left unsupported. About 11 a.m., three Japanese companies, taking advantage of a thick fog which hid them from view, crept up from Pen-hsi-hu and recaptured this important hill as well as another rather farther north. When the mist cleared away a strong body of Russians could be seen crossing the ridge from Kao-tai-tzu into the Ho-ti-kou valley, and soon afterwards the whole front of the Japanese line from Ming Shan to Shih Shan was hotly engaged. By 2 p.m. a regular battle was raging in the course of which the commander of the *Kobi* battalions was severely wounded. During the afternoon the Russians sent more men into the front line, but every attack was repulsed, and when darkness put a stop to the fight the Japanese right flank was still secure.†

Except for the fighting at the passes the Japanese First Army took little part in the operations on the 10th. The advance of the Fourth Army was delayed, and until it should get into position the 2nd and Guard Divisions were not free to move. In these circumstances the Russian centre was not attacked, but, as his information with regard to the distribution of the Japanese seemed to indicate that a movement in that direction was to be expected, General Kuropatkin ordered three-quarters of the 4th Siberian Corps up into his front line, and placed General Mishchenko as well as General Mau under the orders of General

\* About two miles south of Hsiao-shih (see Strategic Map 5).

† The Russian account of the operations on the eastern front on this day differs considerably from that given in the *Reports from British Officers*. The latter speaks of the Umezawa brigade being attacked by General Stakelberg's main bodies, but from the correspondence quoted above it seems clear that nothing more than strong reconnoitring parties were sent forward.

Zarubaiev. General Mishchenko was then at Pa-chia-tzu, in touch with the right of the 1st Siberian Corps and supported by the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment at Shang-liu-ho-tzu; the 5th (Irkutsk) and 8th (Tomsk) Regiments were on the heights east of Pan-la-shan-tzu; and the 9th (Tobolsk) and 10th (Omsk) Regiments at Yen-san-sai.\* General Mau's advanced guard was on the Temple Hill with his reserve near San-kuai-shih. In support of the centre, one brigade of the 37th Division was moved to Tung-shan-kou, while the remainder of the 1st Corps was five miles in rear at Liu-fan-tun.

From their position near the Yen-tai mines the outposts of the Japanese 2nd Division were able to watch the enemy gradually gathering for battle, but beyond a mild exchange of artillery fire the Russians were permitted to carry out their movements at their leisure. A little to the east, however, the Fourth Army had been set in motion, and the advanced guards came into contact with the enemy at an early hour. The 10th Division met with very little opposition, and its cavalry occupied Kuei-tzu-shan at 8.20 a.m., followed not long afterwards by the 20th Brigade. Except for a few weak piquets which fell back before the Japanese advance no enemy was visible in front, but to the right two or three batteries south of San-chia-tzu were engaging Japanese artillery near Chien-tao, and to the left a Russian force correctly estimated at about one regiment was on the height east of Wu-li-tai-tzu. Soon after midday the main body of the Japanese 10th Division entered Ying-kuan-tun, and three batteries of artillery were then sent forward with the intention of engaging the enemy to the east. It soon became evident that the 5th Division to the west was in greater need of assistance, and two of the batteries were diverted towards Yao-pu, whence they could shell the Russian position above Wu-li-tai-tzu. As the main body of the 10th Division could not push forward until the hill on its left was in Japanese hands, its advance was suspended and the commander decided to bivouac for the night between Ying-kuan-tun and Ma-niu-tun.

The force which was delaying the Japanese 5th Division, and consequently the whole of Marshal Oyama's concerted movement, was the 124th (Voronej) Regiment under Colonel Solomka, whose skilful leadership on this day furnished one of the most interesting incidents of the battle. For the past five days Colonel Solomka had commanded the vanguard of the Xth Corps, supported by the remainder of the advanced guard under General Ryabinkin. At 10.30 a.m., the chief of General Sluchevski's staff received a telegram from General Kuropatkin saying that not more than three battalions were to be sent to the heights west of Ku-shu-tzu, and that the supports were to choose a position behind the Shih-li Ho from Hsiao-fan-chia-tun to Ying-pan, which was to serve as a "main position" for the corps when the advance was continued. This order was passed on to General Ryabinkin, who was also told that

\* Called on the Russian map Yan-chen-pu.

he was not to engage in a stubborn fight, but if attacked in force was to retire behind the right flank of the main body towards Chang-hsin-tien, where he was to act as a reserve to the corps. In accordance with these instructions, Colonel Solomka, with three battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment and one battery, was left to face the attack, supported on his right by covering troops of the XVIIth Corps, but with his left somewhat exposed. One battalion was posted in the village of Ku-shu-tzu, one was in shelter trenches on the eastern and western slopes of the hill, and the third was a little in advance south of Chou-kuan-tun. The battery was under cover, on the ridge which was left unoccupied by the infantry. Behind the Voronej Regiment, General Ryabinkin posted three battalions of the 123rd (Koslov) Regiment on the line indicated by General Kuropatkin, and held back the rest of his command at Hsin-chuang. Further to the north the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division was at Ning-kuan-tun, and the 2nd Brigade at Hung-pao-shan. With each brigade there was a division of artillery.

The advanced guard\* of the Japanese 5th Division left Lan-ni-pu at 8.30 a.m. under General Murayama, with orders to attack Wu-li-tai-tzu from Shan-wo-pu. Half an hour earlier a flank detachment† under General Yamada had left Nan-tai for Yen-tai station, whence it was to move along the railway and co-operate with General Murayama. The remainder

of the division left Lan-ni-pu at 9.40 a.m. and followed the advanced guard. At 9 a.m., the commander of the division was informed that Russian infantry and cavalry could be seen in the direction of Meng-hu-lu-tun; and at 10.20 a.m., when his vanguard reached Yen-tai, General Murayama saw for himself that the hill above Wu-li-tai-tzu was held by the enemy. In these circumstances he decided that a direct advance over the flat ground in front was impossible and turned his leading battalion sharply to the east with the intention of delivering his attack through Tsao-kuan-tzu. The main body of the advanced guard was ordered to deploy near Huang-ti, and the artillery was to come into action on the high ground south-west of Tsao-kuan-tzu. For some reason the Japanese movements lacked their usual vigour and, although the whole of Marshal Oyama's movement for the day was dependent upon the punctual performance of the task allotted to each division, it was not until nearly 12.30 p.m. that the advanced guard moved forward to the attack. Soon after 1 p.m., the artillery opened fire, and about half an hour later the battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment with the flank detachment joined in the bombardment from the neighbourhood of Ku-chia-tzu. All six batteries threw up field entrenchments. Colonel Solomka's battery replied from its concealed position, where it was so well hidden that, not only

\* 21st Regiment, one section cavalry, 1st Battalion 14th Artillery Regiment, and three companies of engineers.

† 11th Regiment, one section cavalry, 1st Battalion 5th Artillery Regiment, and two companies of engineers.

were the Japanese gunners quite unable to locate it, but it succeeded in attracting the whole of the hostile artillery fire upon the unoccupied crest of the hill and away from the infantry on the slopes. The movements of the Japanese infantry were still very slow, apparently because the commander of the flank detachment had not been informed that the advanced guard had been turned off the main road and was still expecting it to appear in the neighbourhood of Shan-wo-pu. Each commander was therefore waiting for the other, but about 2.30 p.m. General Ueda directed both his detachments to move straight against the hill east of Wu-li-tai-tzu. The 1st Battalion of the 11th Regiment at once occupied the northern end of Shan-wo-pu and as the advance still hung fire, the divisional commander reiterated his orders for a vigorous attack upon Wu-li-tai-tzu and the hill to the east. The artillery of both detachments as well as the two batteries of the 10th Division near Yao-pu now concentrated their fire upon Colonel Solomka's little force, but his arrangements for the defence were so cleverly disguised that, although his gunners were forced temporarily to abandon their guns, his infantry hardly suffered at all and the Japanese made no progress. Towards evening, as the light was beginning to fail and the resistance showed no signs of weakening, General Ueda sent up a battalion of the 42nd Regiment into the centre of his attacking line. This fresh battalion reached Shan-wo-pu without loss soon after 5 p.m., and about the same hour the commander of the flank detachment, who was at Ku-chia-tzu, heard for the first time that the advanced guard had changed the direction of its attack. The whole Japanese line then advanced simultaneously and, as it was evident that the enemy was in greatly superior strength, Colonel Solomka withdrew his battery and his advanced battalion to Ku-shu-tzu. The 2nd Battalion of the Japanese 21st Regiment then entered Chou-kuan-tun, and about 7.30 p.m. a patrol which pushed forward under cover of darkness found that San-chia-tzu had been evacuated. An advanced post of the Russian XVIIth Corps held out in Wu-li-tai-tzu until after midnight when the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Regiment succeeded in entering the village.\* Although deprived of any support on its right the Voronej Regiment maintained a bold front on the northern end of the hill. There it repulsed three successive assaults during the night, two being beaten off by rifle fire and the last by a bayonet charge, but at 5.30 a.m. on the morning of the 11th an enveloping attack by three Japanese battalions from the 11th and 42nd Regiments at last induced it to retire beyond the Shih-li Ho, where it rejoined the remainder of General Ryabinkin's advanced guard.

The importance of this little engagement above Wu-li-tai-tzu was quite out of proportion to the number of lives lost, for throughout the day Colonel Solomka had no more than one officer

\* von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei*, Vol. II, p. 71, states that the outpost of the XVIIth Corps was withdrawn from Wu-li-tai-tzu at 11 p.m. The Japanese do not appear to have discovered the fact until some time later.

killed and one officer and ten men wounded.\* Yet without performing any great deed of heroism, almost without loss to themselves, three battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment and a battery of artillery had held at bay an entire Japanese division for twenty-four hours, and had affected the front of battle for many miles beyond the range of their own rifles. Such are the effects which, under favourable conditions, may be achieved by a few resolute and well-led men armed with modern weapons.

















































To the west of the railway the advance of the Japanese Second Army also met with some opposition. The ultimate objective allotted to General Oku by Marshal Oyama's orders was the line from Pan-chiao-pu to Ta-ping-chuang, and on this, the first day of the advance, it was intended that the 3rd Division should reach Wu-li-chieh, while the 6th and 4th Divisions were to make for Lang-tzu-tai and Yang-chia-wan respectively. All three divisions advanced simultaneously in line, moving on a broad front with ample room to deploy. The 3rd and 6th Divisions were on the east of the Sha Ho, and on the west was the 4th, with its left protected by General Akiyama's cavalry, which was especially warned to reconnoitre carefully in the direction of Chang-tan. Each division was covered by its own advanced guard and it also threw out a flanking detachment so as to maintain communication along the whole front. The captured field gun battery was still attached to the 3rd Division and the captured howitzers to the 4th Division. As it was important that the Second Army should be in a position to assist the armies on its right should the necessity arise, General Oku kept under his own hand a strong reserve of fifteen battalions of infantry and six batteries of field artillery, all of which marched in parallel columns just west of the railway. (See diagram p. 36.)

For some hours the march was unchecked, but it soon became known that the enemy's outposts were in Meng-hu-lu-tun, Hsiao-tung-shan-pu, Erh-tai-tzu, and Hsi-kuang-shan-tun. Before long the advanced troops were engaged along the entire front with the 2nd Brigade of the Russian 3rd Division and the detachments under Colonel Stakhovich and General Grekov. The opposition was nowhere very serious, and by midday the advanced guard of the 3rd Division was at Hsin-li-tun, in touch with the left of the Fourth Army, with the flank detachment in Meng-hu-lu-tun, whence a Russian piquet had retired towards Erh-tai-tzu. The flank detachment of the 6th Division was at San-chia-tzu, and the advanced guard at Kang-chia-tai was opposed by the enemy holding Ching-tsui-tzu and Hsiao-tung-shan-pu. Of the 4th Division the advanced guard and the 1st Battalion of the 48th Regiment (6th Division) were at Ta-huang-tun, while the greater part of the 4th Cavalry Regiment, supported by the flanking detachment which was still in its old position at Hsiao-kuan-yin-ko, had reached Hu-chia-tun.


















































































As the 5th Division on his right was still held in check, and

\* von Tettau, Vol. II, p. 70    Apparently inclusive of the night attacks.  
(4725)    c 2



4th Division.			6th Division.		3rd Division.	
Flank Det.	A.G.	A.G.	Flank Det.	Flank Det.	A.G.	
 2 Squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment.  3rd Battalion 8th Regiment.	 1 Section 4th Cavalry Regiment.  1st and 2nd Battalions 8th Regiment.  3 Batteries 4th Artillery Regiment.  1 Company Engineers.	 1 Squadron 6th Cavalry Regt.  2nd and 3rd Battalions 45th Regiment.  3 Batteries 6th Artillery Regiment.  1 Company Engineers.	 1 Squadron 6th Cavalry Regiment.  2nd Battalion 13th Regiment.	 1 Section 3rd Cavalry Regiment.  2 Companies Battalion 34th Regiment.	 2 Squadrons 3rd Cavalry Regiment.  1st and 2nd Battalions 18th Regiment.  1 Battery 3rd Artillery Regiment.  1 Company Engineers.	
Main Body. 1,000 yards in rear of A.G.  3 Sections 4th Cavalry Regiment Divisional Head-quarters.  37th Regiment.  3 Batteries 4th Regiment.  Captured Howitzers (?)  Engineers.		Main Body. 1,000 yards in rear of A.G.  1 Squadron 6th Cavalry Regiment.  1st Battalion 45th Regiment.  Engineers.  3 Batteries 6th Artillery Regiment.  2 Battalions 13th Regiment.		Main Body.  3 Sections 3rd Cavalry Regiment. Divisional Head-quarters.  3rd Battalion 18th Regiment.  Engineers.  5 Batteries 3rd Artillery Regiment.  Captured battery.  34th Regiment, less 2 companies.		
Army Reserve. Left Pai-chia-huang-ti and Hung-chia-huang-ti.						
19th Brigade.   		24th Brigade.   		5th Brigade.   		
13th Artillery Regt.     						

The Akiyama Brigade.



The third Battalion of the 48th Regiment (6th Division), and two battalions of the 9th Regiment (4th Division) are not accounted for in this diagram. The former battalion was part of the advanced post of the 6th Division and came under the 4th Division when the advance began. The latter battalions were with General Akiyama's cavalry

The Akiyama Brigade.



The third Battalion of the 48th Regiment (6th Division), and two battalions of the 9th Regiment (4th Division) are not accounted for in this diagram. The former battalion was part of the advanced post of the 6th Division and came under the 4th Division when the advance began. The latter battalions were with General Akiyama's cavalry brigade.

the country to the north was absolutely devoid of cover, the commander of the Japanese 3rd Division reinforced his advanced guard with a battalion and battery, and ordered it to move against Yen-tao-niu-lu through Meng-hu-lu-tun, where it was to be joined by the flank detachment. At the same time the flank detachment of the 6th Division attacked Ching-tsui-tzu, and its advanced guard moved against Hsiao-tung-shan-pu and Ta-tung-shan-pu. Meng-hu-lu-tun was reached without difficulty, but it was not until after 7 p.m. that the Japanese at last succeeded in crossing the mile of open country which separates that village from Shuang-tai-tzu. To the west, Ching-tsui-tzu and Hsiao-tung-shan-pu were both occupied with but few casualties, and before nightfall Erh-tai-tzu and Hsiao-tung-shan-pu were in the hands of the 6th Division. On the right bank of the Sha Ho the Japanese 4th Division encountered practically no resistance, the enemy in front of it retiring towards Ta-ping-chuang. But although the Japanese loss was slight the advance was slow, and long before firing ceased it had become evident that the Second Army would have to halt considerably short of the line which General Oku had hoped to reach. So soon, therefore, as Shuang-tai-tzu was entered the advance was suspended, and the troops of the Second Army halted for the night in the positions shown in Map No. V/3.

At no point had any real opposition been encountered, for in accordance with their instructions the outposts of the Russian XVIIth Corps had declined to become involved in a serious action. The total loss in the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, is said not to have been more than fifty men, as throughout the day it had fallen back steadily from village to village until it joined the 1st Brigade on the Shih-li Ho, where the united 3rd Division was to hold the right of the "advanced position" upon which General Kuropatkin proposed to receive the Japanese attack. Five battalions and three batteries held the front from Shih-li-ho to Yen-tao-niu-lu; five more battalions and three batteries carried on the line as far as Hsiao-tung-tai; one battalion was in a strong work at Erh-shih-chia-tzu; three battalions and a half were in reserve at Wu-li-chieh. The right flank was watched by Colonel Stakhovich's detachment at Yang-chia-wan, and still further west at Li-ta-jen-tun was General Grekov in touch with General Dembovski, who did not move from Ta-wang-kuan-pu.

On the extreme left of the Japanese armies the position of the cavalry underwent very little alteration. The main body and a battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment moved from Hei-kou-tai to Shen-tan-pu, leaving a company of infantry and the 14th Cavalry Regiment at the former village to protect the ford, and the 11th Cavalry Regiment with another company of infantry at San-tai-tzu\* and Chi-tai-tzu.\* At 7.30 p.m. on the 10th orders were

\* Six and a half miles and eight miles respectively south-west of Hei-kou-tai, and about three miles north-west and south-west of Niu-chu; see *Strategical Map 5*.

issued for an advance next day in co-operation with the Second Army, the 11th Cavalry Regiment to move up the right bank of the Hun Ho should circumstances permit.

Although the centre of his line had received a slight check, and the Second and Fourth Armies had failed to carry out their task in its entirety, Marshal Oyama was at last in a position to formulate a more definite plan of battle. He knew that the First Army on his right was already hard pressed and, as there were indications that the strength of the enemy in the east was being increased, he pressed upon General Oku the urgent necessity for rapid and decisive action. The commander-in-chief's message reached the head-quarters of the Second Army shortly after midnight, and was followed within a very few minutes by the following orders for the 11th:—

- (1) I desire to drive the enemy who is at present east of the Mukden highway to the north-east.
- (2) The First Army, in accordance with orders issued yesterday, will attack towards Feng-chi-pu.
- (3) The Fourth Army will drive back the enemy at Wu-li-tai-tzu before the army makes its main advance. It will then wheel to its right and advance against Liu-chiang-tun.
- (4) The Second Army, after having driven back the enemy to its front, will advance to the line Sha-ho-pu—Kuan-lin-pu, so as to assist the wheeling movement of the Fourth Army. Care should be taken to guard against an attack from the direction of the Hun Ho, and to reconnoitre the right bank of that river.
- (5) The General Reserve,\* under General Uchiyama, will assemble near Ta-lien-kou at 7 a.m. ready to advance to the hill east of Tu-men-tzu.
- (6) Head-quarters will move to Yen-tai.

In these orders it is possible to trace the next step in the development of the battle, for they contain the first definite statement of Marshal Oyama's intention, namely, to drive away to the north-east that portion of the Russian army which was to the east of the Mukden highway, while still resisting with a comparatively weak force the attack against his own right. To be successful in this endeavour he must break the front of the Russian Xth Corps by a directly frontal attack. The task was very formidable, but if the effort should succeed the reward would be great.

Thus, when the coming of night put a stop to operations on the 10th October, 1904, the preparations for the second great land battle of the war were nearly complete. The stage was cleared and the drama was about to begin. The only Russian force still south of the Shih-li Ho was Colonel Solomka's at the Wu-li-tai-tzu hill, and before daylight on the 11th he too fell back. Along a

\* 3rd and 11th *Kōbi* Brigades, 15th Artillery Regiment and the Foot Artillery.

front of more than forty miles from Chang-tan on the west, through Shih-li-ho, to Pen-hsi-hu on the east, four hundred thousand men were ready to do battle for supremacy in the Far East. What wider issues hung upon the result it is early yet to say; but that they were far greater than the ostensible causes of the war has already been amply proved.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE 11TH OCTOBER—THE RUSSIAN EASTERN FORCE CHECKED AT THE PASSES—THE 4TH SIBERIAN CORPS SOUTH OF THE SHIH-LI HO—JAPANESE SUCCESS IN THE WEST.

(Map V/4.)

THE advance of the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies during the 10th October does not appear to have caused General Kuropatkin any anxiety. His plans underwent no alteration and his intention for the 11th was to maintain with the Xth and XVIIth Corps the advanced position on the Shih-li Ho, while General Stakelberg's Eastern Force was to continue its turning operation against the Japanese right, assisted by a forward movement of General Mishchenko's cavalry and the 4th Siberian Corps in the centre. For the past three days the position of the Umezawa Brigade and the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu had been one of extreme peril, but reinforcements had arrived and by the morning of the 11th the formidable line of heights from Ming Shan to the Tu-men-tzu Ling were comparatively strongly held. Nevertheless General Stakelberg's force was far larger than anything which General Kuroki could send to oppose it, and for twenty-four hours longer General Inouye was called upon to repel a series of desperate attacks which compelled him to place every available man in his fighting line.

On the evening of the 10th October General Stakelberg had issued a manifesto reminding his troops that the task before them

<p>The attack on the passes by the Russian Eastern Force.</p>	<p>was one of supreme difficulty, and exhorting them to remember their nationality and that victory must be won at all costs. The information with regard to his arrangements for attack is very scanty. During the morning of the 11th General</p>
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Samsonov crossed to the south bank of the river where he supported General Liubavin, while his batteries came into action in support of the main operations on the right bank. The remainder of the Eastern Force was divided into two columns. On the left, the 3rd Siberian Corps and General Rennenkampf's force, both of which were under the command of General Ivanov, were to drive the enemy from, and to occupy, the Ming Shan—Shih Shan position. On the right, the 1st Siberian Corps was to establish itself on the ridge east and west of the Tu-men-tzu Ling. To maintain connexion between the two wings, the 3rd Siberian Corps was to send a detachment along the road from the Ho Ling to Hua-lien-sai. The 2nd Siberian Corps was to remain in reserve at Hsiao-shih-chiao-tzu. To oppose this attack by the Russian Eastern Force, General Inouye had at his disposal fifteen battalions of infantry (less one company) and thirty guns,

distributed over a front of nearly eight miles. At Pen-hsi-hu and the neighbourhood were six and three-quarter battalions with eight guns; between Shih Shan and the Ta Ling, one and three-quarter battalions with six guns; at the Ta Ling, two battalions and ten guns; at the Tu-men-tzu Ling two and a half battalions and six guns. The reserve, which was at Li-shu-ti-hsia, consisted of one and three-quarter battalions only.

From these dispositions it would appear that a determined movement along the south side of the river must have been successful; for, with the exception of Prince Kanin's cavalry brigade which was by this time in Chiao-tou, the Japanese would have had no troops available to oppose it. However, the fighting was begun by the Japanese, who soon after dark on the 10th had moved two guns to a position south-west of Pen-hsi-hu whence they were able to enfilade the Cossacks on the other bank. To escape this fire, General Liubavin withdrew his troops about a mile to the westward until met by a supporting force of nine squadrons and four guns under General Samsonov, but even with this access of strength the Russian cavalry did no more than watch the progress of the battle.

The details of the main encounter are difficult to follow, but General Ivanov's intention seems to have been to deliver simultaneous and converging attacks against the southern section of the Japanese defences. General Rennenkampf was to move directly upon Pen-hsi-hu by the road from Ho-ti-kou and to gain possession of the passes. At the same time the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, under General Danilov, was to advance on a wide front from the direction of Kao-tai-tzu against Shih Shan which was regarded as the key of the defence. On the left was the 6th (Yeniseisk) Regiment\* and five companies of the 7th (Krasnoyarsk) Regiment; in the centre were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment which had already distinguished itself on many a hard-fought field; on the right were the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment. On the right of the 3rd Siberian Corps, four machine guns joined in the fight from the direction of the Ho Ling. The 3rd East Siberian Rifle division under General Kashtalinski was in reserve near Kao-tai-tzu.†

So superior in strength were the Russian columns that notwithstanding the procrastination of the past few days their chances of success were still good. But in that rugged country, where every movement was confined to narrow mountain paths, numbers alone were of small avail. About noon the 214th (Mokshan) Regiment, on General Rennenkampf's left, attacked the Ming-shan Ling from the south; but although the

\* Attached to the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division from the 1st Siberian Infantry Division.

† The force detailed for the attack consisted of 58 battalions, 24 machine guns, 122 field guns, and 28 squadrons of cavalry.

Japanese were also exposed to a heavy plunging fire from Ming Shan itself, every effort was repulsed. Elsewhere the Russians were no more successful. The Yeniseisk Regiment made no impression on the defence; the centre column was brought to a standstill at the foot of the position; and the commander of the right column and most of his officers were killed or wounded when still considerably short of Shih Shan. At 1.30 p.m., General Danilov was hit in the foot, but being able to ride he retained control of the operations. At 2.30 p.m., General Rennenkampf renewed his attacks in the south, and a heavy artillery fire was concentrated against Shih Shan. Soon afterwards the chief of General Rennenkampf's staff was badly wounded, and by 5 p.m. twelve officers and five hundred and fifty men had already reached the field hospitals.\* How many more were lying out on the hill-sides it is impossible to say. When the sun set the defence was unshaken, and the Russian mountain guns, whose nearest supplies were thirty miles away on the Mukden—Fushun railway, were very short of ammunition. Nevertheless General Ivanov, acting under instructions from General Stakelberg, issued orders for a night attack. It is not clear by whom this assault was to have been delivered. Of the 3rd Division, which was in reserve in the morning, five battalions had reinforced General Rennenkampf during the day, and a battalion of the 10th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had joined the two battalions of the 21st East Siberian Rifle Regiment in the centre of General Danilov's line. At the most therefore only six battalions can have been left, and it is at least probable that some of these had been engaged and that the only troops available were those which had already been several times repulsed and were sadly in need of rest. The state of affairs at the front was represented to General Ivanov by Captain Golyeevski, an officer on General Danilov's staff, and the orders for the attack were eventually countermanded.

At the Tu-men-tzu Ling the 1st Siberian Corps was opposed no less stubbornly than were the divisions on its left, and although greatly superior in numbers to the Japanese troops which held the pass, was beaten off with heavy loss. The details of the fighting are even more meagre than those of the battle round Pen-hsi-hu. The Russians advanced to the attack in three columns, on a front of about five miles. In the left column, which was commanded by General Kondratovich and was directed against the Ta Ling, were the 34th, 35th, and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, with three field batteries, four mountain guns, and eight machine guns. The centre column, which was to take the Tu-men-tzu Ling, was under the command of Colonel Lisovski, of the 33rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and under him were his own regiment, some infantry of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, two batteries of field artillery, and six mortars. The right column, consisting of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, a battery, and four squadrons of Primorsk Dragoons,

The 1st Siberian Corps beaten off at the Ta Ling and Tu-men-tzu Ling.

\* Camperio, *Al Campo Russo in Mancuria*, p. 278.



was to attack the Cheng-kou Ling.\* The supreme command of the operations was in the hands of General Gerngross.

The left column was easily checked. The 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, after getting into touch with the right of the 3rd Siberian Corps, was to turn the flank of the Ta Ling and to penetrate as far as Hua-lien-sai while the 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was to make a frontal attack upon the pass. For a time all appears to have gone well. Communication was established with General Ivanov's corps to the south, and some Japanese outposts were driven from an advanced position. Then, however, the Russians found themselves brought up sharply at the foot of a rocky ridge with almost precipitous slopes. The crest above them was lined by Japanese marksmen, and as no weak spot in the defence could be detected General Kondratovich decided to stay where he was until night.

At the Tu-men-tzu Ling the fighting was more severe, but the failure of the attack was no less complete. Colonel Lisovski, whose orders seem to have been vague, advanced in two columns with a flank guard on his right. It was generally understood that a pass over the mountains to the south was to be carried, but neither of the columns from which most was expected was clear as to its own objective, and no arrangements appear to have been made for inter-communication and mutual support. The ground was very intricate, and to defend the pass the Japanese found it necessary to occupy an advanced post about one thousand yards to the north-east of their principal line. The left of the position was prolonged westward of the pass into the wild block of mountains south-east of the Chao-hsien Ling. There it was entirely in the air, and was not really secure until strengthened by the arrival of the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Division on the evening of the 12th October. The total length of the position was a little under two miles. The most vulnerable point in the Japanese line was the extreme left flank; but the want of maps and their general inexperience of mountain warfare made the Russians loth to involve themselves in that inaccessible region, with the result that both Colonel Lisovski's columns marched straight against the Japanese advanced post which was held only by three sections of infantry and six mountain guns. At 9 a.m., sixteen guns opened fire from the north, at a range of four thousand five hundred yards. The infantry advance began about an hour later, and by 1 p.m. the Russians were established about half a mile north of the Japanese trenches. All through the afternoon the garrison of the Japanese outpost was steadily strengthened until it amounted to two companies and a section, an incredibly small force considering the importance of the task; but the attack was not pressed with real vigour, and although supported by heavy artillery fire the Russians never got within six hundred yards of their goal. Night found the situation unchanged, and the Japanese took advantage of the cover afforded by the darkness to strengthen

\* This column joined General Mishchenko (see p. 45) with whom it acted until nearly the end of the battle.

their entrenchments in preparation for a renewal of the combat. Here, as in front of Pen-hsi-hu, it was at one time General Stakelberg's intention to carry the heights by a night attack; but at 5 p.m. he heard that the Japanese were threatening to out-flank the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment which was on the Chao-hsien Ling on his right.\* As the loss of that pass would endanger his retreat he dispatched the 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to Nan-shan-pu. About the same time information was received that General Zarubaiev had been compelled to withdraw his advanced guards across the Shih-li Ho. Thereupon General Stakelberg countermanded his previous orders, and at midnight issued fresh instructions†:—

General  
Stakelberg's  
orders.

- (1) To strengthen the corps reserves by withdrawing during the night, as many men as possible from the firing line.
- (2) To entrench the positions then held.
- (3) To concentrate the reserve (fourteen battalions), strengthened by part of the artillery of the 3rd Siberian Corps, at Hsia-ping-tai-tzu; there to prepare a defensive position to meet the Japanese counterstroke between the 4th Siberian Corps, and the Eastern Force. At the same time to post two regiments and two batteries on Wai-tou Shan and Hsiao-liu-huo Shan.
- (4) If the 4th Siberian Corps should continue to retreat, as small a force as possible was to be left on Wai-tou Shan and Hsiao-liu-huo Shan, while the rest of the Eastern Force was to be hurled against the flank and rear of the Japanese as they pressed on in pursuit.

Westward of the Tu-men-tzu Ling the rôles of the combatants were reversed. There the Russian centre and right stood upon the defensive, waiting for the powerful Eastern Force to crush all opposition and advance against the Japanese communications. This passive attitude gave Marshal Oyama exactly the opportunity he desired, and among the hills to the east and north of the Yen-tai mines, as well as in the open plain to the west, the Japanese, in their turn, became the aggressors, leaving only the

The Japanese  
attack in the  
centre and west.

\* *Conférences sur la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, Part V, p. 197, et seq. French edition. It is not clear what Japanese troops these were, but probably part of the detachment which had been left near Mien-hua-kou by the 12th Division. See p. 24.

† During the night General Stakelberg received from the chief of General Kuropatkin's staff a message which informed him of the situation in other parts of this immense battlefield, so far as it was known to head-quarters at the time of dispatch. The memorandum ran as follows:—"Since dawn the Japanese have assumed the offensive along the whole front, and have attacked our advanced guard positions on the line Wu-li-chieh—Shih-li-ho—Fan-chia-tun—the heights north of Ta-pu and Ku-chia-tzu. Simultaneously they have attacked the position held by the 4th Corps on heights to the left of Shang-liu-ho-tzu and Mien-hua-pu. These troops have accepted battle so as to enable you to finish your enveloping movement. The enemy's most desperate attacks have been delivered against the position of the 4th Siberian Corps and the heights north of Ta-pu and Ku-chia-tzu. So far we hold our own everywhere."

12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade to guard the rugged mountain passes on the right flank. In accordance with this plan the remainder of the First Army was to advance towards Feng-chi-pu, while the Fourth Army, after passing through Wu-li-tai-tzu, was to wheel north-eastward toward Liu-chiang-tun. Feng-chi-pu is a village on the Sha Ho some twelve miles to the north of the line which the First Army had held since the battle of Liao-yang; and before it could be reached the valley of the Shih-li Ho\* had to be crossed. Taking advantage of the freedom of action left to him by the commander-in-chief, General Kuroki allotted the high ground north of Shang-liu-ho-tzu to the Guard Division as the objective of the first day's operations; while the 2nd Division was to gain possession of the Temple Hill and Nan Shan.

These orders were received about midnight by General Asada, who had succeeded General Hasegawa in command of the Guard Division, and he at once decided to seize, before daylight, the heights 787 and 774, which lay immediately in front of him and would afford a commanding position whence

The Guard  
Division.

to cover his infantry as it crossed the valley beyond. The higher of the two hills and the ridge to the east were occupied by the 1st Guard Brigade without opposition. The 2nd Guard Brigade on the left was less fortunate, as hill 774 was found to be held in force. The brigadier's instructions were, "Bayonets to be fixed and rifles loaded, the bayonet only to be used unless the enemy can be distinctly recognized; then fire may be opened." There had been no time to prepare distinctive badges, so, in a characteristically worded order, General Watanabe added, "Japanese are short, foreigners are tall. There are no foreign attachés with the brigade to-night, so treat every tall man you come across as an enemy." As the 4th Guard Regiment, which was leading, approached the hill, fire was opened upon its skirmishers from the Russian sentry line, which had been pushed fifty yards down the forward slopes. The skirmishers dropped back upon the supporting companies, and the Russian sentries retired to the crest. There, when day began to dawn, the defenders were easily visible against the skyline, while the assailants in the valley below were still in complete darkness. A musketry action ensued, while the 3rd Guard Regiment worked its way round the enemy's right. This threat was sufficient to cause the Russians to retire to Watanabe Yama, and the 3rd Regiment was able to occupy the hill-top without firing a shot. The 4th Regiment prolonged the line to the right, and came into touch with the left of the 1st Brigade near height 787.

By these movements both Guard brigades had struck at the outposts of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment† and General

\* At the time of the battle the Shih-li Ho offered no obstacle to the movement of infantry. Occasional shallow pools of water marked the course of the stream, elsewhere the river bed was dry. In some places the banks were ten feet high and steep; but at others even artillery could cross without difficulty.

† The flank detachment of the 1st Siberian Corps. See p. 43. During

Mishchenko's cavalry, which were in joint occupation of Pa-chia-tzu and the hills to the south. The Japanese were in greatly superior strength, but a brigade\* had been detailed from the 4th Siberian Corps to assist General Stakelberg in his attack upon the passes to the east. Hearing of the straits in which the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was placed, the commander of this brigade, General Shileiko, halted just west of Pa-chia-tzu and detached a considerable portion of his force to assist the defenders of Watanabe Yama and to support their left flank. During the morning some of these men tried to work their way round the Japanese right towards Mien-hua-kou, but their intention was discovered, and to meet it General Izaki, who commanded the 1st Guard Brigade, threw out a detachment to the south of that village and sent the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment to hold the ridge in front of height 787.

Meanwhile the Russian force on Watanabe Yama was gradually increased to about two battalions, and some batteries of artillery came into action against height 774 and the right brigade, the 3rd, of the Japanese 2nd Division. The Japanese artillery had been left in the valley near Hua-niu-pu-tzu, but soon after 9 a.m. a battery† was brought up west of Shang-chen-chia-kou and opened fire. More reinforcements arrived to strengthen the Russian firing line, and about 9.30 a.m. a strong body of Cossacks galloped up the valley west of Watanabe Yama against the left of the 3rd Guard Regiment. Some time earlier a similar attempt had been made by a weak body of three squadrons, but neither it nor the more serious effort met with any success. Almost immediately five Russian battalions appeared between Pa-chia-tzu and Mien-hua-pu, and sent two companies to strengthen the little force at Mien-hua-kou, which, with this addition, amounted to about a battalion. A combined frontal and flank attack upon the Japanese right got no nearer than seven hundred yards from the position. There the Russian firing line lay down and a sharp musketry fight went on until 1 p.m., when a battery of eight guns came into action against height 787 from a position near Mien-hua-pu. At the same time more Russian infantry came to the assistance of their comrades, and the enveloping movement was renewed; but although General Izaki thought it advisable, as a precautionary measure, to bring up the whole of his brigade reserve, his position was at no time in serious danger. At 4.30 p.m., a battalion of the 46th Regiment, which had been left behind by the 12th Division, came to his assistance, and the Russians were then driven out of Mien-hua-kou.

Meanwhile a much heavier attack was developing against the 2nd Guard Brigade on height 774. Supported by rifle fire from Watanabe Yama and by artillery near Mien-hua-pu and in the

the next few days this regiment acted entirely with General Mishchenko's cavalry.

\* 1st Brigade, 3rd Siberian Infantry Division.

† The 4th Battery Guard Artillery Regiment. The 1st and 5th Batteries came up about two hours later.

valley north-east of San-cheng-tzu Shan, a column of Russian infantry advanced from Shang-liu-ho-tzu against the left of the Guard Division. By 1 p.m., the situation in this quarter was really dangerous for the Japanese, and the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Russian counter-attack against the 2nd Guard Brigade.

Regiment was sent forward from the divisional reserve to the southern slope of hill 774; while the Hijikata Battery and the 6th Guard Battery took position on the eastern slopes of hill 774 whence they shelled the infantry on Watanabe Yama and the hostile guns in the valley near Mien-hua-pu. General Asada's difficulties were increased by the fact that about midday he was ordered to assist the 3rd Brigade on his left, which was held in check from San-cheng-tzu Shan. The left of his own division was considerably in advance of the right of the 2nd Division, and an attack due westward would have the effect not only of assisting General Matsunaga's operations, but also of protecting his own exposed flank. General Watanabe was therefore ordered to detach as many men as possible, supported by three batteries, to co-operate with the 3rd Brigade. The only troops which could be spared were the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment, which had just joined the brigade, and about one battalion of the 4th Regiment. The attack was on the point of being launched when it was postponed on account of a message received from General Matsunaga saying that the enemy in his front was so strong that he not only could not maintain his present position, but that he was compelled to fall back. In these circumstances General Watanabe could not afford to embark upon any offensive movements, for if deprived of support on his left he would not be able to do more than hold the hill he had taken. It eventually transpired, however, that the message had been wrongly delivered by the orderly to whom it had been entrusted, and that General Matsunaga's intention had been to let General Watanabe know that without some assistance from the Guard Division he would be unable to advance. So soon as the difficulty was cleared up, the two Guard battalions were ordered to advance under Colonel Iida, but more than two precious hours of daylight had been lost. The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment moved at once straight towards Shang-yueh-ho-kou, but the battalion of the 4th Regiment did not join it until after dark, when it was already too late to hope for any real success. General Matsunaga moved forward simultaneously from the south, but the right wing of the 4th Siberian Corps\* stood firm. The frontal attack failed, while the flank battalion got no further than the village of Shang-yueh-ho-kou, and when night fell General Asada withdrew his men to the eastern side of the valley.

Throughout the 11th, therefore, the Guard Division had been unable to move beyond the two hills from which the Russian outposts had been driven before dawn, or to set foot in the valley which General Asada had hoped to cross. But the experience of the past few months had shown, on more than one occasion, that tasks which by daylight were impossible were not

\* 5th (Irkutsk), 8th (Tomsk), and 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiments

necessarily insuperable, and Colonel Iida's column had not long returned when General Kuroki issued orders for a night attack, the account of which must, however be left for another chapter.

While one part of the 4th Siberian Corps was clinging to Watanabe Yama, the other part was holding San-cheng-tzu Shan with equal determination. General Kuroki's

The Japanese 2nd Division. intention was that while the Guard Division crossed the Shih-li Ho near Shang-liu-ho-tzu, the 2nd Division should gain possession of Temple

Hill and Nan Shan. To carry out his portion of the programme, General Nishijima, who had succeeded General Nishi in the command of the 2nd Division, ordered the 3rd Brigade to take San-cheng-tzu Shan and the 15th Brigade to capture Temple Hill. In this way the former brigade was opposed by General Zaru-baiev's right, while the latter brigade advanced directly against General Mau. Two perfectly distinct actions were therefore fought by this division, whose brigades were separated by an open valley down which flows a tributary of the Shih-li Ho. To support the infantry attack, the artillery of the 2nd Division was disposed as follows. The 1st and 2nd Batteries were on Ta Shan where they had been the previous day, and the 3rd Battery was securely entrenched in a stubble field just west of Chien-tao. The 2nd Battalion was further forward, south-east of Pan-la-shan-tzu. Two of its batteries were hidden behind Ishi Yama, with a strictly limited field of fire towards San-cheng-tzu Shan; the remaining battery was on the eastern side of the stream which winds round the foot of the former hill.\*

During the night the outposts of the 5th and 8th Siberian Regiments had evacuated Pan-la-shan-tzu, and before daybreak that

Attack of the Japanese 3rd Brigade on San-cheng-tzu Shan. village and Shuang-lung-ssu were in the hands of the Japanese 15th Brigade. On the right of the division, the 3rd Brigade assembled north of Shang-chen-chia-kou, and at 5 a.m. began to advance.

The Russian outposts fell back, but the Japanese soon came under the fire of about two battalions which had established themselves on the south-west slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan. The artillery did not open fire until 7 a.m., and even then a thick mist enveloped the valley of the Shih-li Ho. Soon after 9 a.m. it began to clear, and from near the Yen-tai mines a strong Russian force could be seen crossing the valley into the broken ground west of San-cheng-tzu Shan.† Very soon afterwards the Russian batteries near that hill concentrated an overwhelming fire upon the two Japanese batteries south of Ishi Yama, sweeping

\* There is no exact information as to the disposition of the Russian artillery, but according to the report of the British attaché who was with the Japanese 2nd Division, one mountain and two field batteries were in action on San-cheng-tzu Shan, and a fourth battery was on Temple Hill. The last battery frequently changed its position during the morning and retired altogether in the afternoon.

† *Reports from British Officers*, Vol. I, p. 589. Apparently two battalions of the 8th (Tomsk) Regiment which were moved up to support the outpost battalions.

each gun in turn until not a man dared leave the cover which had been prepared. For a time it was thought that a counter-attack was imminent, but about 10.20 a.m. large bodies of Russians could be seen moving up the valley north-west of Shao-ta-kou, and others disappeared northward from Temple Hill. Any anxiety which General Matsunaga may have felt was thus dispelled, and when two Russian companies pushed up the valley on his right front, it began to look as though General Zarubaiev was contemplating an attack against the left of the Guard Division. General Matsunaga then sent three companies from his brigade reserve to reinforce his left and to dislodge the enemy from the south-western slopes of San-cheng-tzu Shan. Between Ta Shan and the Russian position a succession of ridges afforded cover to the advancing infantrymen, who, while moving with marvellous rapidity, were quick to avail themselves of every advantage which the ground afforded. Many desperate encounters took place. In some places the combatants discharged their rifles into each other's faces at a distance of only a few feet; at other places the Russians fought gallantly with the bayonet, but by 1.40 p.m. the Japanese had effected a lodgment in the Russian outpost line, and the defenders were retreating slowly across the valley which separated them from their main body. One attempt was made to follow up this first success and to capture San-cheng-tzu Shan, but the slopes were so steep and the opposing force so strong\* that General Matsunaga decided to suspend operations until assistance could be obtained from the Guard Division. At every point in the advance the men of the Japanese 3rd Brigade threw up shelter trenches, which in the brown soil were extremely difficult to detect, and offered a poor target to the Russian gunners. So careful were they to run no needless risk that the British attaché who watched this attack reported that "the whole Japanese army in front seemed to be underground." Then occurred the misunderstanding which led General Watanabe to countermand his orders to Colonel Iida, whose attack, when it was at last delivered, was unable to penetrate beyond Shang-yueh-ho-kou. A direct assault upon the formidable position in front must have entailed great loss of life, and the only course open to General Matsunaga was to conserve the energies of his men for a night attack.

While the 3rd Brigade had been working its way slowly towards San-cheng-tzu Shan, the 15th Brigade on its left had been quite unable to cross the valley which lay to the north of the villages it had occupied before dawn. The advance of the Fourth Army was also meeting with strong opposition, and until it, too, should be ready to storm the hills on the far side of the Shih-li Ho, General Okasaki did not feel that he would be justified in making the attempt. However, at 3 p.m., he received another order to assault the Temple Hill. At every other point General Kuroki

\* The 5th (Irkutsk) and 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiments had by this time come to the assistance of the 8th (Tomsk) Regiment.



had found himself unable to make headway against the Russian infantry on the hills to the south of the Shih-li Ho, and now resolved to reach their side of the river by working across the open plain. The contrast between the operations of the two brigades composing the Japanese 2nd Division was very marked. The 3rd Brigade was in the mountains; the 15th Brigade, only three miles to the west, was on the southern edge of a perfectly flat valley, and was about to attack General Mau's brigade, which was strongly posted on the Temple Hill supported by two battalions of the 145th (Novocherkask) Regiment and a battery on San-kuai-shih Shan, sometimes called "Two-peaked Hill." Temple Hill, which is about five hundred yards long, fifty yards broad at the top, and about eighty feet above the level of the plain, stands out as a salient knoll connected with the main mass of the Lo-ta Shan by a long low neck of ground. All along its western slope, and as far as the southern point of Temple Hill, was a deep sunk road, worn by ages of Chinese traffic into a covered way six feet below the surface of the ground. No freshly turned earth betrayed the alignment of this natural fortification, but the Russians, as usual, took no care to conceal their dispositions in the road or on the hill above. Although the villages of Ku-chia-tzu and San-chia-tzu afforded some cover to the advancing force, the last six hundred yards were perfectly open. To rush this position would have been difficult in any circumstances, but the task was rendered more formidable by the facts that to east and west the attacking lines were held in check, and that the Russian batteries on San-kuai-shih Shan and near San-chia-tzu were free to enfilade the 15th Brigade as it advanced across the plain.

The attack began at 3.30 p.m. On the right were two and a half battalions of the 16th Regiment; on the left a battalion and a half of the 30th Regiment; two companies from each regiment were in brigade reserve.\* The infantry were supported by one of the batteries on Ta Shan and by the battery north of Ishi Yama, but as these were hardly sufficient to cope with the Russian guns, General Okasaki asked for the assistance of a mountain battery, and of the three batteries of the 14th Artillery Regiment which were with the Fourth Army on his left. The Japanese firing line left the shelter of the villages, Pan-la-shan-tzu and Shuang-lung-ssu, in single line but without any extension. The supports followed two hundred yards in rear, also in single line, and four hundred yards behind them came the reserves, moving shoulder to shoulder in double rank. The long straggling village of Ku-chia-tzu hid the Japanese advance from the Russians at the foot of the hill, and was reached with very little loss, at 4 p.m. There the firing line halted, as if gathering strength to cross the six hundred yards of bare stubble in front, while a terrific rifle fire was exchanged between the village and the sunken road. At 4.40 p.m., the first line

\* The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Regiment seems to have been in divisional reserve.

started at a run straight for the Temple Hill. Other lines followed in quick succession, with an average interval of about three paces between the men. One halt only was made to fire while crossing the dangerous zone, and in a very few minutes the leading Japanese soldiers reached the nearest point of Temple Hill, and the whole line then dashed into the sunken road right on top of the Russian infantry. Furious bayonet fighting followed and, as the setting sun lit up the western slopes, the whole mass, Russian and Japanese, rushed pell-mell up the hill towards the temple at its summit. The defenders clung desperately to their trenches, and at one point some fifty men were afterwards found dead in a row; some still kneeling to fire and with their fingers on the triggers. At 5 p.m., a Russian battery at San-kuai-shih Shan turned its fire upon the Temple Hill, but the Japanese had already made good their footing. Had it opened while they were crossing the plain it might have rendered great assistance to the infantry, but the opportunity was gone. Once they were established on the hills the Japanese lost no time in entrenching the position they had won, and while doing so suffered a good many casualties from artillery fire. Two infantry battalions were also seen coming down from the north as if to make a counter-attack, but were driven off by Japanese artillery. Even then the fighting was not over, for after sunset three successive counter-attacks were repulsed before the Japanese were left in undisputed possession of the hill. The casualties suffered by the 15th Brigade in the first attack and during the night amounted to about a thousand, the heaviest loss falling upon the 30th Regiment, which had six hundred men killed or wounded, chiefly, it is said, by the Russian artillery fire just before sunset. At 7 p.m., six companies of the 29th Regiment, 3rd Brigade, entered San-chia-tzu where they were promptly attacked on three sides. Seeing the difficulty in which they were involved, General Okasaki sent three companies of the 16th to their assistance, and with this reinforcement, they were able to maintain their hold upon the village, but were not strong enough to drive off the enemy.

The success of the Japanese attack upon Temple Hill must be attributed in the first instance to the singularly bad shooting of the Russians, and secondly to the speed with which the assaulting infantry covered the open space beyond Ku-chia-tzu. At no point did the Russians attempt anything more than a purely passive defence, but the Japanese casualties must have been terribly heavy had the sunken road been lined by skilled riflemen, even under the most indifferent leadership.

For some time General Kuropatkin feared that the loss of Temple Hill would be immediately followed by an attempt to break through between his centre, and the left of his Xth Corps; but although the moment would appear to have been favourable to the enterprise, the commander of the Japanese Fourth Army thought otherwise, and the respite afforded was sufficient to enable the two remaining battalions of the 145th Regiment\* to reach

\* 1st Brigade, 37th Division, 1st Army Corps.

San-kuai-shih Shan, and for the 146th Regiment\* to join General Mau. At the same time the 2nd Brigade of the 37th Division was brought up to Tung-shan-kou, where the commander-in-chief had established his head-quarters.

It has already been stated that General Okasaki's attack was delayed until the afternoon, owing to the fact that the Fourth Army on his left could not advance in line with him. All through the previous day Colonel Solomka had held the Japanese 5th Division at bay, and when at last overpowered, during the early hours of the 11th, he had fallen back upon the advanced position behind the Shih-li Ho. There he joined the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, 31st Infantry Division under General Ryabinkin, who then had six battalions on the line Hung-chia-chuang—Fan-chia-tun. Two battalions and three batteries were in reserve at Hsin-chuang. The 9th Infantry Division and the 9th Artillery Brigade were in the main position two miles and a half farther north, where they remained while the advanced guards under Generals Mau and Ryabinkin were gradually overwhelmed.

To reach Liu-chiang-tun, the objective allotted to it by Marshal Oyama's orders, the Japanese Fourth Army must change its direction towards the north-east, and with that intention General Nodzu issued his orders at 1 a.m. on the 11th. At that hour he was under the impression that the 5th Division had gained complete possession of the Wu-li-tai-tzu hill, but it was not until fully four hours later that the last of the Russians retired. The 10th Division, on the other hand, was ready to make an immediate advance. In front of it lay a perfectly open plain swept by rifle fire from the north and commanded, to some extent, from the hills to the east. To cross would evidently be no easy task, but one brigade of infantry, with a battalion of field and a battalion of mountain artillery was told off to make the attempt, while the right flank was to be guarded by the other brigade of infantry on the hill above Kuei-tzu-shan. At 6.30 a.m., the 10th Division was ready, but the right of the 5th Division on the left was still in Ku-shu-tzu and showed no sign of moving. For two hours there was no change, and the commander of the 10th Division resolved to make an attempt to reach San-kuai-shih Shan unaided. Four hostile batteries could be located to the east, one north of Temple Hill, one north of San-chia-tzu, and two behind San-cheng-tzu Shan. Infantry and cavalry could be seen at all points from San-chia-tzu to Ta-pu and Shuang-tai-tzu, but to the immediate front there appeared to be no great strength. However, at 9 a.m. just as the

Postponement  
of the attack of  
the Japanese  
10th Division.

10th Division was about to advance the Russians were seen to be reinforcing all their advanced posts, and about a brigade came up to Shao-ta-kou. In these circumstances General Kawamura decided to postpone any movement until the troops to right and left were also ready. Meanwhile he contented himself with ordering a bombardment of the entire Russian position from

\* 1st Brigade, 37th Division, 1st Army Corps.

San-cheng-tzu Shan as far as Shuang-tai-tzu. For some hours there was no further movement, but about 2 p.m. believing that the artillery bombardment had shaken the defence. General Kawamura ordered the 20th Brigade to advance towards Hsiao-pu and Ku-chia-tzu. The 8th Brigade was to protect the left of the 20th and to maintain connexion with the right of the 5th Division; and the 10th *Kobi* Brigade, which had also been placed at his disposal, was to be in divisional reserve at Ying-kuan-tun. His orders had hardly been issued when three fresh Russian batteries came into action, two of them on San-kuai-shih Shan.\* The strength of the defensive line was thus restored, and even after the 15th Brigade had won a footing on the Temple Hill the odds against success seemed so great that General Kawamura resolved not to make any attempt to cross the valley until after sunset.

As the Fourth Army seemed to be unable to make any progress Marshal Oyama had sent the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades and the 15th Artillery Regiment from his general reserve to its assistance.† As soon as the guns arrived they were handed over to the 10th Division and were ordered to join in the general bombardment of the Russian line, preparatory to the night attack. At 6.30 p.m., just as detailed orders were being issued, an urgent appeal for assistance came from the 30th Regiment on Temple Hill, and two battalions of the 20th Regiment went off to its support; but as all infantry movements were suspended for the time in this quarter of the field it will be as well to leave the 10th Division making ready for the assault on Sai-kuai-shih Shan and to follow the operations further west.

After delivering its successful attack at 5 a.m.‡ the Japanese 5th Division made no movement for some hours, and at 9 a.m. the right brigade was in Ku-shu-tzu opposed by General Ryabinkin at Hsiao-fan-chia-tun, while the left brigade was at Wu-li-tai-tzu where it was confronted by the left of the covering troops of the XVIIth Corps at Shih-li-ho. During the morning General Ryabinkin brought two of his batteries to Hung-chia-chuang, and at 9.30 a.m. a report was sent back from the front to the commander of the Japanese 21st Brigade saying that until the Russian artillery was silenced no advance would be possible. Almost immediately three Japanese batteries came into action near Ku-shu-tzu and the Russians in their turn began to suffer heavily. The main body of the Xth Corps gave no assistance to General Ryabinkin, who even ordered back his third battery when he heard that it was coming up from Hsin-chuang. The loss of the Wu-li-tai-tzu height soon began to be felt and, as General Kuropatkin gave orders for it to be retaken, General Ryabinkin

\* Presumably belonging to the Russian 37th Division.

† About this time also a message was sent to General Nodzu saying that the 5th Division was to take the place of these two brigades in the Army Reserve. This message was confirmed in Marshal Oyama's orders see p. 62.

‡ See p. 34.

was told to hold his present position and to report how many men would be required to recover the hill. In reply he expressed the opinion that an infantry division with its artillery should be sufficient, and advised that a frontal attack should be accompanied by a turning movement from the direction of the Mandarin road. For some time nothing was attempted, but about noon the 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment, with some artillery of the 35th Division, was sent from Liu-tang-kou to Shih-li-ho to support the proposed attack. However, just as the attack was to be launched disquieting rumours began to reach General Kuropatkin and to arouse the fear that the Japanese might succeed in breaking through between General Mau's advanced guard on the Temple Hill and the left of General Bilderling's forces. To guard against this danger General Gershelmann was ordered to send two battalions of the 34th (Syev) Regiment from Ning-kuan-tun to Ying-pan, where they arrived about 3 p.m. and came under the orders of General Ryabinkin. By this time every man of the Russian advanced guards, except the battery which had been sent back to Hsin-chuang, had been absorbed into the firing line, and about 4.15 p.m. two more battalions, this time from the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment were sent to their support from Hung-pao-shan; but this last reinforcement did not arrive in time to take any part in the fighting. Except for these four battalions the main body of the Xth Corps stayed all day in the main position while the brigade under General Ryabinkin was left unaided in the advanced line, but in this quarter of the field the infantry of neither side had any marked superiority of strength. The two unfortunate Russian batteries near Hung-chia-chuang were nearly annihilated, fully thirty per cent. of their personnel being killed and wounded, while the 6th Battery lost ninety-two horses and the 8th lost fifty.

Like the Xth Corps on its left, the XVIIth Corps was drawn up on the morning of the 11th in two lines. In front was the 3rd Infantry Division under General Yanzhul, holding the Shih-li Ho from the village of that name as far west as Erh-shih-chia-tzu,\* while behind it the 35th Infantry Division, with the 35th Artillery Brigade, under General Dobrzhinski, was in reserve between Liu-tang-kou and Chien-liu-tang-kou. Colonel Stakhovich

\* The 3rd Division was distributed as follows :—

Left section, under Colonel Grulev—

In Shih-li-ho, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, 11th (Pskov) Regiment (the 1st Battalion was with Colonel Stakhovich), and the 6th Battery, 3rd Artillery Brigade.

Centre section, Colonel de Vitt—

From Yen-tao-niu-lu to Shih-li-ho (both inclusive), 1st and 2nd Battalions, 12th (Velikolutz) Regiment, 4th and 5th Batteries, 3rd Artillery Brigade.

Right section, under Major-General Zashchuk—

In Erh-shih-chia-tzu, 1st Battalion, 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment.

From Hsiao-tung-tai to Yen-tao-niu-lu (both inclusive), the 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Batteries 3rd Artillery Brigade.

was at Yang-chia-wan, and still further to the west was General Grekov's Cossack brigade near Li-ta-jen-tun. At Shih-li-ho the fighting was very similar to that on the right of the General Sluchevski's corps, except that the Russian advanced guard was less severely handled. At 9.35 a.m., a battalion of Japanese artillery came up in support of the infantry and opened fire south of Wu-li-tai-tzu, but the Russian batteries held their own and there was no advance. On two separate occasions, at 1 p.m. and again at 4.30 p.m., urgent orders were sent from General Nodzu to the commander of the 21st Brigade, explaining the difficulty which was being experienced by the First Army in warding off General Stakelberg's attacks, a difficulty which could only be met by a success against the Russian centre or right. But although General Inouye's need was fully realized, the 21st Brigade could make no headway against the left of the Russian 3rd Division, and at nightfall even its leading infantry was no further northward than Hsiao-hsien-kou.

At every point along the front of battle from the Tu-men-tzu Ling to the railway the Japanese had encountered at least equal

**The Japanese  
Second Army.**

forces, and on their extreme right they had been attacked by greatly superior numbers. West of the railway the conditions were very different, for there the entire Second Army and General Akiyama's cavalry were opposed only by the XVIIth Corps, of which part was engaged with the left brigade of the Fourth Army, and by the detachments under Colonel Stakhovich and General Grekov. General Dembovski, it is true, held Chang-tan, but as he remained a passive spectator his influence on the battle was of the slightest. Whether the arrangement of the Russian army in two lines was known to the Japanese commanders is not clear, but General Oku's orders for the 11th, which were issued as early as 8.50 p.m. on the previous evening, were that the 3rd Division was to advance to a line from Shih-li-ho to Yen-tao-niu-lu, the 6th Division was to carry on the line as far as Yang-chia-wan, and the 4th Division was to reach Ching-tsui-tzu. The advance was to begin at 6 a.m., at which hour the reserve of the army was to assemble near its billets.

As on the previous day, the 3rd Division was drawn up in two wings and a reserve. On the right were the 1st and 3rd Battalions

**Attack of the  
Japanese 3rd  
Division on  
Yen-tao-niu-lu.**

of the 34th Regiment, whose orders were to cross to the east of the railway line and then to move northward against Shih-li-ho. On the left, the 18th Regiment was to deliver a direct attack upon Yen-tao-niu-lu. The 2nd Battalion of the 34th Regi-

Right flank detachment, under Colonel Stakhovich—

In Yang-chia-wan and Hsiao-yu-chung-pu, five squadrons, 52nd (Nyejin) Dragoons, 1st Battalion 11th (Pskov) Regiment, two guns.

In reserve at Wu-li-chieh (N.), under Major-General Yakubinski—  
5th and 6th Companies, and 3rd and 4th Battalions, 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment (two companies were absent elsewhere), 3rd and 4th Battalions, 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment, and two squadrons 51st Chernigov Dragoons.

ment followed in reserve. Punctually at 6 a.m. the six batteries of the Japanese 3rd Artillery Regiment came into action between Shuang-tai-tzu and Meng-hu-lu-tun and began to shell the whole Russian front from Shih-li-ho to Lang-tzu-tai. The guns on the Russian right found their field of fire so much restricted by the village of Yen-tao-niu-lu that only one battery was able to reply, but from the neighbourhood of Shih-li-ho the guns with the 2nd Brigade of the Russian 3rd Division swept the plain with such effect that it was soon evident that an advance along the railway must be attended with very heavy loss. At 7.50 a.m., hoping to hurry on the advance, General Oku sent the 6th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment\* from his army reserve to the assistance of the 3rd Division. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 6th Regiment were promptly added to General Oshima's right wing, which reached Wu-li-tai-tzu without difficulty about 8.30 a.m., but there found that in the face of the Russian artillery fire no further advance was possible. Meanwhile, the 18th Regiment on the left had got to within a thousand yards of Yen-tao-niu-lu with comparative ease, but at that point it was met by such heavy rifle fire that the men were compelled to lie down behind any shelter which could be found or improvised. There they remained until 11 a.m., when General Oshima arrived at Wu-li-tai-tzu at the head of the reserve,† and making a rapid survey of the situation ordered both wings of his division to renew the advance. The right wing, in conjunction with the left of the 5th Division, was to drive the Russians from Pan-chiao-pu, while the left wing was to take Yen-tao-niu-lu and press on to Wu-li-chieh (N.). The artillery was to move as near as possible to the Wu-li-tai-tzu hill in support of the infantry attack. By midday the leading infantry of the right wing entered Hsiao-hsien-kou, but could get no further as no help was forthcoming from the 5th Division. Meanwhile the left wing, supported by the right flank detachment of the 6th Division, was less than four hundred yards south of Yen-tao-niu-lu. Foot by foot the Japanese crept closer to the walls of the village, but when within fifty paces of their goal their strength failed. Possibly a timely reinforcement might have borne down the opposition; but in place of reinforcements came a counter-attack by the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment, before which the Japanese fell back to the outskirts of Erh-tai-tzu. This was a local counter-attack only, undertaken on the initiative of the commander of the 4th Battalion, and no preparations had been made to follow it up; but according to the Russian accounts the two battalions halted after pursuing the Japanese for nearly a mile, and then withdrew without difficulty to their trenches. The Japanese acknowledge a loss in this affair of over two hundred, almost all of whom were killed, while the Russians had three hundred killed and wounded. There were no prisoners.

\* Belonging to 5th Brigade, 3rd Division.

† The 2nd Battalion 34th Regiment, 1st Battalion 6th Regiment, and 3rd Battalion 33rd Regiment.

For some hours after this check there was a lull in the fighting, but about 3 p.m. General Oku was warned that a large force of the enemy could be seen pressing southward towards the Fourth Army. Acting in the spirit of Marshal Oyama's instructions, he at once sent six companies\* from his reserve to the 3rd Division, keeping two only with his own head-quarters. On receiving these reinforcements General Oshima dispatched two and a half battalions of the 33rd Regiment to join the 18th Regiment on the left wing, and at the same time ordered General Marui to renew his efforts to break through the Russian line. One Japanese battery changed position a little to the west to support the attack. At 4 p.m., an officers' patrol, which was sent forward from the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment, found that for some reason which has never been satisfactorily explained, Nan-kuan-tzu, a hamlet of some thirty houses about two hundred yards south of Yen-tao-niu-lu, had been evacuated. This information was at once communicated to the troops in rear, and at 5.30 p.m. the remainder of the battalion entered the deserted houses. The larger village to the north was still held, but after some very severe fighting the Russians were at last expelled and driven back to the bed of the Shih-li Ho, where they found some cover from the Japanese fire. By this success the Japanese severed General Zashchuk's connexion with the troops on his left, and as Colonel Stakhovich and General Grekov had already retired, both his flanks were to some extent exposed. Unless the village could be retaken the centre of the defence would be in danger of being broken, but General Zashchuk's troops were all in action and General Yanzhul had no fresh troops at his disposal. One battalion of the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment had been sent to reinforce the right section very early in the day, and all the remainder of the divisional reserve had gone to the assistance of Colonel de Vitt in the centre. Six companies of the 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment were, however, on their way from Shih-li-ho to Lung-wang-miao, and it was proposed that they should deliver a counter-attack. At this moment, about 7 p.m., the Japanese 6th Division renewed its attacks against General Zashchuk's right, and was only beaten off after an hour's stern fighting. Meanwhile, General Bilderling had heard of the loss of Yen-tao-niu-lu and, realizing the danger, had ordered General Dobrzhinski, the commander of the 35th Division, to retake it under cover of darkness. The 139th (Morshansk) Regiment and two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment were detailed to carry out the task, while the 137th (Nyejin) Regiment, the last of the corps reserve, was sent with the artillery to Chien-liu-tang-kou to protect the right flank in case of the failure of the night attack.†

\* Three companies from the 1st Battalion, and three from the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment.

† The above account is taken from a lecture given by Lieutenant-Colonel Neznamov, of the Russian General Staff, at the Nicholas Academy, St. Petersburg. Another account given by Captain Chelavine, who was on Zashchuk's staff, is as follows:—On hearing that Yen-tao-niu-lu had been lost General Zashchuk at once ordered a battalion of the 10th Regiment, which had been sent to him from the divisional reserve early in the day,



Leaving the Japanese 3rd Division in possession of Yen-tao-niu-lu, it is now necessary to follow the progress of the 6th Division on its left. When making his plans of battle General Oku had, in accordance with his orders from head-quarters, retained a strong reserve under his own command. To form this reserve one brigade had been taken from each of his three divisions, with the result that on the morning of the 11th General Okubo had only the 11th Brigade with which to attack the right of the Russian 3rd Division and Colonel Stakhovich's detachment. At 6 a.m., the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 45th Regiment and a company of engineers assembled north of Ta-tung-shan-pu. The 3rd Battalion led the advance, and as soon as its skirmishers reached San-chia-lin-tzu they came under heavy fire from Yang-chia-wan. The two field guns with Colonel Stakhovich's force came into action north-west of the village, and as they could not be located by the Japanese batteries which were near Ta-tung-shan-pu,\* the advance was checked. Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, which still formed the right flank detachment as on the previous day, worked its way slowly northward until at 8.30 a.m. it was only six hundred yards from Yang-chia-wan. Further advance was then impossible until either the divisional artillery should establish a marked superiority, or the turning movement by the 4th Division should begin to make itself felt. Three batteries belonging to that division were at Ching-tsui-tzu only a short distance to the west, but as they too were unable to find a target they were of no assistance to the infantry on their right. Being unable to move forward, the two battalions of the 45th Regiment threw up what shelter they could and held on to the line they had reached; but at 11.30 a.m., when the Russians delivered their counter-attack from Yen-tao-niu-lu, the flank detachment was compelled to fall back west of Erh-tai-tzu. There it was reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Regiment, but as the Russians did not follow up their success the Japanese were soon in a position again to assume the offensive. It soon became evident that the 11th Brigade was not strong enough to break down the defence, and at 1.30 p.m. General Oku sent forward the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 48th Regiment and the 13th Artillery Regiment which had hitherto been kept in reserve.

and six companies of the 12th Regiment, which were already on their way to strengthen the garrison of the village, to retake it, supported by the fire of the 3rd Battery. However, news of the reverse quickly reached General Bilderling, who ordered a night attack by the 139th and 140th Regiments. On learning the intention of the corps commander, General Yanzhul, the divisional commander, countermanded the attack which had been arranged by General Zashchuk, and sent an orderly to inform that officer of what he had done. The latter message failed to reach its destination, and when about 6 p.m. General Zashchuk was informed that he might retire if his position was untenable, he declined to do so on the ground that he could not abandon the troops whom he believed were about to deliver a counter-attack.

\* 1st Battalion, 6th Artillery Regiment.

Seventy-two Japanese guns were then to be massed against the 1st Battalion of the 11th (Pskov) Regiment in Yang-chia-wan and the right of General Zashchuk's section of the Russian line. With this support the 45th Regiment was to carry Yang-chia-wan, whence, acting in concert with the 13th Regiment, it was to move against Lang-tzu-tai. Suddenly, just as the assault was about to begin, the rifle fire from Yang-chia-wan was silent. An officer's patrol which was sent forward came back with the information that the enemy was in retreat, and at 2.40 p.m. the Japanese entered the village, whence they could see Colonel Stakhovich's infantry retiring northward\* and his cavalry moving towards Hsiao-yu-chung-pu. The news of this success was at once communicated to the right wing of the division. The 1st Battalion of the 13th Regiment was sent to join the 45th in Yang-chia-wan, and both wings then started to the attack of Lang-tzu-tai as arranged. The ground to the south of the Russian position was open and thoroughly swept by rifle fire from the villages which lined the banks of the Shih-li Ho, and when the advance was stopped at 7 p.m., the right wing of the 6th Division was still a thousand yards south of Lang-tzu-tai, while the left wing was no further forward than Yang-chia-wan.

To the west of the Sha Ho the turning movement by the Japanese 4th Division had hardly been marked by that vigour which might have been expected. General Oku's orders for the 11th reached divisional head-quarters at 2 a.m., and at 2.30 a.m. General Tsukamoto issued his detailed orders for the day. The 3rd Battalion of the 8th Regiment was transferred from the

The enveloping movement of the Japanese 4th Division.

flank detachment to the advanced guard, and its duties were taken over by the 1st Battalion of the 48th Regiment,† which was to occupy and to remain in Li-ta-jen-tun. The advanced guard was to reach the line Ta-yu-chung-pu—Ching-tsui-tzu, in co-operation with the 6th Division on its right. The 37th Regiment was to assemble at 6.30 a.m. as follows:—1st and 3rd Battalions, southwest of Shu-pei-tai; 2nd Battalion, north of Hsi-kuang-shan-tun where General Tsukamoto also placed his head-quarters. The exact distribution of General Grekov's detachment, by which the Japanese 4th Division was opposed, is not known, but it was on the line Hsiao-yu-chung-pu—Li-ta-jen-tun. At 7.15 a.m., the 2nd Battalion of the Japanese 8th Regiment reached Ching-tsui-tzu, and at 8 a.m. the remainder of the advanced guard was in Yu-chia-tien-tzu. So far no enemy appears to have opposed the march of the advanced guard, but the flank detachment on reaching Li-ta-jen-tun about 8.45 a.m. drove out some small bodies of hostile cavalry which retired towards Hei-lin-tai and Fu-chia-chuang-tzu. By 9 a.m., therefore, the 4th Division had

\* Colonel Stakhovich's unexpected retreat was due to the advance of the Japanese 4th Division, which had driven General Grekov northward, and was threatening the right of the XVIIth Corps. Colonel Stakhovich fell back to Chung-lu-yen-tai, where he was reinforced by two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment and a battery.

† Belonging to the 6th Division. See diagram, p. 36.

already reached the line allotted to it,\* but at that hour the following fresh instructions were received from General Oku:—

(1) The Second Army will advance to the line Sha-ho-pu—Kuan-lin-pu, so as to assist the movements of the other armies.

(2) Your division should endeavour to reach Kuan-lin-pu.

The advanced guard of the 4th Division was accordingly directed to continue its forward movement towards Chang-liang-pu; while the flank detachment was to push on through Ta-ping-chuang to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. As before, the main body was to follow the road taken by the advanced guard. At this hour General Grekov's battery was shelling the Japanese in Ching-tsui-tzu from a position north-east of Ta-yu-chung-pu, and part of his cavalry was holding Hsiao-yu-chung-pu. The villages in front were also held in varying strength, and some Russian guns were in action north of Ta-ping-chuang. At 11.20 a.m., the 1st Battalion of the 8th Regiment was directed eastward to threaten Colonel Stakhovich's retreat from Yang-chia-wan; but in spite of repeated orders from head-quarters the main body of the 4th Division made no progress. During the afternoon Hsiao-yu-chung-pu and San-chia-tzu were both occupied by the advanced guard, but the flank detachment on the left got no further than Li-ta-jen-tun and when night fell the Russians were still holding Ta-yu-chung-pu, Hsiao-tai, Hei-lin-tai, Kao-chia-tai, and Fu-chia-chuang-tzu.

On the extreme left of the Japanese armies General Akiyama's cavalry brigade remained throughout the 11th at Shen-tan-pu, watching the river crossing at Chang-tan, and keeping his two detached posts at Chi-tai-tzu† and Hei-kou-tai as on the previous day. Until after midday neither army made any move in this quarter of the field, but at 12.40 p.m. General Akiyama heard of the intended advance of the 4th Division, and the message was accompanied by a request that a cavalry detachment should move simultaneously towards the north-east. Not long afterwards a report came in from the 13th Cavalry Regiment that a small force of Russian infantry, about one company, had entered Chou-kuan-tun, and that another party could be seen in Ku-chia-tzu. At 2.20 p.m., three more companies entered Ku-chia-tzu, whence an advance was made to Pei-tai-tzu, driving out one of General Akiyama's infantry outposts. The Japanese artillery‡ opened fire, and a reconnaissance was then sent out from Hsiao-tai-tzu towards Ku-chia-tzu, with the result that the Russians in that village fell back to Hsiao-han-tai-tzu. The infantry which had thus appeared in front of the Japanese cavalry brigade had been detached from General Dembovski's force. It was sufficient to prevent General Akiyama from taking any active part in the day's operations; and if a few companies were sufficient to produce this result, what might have been the effect of a determined advance by the twelve battalions which remained idle at Ta-wang-kuan-pu?

\* See General Oku's orders.

† See Strategic Map 5.

‡ This consisted of field artillery with some of the gunners mounted for additional mobility.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

NIGHT OPERATIONS, 11TH-12TH OCTOBER, 1904—YEN-TAO-  
NIU-LU—SAN-KUAI-SHIH SHAN—SAN-CHENG-TZU SHAN.

(Map V/4.)

ABOUT 7 p.m., on the 11th October, the battle which had raged since dawn gradually died away. But the pause was not longer than was sufficient for the combatants to replenish their supplies of ammunition and to gather strength for a renewal of the struggle. During the day the situation had undergone but little change. To the east General Stakelberg had been repulsed at the passes; at the Temple Hill in the centre, and at Yen-tao-niu-lu in the west the Japanese had won a footing in the Russian defences; elsewhere they had been unable to make any material progress. At the end of the day the Russians had considerable reserves in hand. Of the 2nd Siberian Corps, only the 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had been brought up from Pien-niu-lu-pu. In the centre, the 4th Siberian Corps had been fully employed, but three brigades of the 1st Corps were still at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. In the Xth Corps, only four battalions of the 9th Infantry Division had been moved forward from the main position between Ning-kuan-tun and Hung-pao-shan. On the right, the whole of the XVIIth Corps had been engaged, but the place of the 35th Division, which had originally been in reserve, had been taken by part of the 6th Siberian Corps. Early in the morning of the 11th General Sobolev, the commander of the latter corps, had been authorized to assist General Bilderling if circumstances made it advisable to do so, but had been warned at the same time that he was to keep his own command concentrated and to bear in mind that it formed the commander-in-chief's strategical reserve. Soon after fighting began General Bilderling asked General Sobolev, who was then at Kuan-lin-pu, to move forward so as to protect the right flank of the Western Force. General Sobolev replied that his orders did not permit him to comply, but that should the XVIIth Corps be compelled to retire he would take up a defensive position to cover its right. A little later, when the enveloping movement by the Japanese 4th Division began to be felt, the commander of the 6th Siberian Corps was ordered by the commander-in-chief, but at the request of General Bilderling, to move his advanced guard to Hsin-tai-tzu and to establish his main body between Shao-chia-lin-tzu and Ta-liang-tun. This had been done, but as the corps was intact, except for the brigade which had been left to garrison Mukden, and as moreover General Dembovski's detachment was also in reserve on the right, about one-third of General Kuropatkin's forces had

not as yet been engaged.\* On the side of the Japanese a very different policy had been pursued. The whole of the First Army, including the Umezawa Brigade, was in action, excluding small local reserves. Of the Fourth Army, the 10th *Kobi* Brigade had been sent to the 10th Division. Of General Oku's Second Army reserve, which had at first consisted of fifteen battalions of infantry, six batteries of field artillery, and a battery of captured 4-inch howitzers, five and a half battalions of infantry had been sent to the 3rd Division, and two battalions with all the field artillery had been sent to the 6th Division; leaving only seven and a half battalions, and the howitzers† under General Oku's immediate command. The army reserve had also been somewhat reduced. At the beginning of the day it had consisted of the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades, the 15th Regiment of Artillery, and the 2nd Independent Battalion of Foot Artillery; but by evening the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades and the field artillery had been sent to the Fourth Army, in exchange for the 5th Division, and only the Foot Artillery remained in reserve.

Such was the state of affairs when Marshal Oyama issued his orders for the 12th October,‡ which were as follows:—

Marshal Oyama's  
orders for the 12th  
October.

- (1) The enemy in the direction of Li-shu-ti-hsia, in front of the right of the First Army, has increased in strength, and is now estimated at three divisions of infantry and eighty guns. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade are consequently unable to take part in a forward movement. Towards Shang-liu-ho-tzu, Hsia-liu-ho-tzu, and Shao-takou the numbers of the enemy are also increasing. In all, about six divisions are threatening the front and right flank of the First Army; but near Shih-li-ho and Fan-chia-tun only about four batteries are confronting the Fourth Army. The country between Fan-chia-tun and San-kuai-shih Shan seems to be clear of the enemy, and the 10th Division is therefore assisting the left of the 2nd Division in an attack upon San-chia-tzu. The 5th Division still maintains its position on the north end of Wu-li-tai-tzu hill, and is engaging the enemy from Shih-li-ho to Fan-chia-tun.
- (2) My intention, as expressed in my orders of last night, is unchanged.
- (3) The Fourth Army will drive back the enemy at San-chia-tzu during the night; and for this purpose the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades are placed at the disposal of the Fourth Army. The 5th Division will, however, come under my direct command.
- (4) The First Army will maintain its present positions, with the exception of the 2nd Division, which will co-operate

\* Irrespective of General Kossakovski's detachment on the Liao Ho.

† These howitzers were sent to the 3rd Division at 7.30 p.m. on this day.

‡ The hour of issue is not known, but these orders reached General Oku at 10.50 p.m.

with the Fourth Army in its attack upon San-chia-tzu. The details of the attack will be arranged by the Fourth Army.

- (5) The Second Army will continue to carry out its previous orders and attack the Sha-ho-pu position.
- (6) The 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades will receive their orders from the Fourth Army.
- (7) Head-quarters of the commander-in-chief of the Japanese armies will be at Yen-tai to-morrow morning.

In accordance with these orders the Japanese troops passed the night of the 11th/12th October either strengthening the positions they held or working their way forward to more advantageous positions from which to renew their attack in the morning. At three points, however, the operations assumed a greater importance. To the west the Russians delivered a successful counter-attack upon Yen-tao-niu-lu; in the centre the Japanese Fourth Army carried San-kuai-shih Shan by a night assault; a little further east the 4th Siberian Corps was at last driven from San-cheng-tzu Shan.

The 139th (Morshansk) Regiment and the two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment which had been detailed for the night attack upon Yen-tao-niu-lu,\* assembled at Chien-liu-tang-kou and at 9 p.m. advanced across country towards Lung-wang-miao. While the column was still on the march heavy rifle fire broke out both from that village and Hsiao-tung-tai. Not knowing what this outburst might mean and fearing that the Japanese might have received warning of the impending attack, General Glasko arranged to halt for the night and to deliver an assault at dawn supported by his artillery; but after a very few minutes the firing died away and the march was then continued. At Lung-wang-miao the men took off all unnecessary equipment. The 1st and 2nd Companies of the Morshansk Regiment deployed along the track from Lung-wang-miao to Lang-tzu-tai, the 4th Company was behind them in a wood, the 3rd Company was left in the former village as escort to the regimental colours. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions formed up in two lines, with companies in column of double sections. The interval between companies and battalions was twenty-five paces, and the distance between companies fifty paces. Connecting files kept up communication along the front, as well as from front to rear. A thick line of skirmishers moved one hundred and fifty paces ahead of the main body, and the regimental scouts were on the right flank. The 1st Battalion of the Zaraisk Regiment marched through Lung-wang-miao so as to attack from the east, and the 2nd Battalion was in reserve. After advancing for ten or fifteen minutes in this formation, with bayonets fixed, an ill-directed fire was opened from the village, but the bullets flew high and the Russian line suffered no loss. The assault was perfectly timed and the encounter was short and decisive. A fierce bayonet fight

Yen-tao-niu-lu  
retaken by the  
Russians.

\* See p. 57.

resulted in the defeat of the Japanese, who were driven from the village with heavy loss. The Russians claim to have found a thousand dead, the greater number belonging to the 33rd Regiment, and to have captured a quantity of rifles which the defenders had not had time to remove from the piles. In the attack the Morshansk Regiment lost eight officers, of whom two were killed, and about fifty men. Those of the defenders who escaped made their way back to the nearest trenches which at dawn were seen to have been pushed up to within four hundred to eight hundred yards of the walls. Some, however, who were unable to get away took refuge in the houses whence they fired occasional shots until morning. The defence of the village was taken over by the Morshansk Regiment, and the two battalions of the Zaraisk Regiment established themselves to east and west on the north bank of the Shih-li Ho.

The result of this attack was to re-establish the XVIIth Corps on the line it had taken up on 10th October, and except for the loss of Yang-chia-wan, which had been evacuated by Colonel Stakhovich, the Russian line of defence was unchanged. The corps reserve was, however, reduced to eleven companies of the 137th (Nyejin) Regiment and four batteries, for during the night one battalion of this regiment was sent to Erh-shih-chia-tzu. Advantage was also taken of the hours of darkness to move the two batteries which were west of Yen-tao-niu-lu to a less exposed position north of the Shih-li Ho.

Japanese night attacks.

This reverse to the Japanese Second Army was more than counterbalanced by two successful attacks upon the Russian centre.

The orders for the assault of San-kuai-shih Shan, which were issued at 6.30 p.m. on the 11th, were as follows:—

- (1) The 20th Brigade to leave its line east of Hsiao-pu at 1 a.m. and to attack the hill north of Ta-a.
- (2) The 8th Brigade to leave its line west of Hsiao-pu and, after taking San-kuai-shih Shan, to advance against Nan Shan. Care should be taken to protect the left flank.
- (3) The line of demarcation between the two brigades is from the western end of Hsiao-pu to the south-west of the hill north-east of Ta-a.

Each brigade to be formed for the attack in two lines—firing line and reserve.

- (4) The 10th *Kobi* Brigade (less 40th *Kobi* Regiment\*) to form the general reserve and leave the east side of Kuei-tzu-shan at 1 a.m. and follow in rear of the centre of the two leading brigades.
- (5) The 10th Battalion of Engineers to follow in rear of the general reserve.
- (6) The artillery will be distributed as follows:—

One battalion 15th Artillery Regiment to take up a position east of Kuei-tzu-shan whence it will be able to open fire upon the enemy in the morning. Head-quarters

\* The reserve of the Fourth Army.

1st Artillery Brigade, 15th Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), 10th Artillery Regiment (less the 1st Battalion), 5th Battery 4th Artillery Regiment, in the valley south of Kuei-tzu-shan. 14th Artillery Regiment (less the 1st Battalion and the 5th Battery), 1st Battalion of the 10th Artillery Regiment, to remain in their present position.

- (7) Escorts for the artillery to be posted as follows:—

One company 20th Brigade, at the foot of the hill north-west of Shuang-lung-ssu.

One company 8th Brigade, at the south-west end of Kuei-tzu-shan.

One company from the 10th *Kobi* Brigade to be attached to the 1st Battalion of the 14th Artillery Regiment and another company from the same brigade to be attached to the 1st Battalion, 10th Artillery Regiment.

- (8) 10th Cavalry Regiment to be posted in the valley south of Kuei-tzu-shan.

- (9) I will be at Kuei-tzu-shan until 1 a.m. and will then accompany the advance of the general reserve.

Before the hour named for the assault the two battalions of the 20th Regiment which had been sent to assist the troops on Temple Hill\* rejoined their own commander, and as soon as the 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades came under General Nodzu's command,\* the 40th *Kobi* Regiment joined the rest of the 10th *Kobi* Brigade in the general reserve of the 10th Division.

San-kuai-shih Shan, the objective of the attack, is a narrow rocky ridge, which in many places rises quite sheer in bare stone pillars. The ridge rests upon a foundation of a grassy hill-side which slopes away gently in every direction until it merges into undulating ploughed fields stretching, to all points of the compass, bare and unbroken, for at least six hundred yards. The actual ridge is about five hundred yards long by fifty broad, low at the centre and with a high peak at either end. At the extremities it may be a hundred feet above the plain, and between the peaks not more than fifty feet. In the centre stood a temple and on the eastern side, nestling close under the flank of the rising ground, was a small Chinese village surrounded by a wall five feet to six feet high.† Both village and hill were held by the 145th (Novocherkask) Regiment of the Russian 37th Division, and on the western side was a battery of artillery.

While the right wing of the Fourth Army was making ready for the assault of San-kuai-shih Shan, the 5th Division on its left was gradually being withdrawn from the firing line into Marshal Oyama's reserve. By 7.20 p.m., the right wing of this division had occupied Hsiao-fan-chia-tun which had been evacuated by the enemy, but the left wing was still strongly opposed from

\* See p. 53.

† Reports from British Officers, Vol. I, p. 534.



Shih-li-ho. At 8 p.m., General Ueda received orders from General Nodzu to halt his troops on the line they were then holding, with a view to passing under the direct command of Marshal Oyama. As, however, the division was in close contact with the enemy General Ueda took upon himself to order the two wings of his division to halt so soon as they should have occupied Hung-chia-chuang and Shih-li-ho respectively; but before those villages were reached the following order was received from the commander-in-chief:—

- (1) The enemy has massed a superior force against the First Army.
- (2) The 10th Division and 15th Artillery Regiment will attack the enemy near San-chia-tzu to-night, and will co-operate with the left of the First Army.  
The Second Army will continue its attack.
- (3) The intention of the commander-in-chief is unchanged.
- (4) One infantry regiment, all the batteries of artillery, and a battalion of engineers should be left under the command of a brigadier, on the northern end of the Wu-li-tai-tzu hill, to guard the left flank of the Fourth Army. The remainder of the 5th Division is to assemble, before 5 a.m., near Huang-ti, where it will await further orders. Great care should be taken that this movement should not be observed by the enemy.

In accordance with these instructions, the forward movement of the 5th Division was suspended. The right wing was ordered to assemble near Ku-shu-tzu, and the left wing to halt at Wu-li-tai-tzu and Hsiao-hsien-kou. Thence they were to retire to Huang-ti through Chou-kuan-tun and Shan-wo-pu respectively. A detachment was left under the command of Major-General Yamada to protect the left of the Fourth Army.\*

Meanwhile the preparations for the night attack had been completed, and before 11 p.m., the 10th Division and 10th *Kobi*

\* The strength and distribution of this detachment was as follows:—

At Hsiao-hsien-kou—

1st Battalion, 41st Regiment, and 2nd Company, 5th Engineer Battalion.

North of Ku-shu-tzu—

41st Regiment (less one battalion), 1st Company (less one section), 5th Engineer Battalion.

West of Chou-kuan-tun—

5th Artillery Regiment (less one battalion).

Near Ku-shu-tzu—

1st Battalion, 14th Artillery Regiment.

South of the saddle north-east of Wu-li-tai-tzu—

4th Foot Artillery Regiment, and the 2nd Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion.

North of Wu-li-tai-tzu—

1st Battalion, 5th Artillery Regiment.

In reserve at San-chia-tzu—

Two sections of the 5th Cavalry Regiment, and one company 5th Engineer Battalion.

These troops were all in position by 3 a.m. except the 4th Foot Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Independent Battalion, which were unable to reach their destination until about 11 a.m.

Brigade had been drawn up in three lines awaiting the order to advance. On the right was the 20th Regiment; then came the 39th; then the 40th; and on the left was the 10th. Each

Night attack on  
San-kuai-shih  
Shan.

regiment had two battalions in the first line, and the third fifty yards behind in support. The 10th *Kobi* Brigade followed about a hundred and fifty yards in rear of the second line; and the 3rd

and 11th *Kobi* Brigades were a mile and a half further to the rear on the left flank of the attack. The men of the first line moved shoulder to shoulder, the supports followed in line of section columns. The 10th *Kobi* Brigade\* was drawn up with the 10th and 20th Regiments abreast, and the 40th Regiment in rear of the centre. Communication between the several lines was to be carried out by men bearing white flags. All troops were ordered to march with bayonets fixed, and even the leading line was not to fire, except in the last extremity. Before the attack began, the black great-coats were put on over the khaki uniform, with a white band round the left arm as a distinguishing badge. The advance was to be covered by scouts who were to give warning by a preconcerted signal of the presence of the enemy, and were then to lie down so as to clear the line of charge or fire.† To ensure correct direction and timing, all commanding officers remained on the hill north of Kuei-tzu-shan until after sunset, and all watches were set by that of the divisional commander. At 1 a.m., a heap of *kao-liang*, which had been prepared at divisional head-quarters, was set on fire as a signal for the attack to begin. As the first flames shot up from the beacon the leading Japanese line started forward on its mission. The advance was very slow, and at 3 a.m., the Japanese left was six hundred yards south-east of San-kuai-shih Shan. There a small Russian piquet was encountered, but was easily brushed aside. When within a hundred and fifty yards, volley firing was opened from the position, but the bullets flew high and the Japanese moved steadily on without making any reply. General Kawamura and his adjutant had their horses shot under them, and shots began to fall in and around Ta-a village, where General Nodzu and the reserve had by this time arrived. In front of the Japanese right all was quiet, and as the firing from San-kuai-shih Shan increased the men of the 20th Brigade, brought up their right shoulders and changed their direction to the north-west. It was soon found that the Russians had pushed their firing line out to the level ground, a hundred and fifty yards south of the actual ridge. Gradually the position was enveloped, the second line became merged into the first, and fire was opened all along the front. So soon as General Nodzu realized that the 20th Brigade had changed its direction, he sent forward the 10th and 20th *Kobi* Regiments to the attack of Nan Shan; but before Ta-a was reached, the 20th *Kobi* Regiment was deflected to the main attack, and eventually came

\* These were, of course, two-battalion regiments only.

† The Russian accounts say that the leading men carried lanterns, which could be seen at a considerable distance and precluded all chance of effecting a surprise.

up into the centre of the Japanese line between the 39th and 40th Regiments in time to take part in the final assault. Meanwhile the 8th Brigade worked round to the south-west and west, capturing some Russian guns which were on the road four hundred yards from the hill,\* and forced its way up the slopes in the face of determined resistance; but the 20th Brigade suddenly found itself brought up by the walls of the village. There General Marui was wounded, and the standard bearer of the 39th was killed. The next officer to seize the colours was also killed. The colonel took his place, but the next moment he too fell, mortally wounded by a bullet from the village wall. The brigade was then without a leader as the colonel of the 20th Regiment was further away to the east, but the brigade adjutant happened to meet the adjutant of the 39th, and together they agreed that at all costs the village must be taken. They called out, "Is there anyone here who will leap into that village and set it on fire?" Out of the darkness came the answer: I, Captain . . . . . will command the forlorn hope; who will follow me? Nearly two hundred men volunteered for the attempt. All the leaders were shot or bayoneted, but others forced their way in, and several buildings were soon on fire. Among the houses the Japanese discovered Lieutenant-Colonel Grippenbergh, so badly wounded that he could hardly stand when set upon his feet. They told him that a Japanese division had surrounded the village, and that he must order his men to surrender. The hopelessness of the situation must have been apparent, but like a gallant soldier he refused to give in, saying that he had been charged to defend his post to the last. However, a corporal was found whose sense of duty was less strict. About a hundred men obeyed his order to cease fire, but two hundred others kept up the fight, and even as late as 7 a.m., when the Japanese were in full possession both of the village and the hill, isolated groups of Russians still held out.

By their resolute defence of this important hill four Russian battalions, whose first experience of war it was, had drawn upon themselves the whole weight of five Japanese regiments. The magnetic influence which a defended post almost invariably exercises upon attacking troops had drawn the 20th Brigade away from its proper objective, the Nan Shan height, into the vortex of San-kuai-shih Shan. Later, the 20th *Kobi* Regiment had been thrown into the attack, and the only regiment which had been able to resist the attraction of the fight was the 10th *Kobi* Regiment, which had continued its march through Ta-a until it came into contact with the left of General Okasaki's brigade. The 40th *Kobi* Regiment had remained in the divisional reserve

\* According to one statement these guns were left behind as the Japanese advanced, and were subsequently carried off by the Russian gunners. According to Captain P. Sukhanov, who was on the staff of the 37th Division, the officer commanding one of the batteries with the advanced guard appeared at General Kuropatkin's head-quarters about 2 a.m. and reported that, fearing to lose his guns, he had delivered a salvo of case shot and had then limbered up and left, leaving some ammunition wagons on the field, as in his opinion the entire Russian detachment had been annihilated.

throughout, but so great was the confusion into which the firing line had been thrown during the night that although the 11th *Kobi* Brigade was added to the 10th Division at daylight no movement was possible for several hours. When the Japanese had leisure to reckon up their gains it was found that two hundred prisoners, two field guns, and eight ammunition wagons had been taken, and that more than eight hundred killed and wounded were lying on the captured height. But their own losses had also been terribly heavy, for in the 10th Division sixty officers and one thousand two hundred and fifty men had been killed or wounded. Great though it had been, this sacrifice of life cannot be reckoned excessive, for so soon as there was sufficient light to enable them to realize the situation, the survivors saw that they and the 15th Brigade on Temple Hill had driven a wedge into the heart of the Russian position.

Simultaneously with this assault upon San-kuai-shih Shan, the 3rd Brigade had at last come into line on the right of the 15th Brigade. At 6.30 p.m. on the 11th, General Kuroki issued orders for the attack to be continued by the Guard\* and 2nd Divisions. At that hour the 15th Brigade had succeeded in establishing itself on the northern side of the Shih-li Ho

valley, but until other troops should succeed in doing so its position was far from secure. At 7 p.m., therefore, General Matsunaga began a fresh attack upon the 4th Siberian Corps on San-cheng-tzu Shan. Of this attack no details are known, but about 1 a.m. on the 12th the Russians were finally driven off the hill, after the Japanese had suffered a loss of more than a thousand men.† The 3rd Brigade continued its advance, supported by the fire of the 15th Brigade, until it gained possession of the heights north-west of Shang-liu-ho-tzu, and the whole of the Japanese 2nd Division was then established on the heights north of the Shih-li Ho. Very little is known of the movements of General Mau's detachment while this fighting was in progress on either side of him. He had been reinforced by the 146th Regiment from the 37th Division, and on the evening of the 11th it was General Kuropatkin's intention to send the 2nd Brigade of that division to help him to hold Nan Shan. With this intention two officers were sent forward from Tung-shan-kou to reconnoitre the road, but on reaching Nan Shan about 8 p.m. no Russian troops could be found. The officers therefore returned to Tung-shan-kou about 10 p.m. and there heard that a report had been received from General Mau saying that he could hold the hill without assistance. Very soon afterwards another report reached head-quarters, this time from the 145th Regiment on San-kuai-shih Shan, saying that Nan Shan had been occupied by the Japanese. From this account it would appear that having failed to recapture Temple Hill General Mau had retreated in a north-easterly direction, and had

\* The Guard Division did not move until the early hours of the 12th.

† "The Battle of the Scha Ho." From the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, p. 51 of the translation.

taken up a new position on Lo-ta Shan, leaving a great part of Nan Shan unoccupied.

With the capture of San-kuai-shih Shan and the heights northwest of Shang-liu-ho-tzu the night operations may be said to have terminated; but since this tremendous struggle continued without any intermission throughout the 12th it is difficult to fix the limits of any particular phase. At this point, however, it will be convenient to leave the centre of the line of battle and to revert to the Japanese turning movement in the west.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE 12TH OCTOBER.—THE FIGHT FOR SHIH-LI-HO AND TO THE WEST OF THE MANDARIN ROAD.

(Map V/5.)

WHEN darkness caused a temporary lull in the fighting on the evening of the 11th October, General Kuropatkin, notwithstanding the reverse to General Mau's brigade at the Temple Hill, still seems to have anticipated the early success of his left wing, and that his right wing need do no more than offer a passive resistance to the Japanese Second Army. His orders to General Bilderling were, therefore, merely to reinforce the advanced position during the night and to hold his own. In compliance with these instructions the Xth Corps sent the two remaining battalions of the 34th (Siev) Regiment to Ta-kou where they were in communication with the 145th (Novocherkask) Regiment on San-kuai-shih Shan. These battalions came under General Ryabinkin, whose force then consisted of the brigade of the 31st Division which he had commanded since the beginning of the battle, and six battalions from the 9th Division. So far as concerned the XVIIth Corps, the order was practically inoperative as all but three battalions had already been absorbed into the firing line.

During the night the commander-in-chief seems to have reconsidered his resolution to stand and fight on the line of the Shih-li Ho, for at 6 a.m. on the 12th, a dispatch reached General Bilderling telling him that in view of the attack against his right by General Oku's army he was to retire to the main Liu-tang-kou—Hung-pao-shan position. Thus, even before the attack had really developed, the Russians were, as on other occasions, considering the advisability of retreat; but by the time the order arrived the Japanese had resumed the attack, and General Bilderling, who had every right to count upon assistance both from General Dembovski and the 6th Siberian Corps, decided to remain where he was. Similar instructions had, however, been sent from General Kuropatkin's head-quarters directly to the commander of the Xth Corps, who prepared to act upon them, with the result that while one-half of General Bilderling's force was meditating retreat, the other half, the XVIIth Corps, was making ready to fight and was disposed as follows :—

At Chung-lu-yen-tai, under Colonel Stakhovich—

3rd and 4th Battalions, 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment.

1 battalion, 11th (Pskov) Regiment.

1 battery, 35th Artillery Brigade, and 2 guns of the 3rd Brigade.

5 squadrons of the 52nd (Nyejin) Dragoons.\*  
Scout Detachment of the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment.

In the section Erh-shih chia-tzu—Hsiao-tung-tai—Lang-tzu-tai, under Major-General Zashchuk†—

2nd Battalion, 137th (Nyejin) Regiment.

2 battalions (less 1 company), 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment.

9th (Ingermanland) Regiment.

5 companies, 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment.

3 batteries, 3rd Artillery Brigade.

1 squadron 51st (Chernigov) Dragoons.

In Yen-tao-niu-lu, under Major-General Glasko—

The 139th (Morshansk) Regiment, supported from the north bank of the stream and at Lung-wang-miao, by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment and by 1 battalion of the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment.

Between Lung-wang-miao and Shih-li-ho, under Colonel de Vitt—

1½ battalions, 139th (Morshansk) Regiment.

4th and 5th Batteries, 3rd Artillery Brigade.

At Shih-li-ho, under Colonel Grulev—

2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, 11th (Pskov) Regiment.

2 companies, 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment.

3 batteries of the 35th Artillery Brigade.

6th Battery, 3rd Artillery Brigade.

At Wu-li-chieh, as reserve to the 3rd Division.

1 battalion 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment.

2 squadrons, 51st Dragoons.

At Chien-liu-tang-kou, as reserve to the XVIIth Corps—

3 battalions of the 137th (Nyejin) Regiment.

4 batteries, 35th Artillery Brigade.

Turning to the Japanese, at 9 p.m. on the 11th, staff officers from the various divisions and units of the Second Army were assembled at General Oku's head-quarters at Ta-

General Oku's huang-ti, where they received their orders for the orders. following day :—

(1) The Second Army will continue the attack to-morrow.

(2) The 5th Division will leave the line of Yen-tao-niu-lu at 6.30 a.m., and will advance against La-mu-tun and Lin-sheng-pu, keeping to the west of the line Erh-tai-tzu—Liu-tang-kou—La-mu-tun. If possible Lang-tzu-tai should be taken before daybreak.

\* 2nd and 3rd Squadrons keeping touch with General Zashchuk, 5th and 6th Squadrons keeping touch with General Grekov ; 4th Squadron in reserve.

† The battalion of the 137th and the companies of the 10th and 12th Regiments did not reach General Zashchuk until about 3 a.m., when they were hastily posted in the line of defence.

- (3) The 3rd Division will leave the line Hsiao-hsien-kou—Yen-tao-niu-lu at 6.30 a.m., and advance against the line Sha-ho-pu—La-mu-tun, in co-operation with the 5th Division.\* If possible Lang-wang-miao and South Wu-li-chieh should be taken before daybreak.
- (4) The 4th Division will threaten the enemy's right flank and rear, so as to facilitate the operations of our army, and will then advance against Lin-sheng-pu and Kuan-lin-pu.
- (5) I will be at the north end of Ta-huang-ti at 6.30 a.m.

At 10.50 p.m., nearly two hours after the issue of Second Army orders, Marshal Oyama's orders for the 12th reached General Oku, and at 1.10 a.m.† they were followed by a dispatch from the commander-in-chief which ran as follows :—

“The principal object of the operations of your army during the day is to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Pan-chiao-pu and Liu-tang-kou, so as to facilitate the turning movement of the Fourth Army to the right. Your left flank division should, therefore, gradually move to the east so as to attack the enemy's right flank.”

Neither these later instructions nor the earlier orders necessitated any material change in General Oku's own plans, but

Enveloping  
movement against  
the Russian  
XVIIth Corps.

they were conveyed to the divisional commanders by officers from General Oku's staff. As General Akiyama's duty was merely to protect the flank of the Second Army, so long as neither General Dembovski nor General Grekov made any move he too remained inactive. At 6.25 a.m. on the 12th, two squadrons, one from the 13th Regiment, and one from the 14th, supported by the remainder of the 13th Regiment and part of the 9th Infantry Regiment, were ordered to get into touch with the left flank of the 4th Division; and the two cavalry detachments on the Hun Ho were ordered to maintain their positions. The main body of the cavalry brigade and the horse artillery made no move.

A far more serious task confronted General Oku's infantrymen, for before they could reach the Russian position and drive the enemy from the villages in which he was established, they had first to cross an open plain which afforded an ideal field of fire to the defence. Undaunted by any thought of difficulty, at 2 a.m.

Japanese  
4th Division.

the commander of the 4th Division, who was at Yu-chia-tien-tzu, ordered his right wing‡ to advance during the coming day through Chung-lu-yen-tai and Hung-ling-pu towards the line

\* These orders were issued two hours before the receipt of Marshal Oyama's orders quoted on p. 62. At the time of issue General Oku could not know that the 5th Division was to be withdrawn to the army reserve, nor did he know that Yen-tao-niu-lu had been lost.

† It is not clear whether this dispatch left the commander-in-chief, or reached General Oku at this hour. It does not appear to have occasioned any modification of plans, as the orders to the 4th Division, which must have been issued before its receipt by General Tsukamoto, underwent no alteration.

‡ 8th Regiment, 1st Battalion 37th Regiment, one section of cavalry, 2nd Battalion 4th Artillery Regiment, one company engineers, half a bearer battalion. Chung-lu-yen-tai is also called Pei-yen-tai in some accounts.



Lin-sheng-pu—Ta-liang-tun. The left wing\* was to move on Kuan-lin-pu, keeping in touch with the cavalry brigade to the west. The divisional reserve† was to assemble at 6.30 a.m. at Yu-chia-tien-tzu and Ching-tsui-tzu.

At 7 a.m., the colonel of the 4th Cavalry Regiment, who commanded the left wing of the division, sent his infantry battalion and a troop of cavalry against Ta-ping-chuang; while the remainder of the cavalry was to reconnoitre northward and to get into touch with General Akiyama. At an earlier hour the right wing commander, keeping the 1st Battalion of the 37th Regiment in reserve, ordered the 8th Regiment to advance from Hsiao-yu-chung-pu, supported by the fire of the artillery. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were to make a direct attack, while the 3rd Battalion,‡ moving through Ta-ping-chuang and Hsiao-tai, was to take the enemy in flank. Ta-yu-chung-pu was found to be very lightly held, and at 6 a.m. was occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Regiment without difficulty; but on approaching Chung-lu-yen-tai the Japanese were met by so heavy a fire from guns and rifles that they were compelled to take cover in a small wood about two hundred and fifty yards from the former village. At 8.30 a.m., a second attempt was made to advance, but this also was unsuccessful. Two batteries were then brought forward from Ching-tsui-tzu to Hsiao-yu-chung-pu, followed shortly afterwards by three others, leaving the 2nd Battery to assist the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 48th Regiment which were encountering serious opposition from Ta-tai and Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. These two battalions had effected a junction about 8 a.m. and had occupied Hsiao-tai without opposition; but Ta-tai was found to be held by the enemy. A force, estimated at about a battalion, could be seen at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu and other troops could be seen moving up to its support. Shortly afterwards a battery of artillery opened fire from the west of that village, and the right wing of the Japanese 4th Division was then being shelled from Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, by the four batteries of the 35th Artillery Brigade near Chien-liu-tang-kou, and by the guns in Chung-lu-yen-tai. A company was sent from the reserve to assist the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Regiment; but owing to the appearance upon the scene of the leading troops of the 6th Siberian Corps, the left wing of the division was thrown upon the defensive and compelled to abandon all idea of a flank attack against Colonel Stakhovich. By 11.30 a.m., the guns in Chung-lu-yen-tai were temporarily silenced, but to the north the Russians were gradually increasing in strength. Before noon three batteries were in action near Wan-chia-yuan-tzu; about seven companies of infantry had been thrown into Hei-lin-tai, and three more

\* 1st Battalion 48th Regiment, and 4th Cavalry Regiment (less three sections).

† 37th Regiment (less the 1st Battalion), one section of cavalry, 1st Battalion and staff 4th Artillery Regiment, one and a half companies engineers, half a bearer battalion.

‡ Less the 12th Company.

advanced towards Hsiao-tai. Colonel Stakhovich had also been reinforced by the 1st, 3rd, and 6th Companies of the 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment.\*

For the time being the Japanese 4th Division had been checked, but on the banks of the Shih-li Ho General Zashchuk's section of the defence was on the point of being overwhelmed. Being temporarily relieved of anxiety as to the safety of the right flank, Colonel Stakhovich found himself free to assist the troops on his left by a counter-stroke towards Hsiao-tung-tai. Two companies of the Bolkhov Regiment led the advance; two more followed in support; the 1st Battalion of the 11th (Pskov) Regiment was in reserve. With its flanks protected by dragoons this little column moved down the left bank of the Sha Ho, but before much progress had been made the leading companies were met by heavy rifle fire from Erh-shih-chia-tzu and Hsiao-tung-tai. Colonel Stakhovich did not press his attack, and at 3 p.m., hearing that General Zashchuk had been forced to retire, he withdrew in good order to his former position. Meanwhile, the position of affairs at the village of Chung-lu-yen-tai had taken a serious turn for the defenders. The advance of the 6th Siberian Corps had been easily checked, and the Japanese 4th Division had resumed its advance. Since early morning General Tsukamoto had been kept fully informed of the movements of the troops on his right. At noon he learnt that the 6th Division was engaged in attacking Lang-tzu-tai, and as the Fourth and First Armies were also known to have made some progress, the 3rd Battalion of the 37th Regiment was sent, at 12.45 p.m., to the commander of the right flank, who was then ordered to capture Chung-lu-yen-tai and to detach his artillery to co-operate with the 6th Division. By 3.30 p.m., the Japanese were within seven hundred yards of the defences, and at every other point the rest of the Second Army had forced the XVIIth Corps out of its advanced position on the Shih-li Ho. As his left was deprived of all support Colonel Stakhovich had no choice but to conform to the general movement, and he withdrew in good order to Hung-lin-pu whence his battery opened fire upon the village which had just been evacuated.

At this juncture, when already almost too late to be of any real service, the 6th Siberian Corps again assumed a somewhat threatening attitude against the weak left detachment of the Japanese 4th Division. Some hours earlier Colonel Stakhovich had informed the commander of the 6th Siberian Corps of the dangerous situation in which the XVIIth Corps had been placed by the Japanese advance, and had pointed out that a counter-attack against the Japanese left might rescue it from its difficulties. Although General Bolotov with the 1st Brigade of the 72nd Division was only a mile away at San-chia-tzu, there was no response to this appeal for some hours; but at 3.30 p.m., the Japanese

\* Apparently these companies had been intended to take part in a counter-attack against the Japanese 6th Division, but had somehow joined Colonel Stakhovich.

4th Cavalry Regiment was attacked at Li-ta-jen-tun by about three hundred Russians,\* supported by an eight-gun battery near Meng-ta-pu. Just at the right moment two squadrons of General Akiyama's cavalry came up from Shen-tan-pu, and with their assistance the enemy was driven off. Almost simultaneously General Bolotov sent forward three companies and the scout detachment of the 286th (Kirsanov) Regiment through Ta-tai towards Hsiao-tai, and two battalions of the 285th (Mtsensk) Regiment deployed between Ta-tai and Hei-lin-tai. The leading troops were allowed to approach unmolested until, at 5.30 p.m., they were within a quarter to half a mile of the defences which had been thrown up round Hsiao-tai. At that moment five batteries, two from Ta-yu-chung-pu and three from Hsiao-yu-chung-pu, opened upon the advancing lines. The infantry joined in with every available rifle, and having lost more than six hundred of their number in less than half an hour, the Russians were driven in disorder through Ta-tai and Wan-chia-yuan-tzu to Kuan-lin-pu.

With this last disaster the Russian defence crumbled. Both wings of the Japanese 4th Division began to follow; but the broken regiments of the Russian XVIIth Corps, which was in retreat before the 6th Division, rallied between Chien-liu-tang-kou and Hung-ling-pu, and as daylight had begun to fail the pursuit was not pressed beyond the line Chung-lu-yen-tai—Ta-tai—Ta-ping-chuang.

Although the reverse to General Bolotov's advanced guard was the final blow, the primary cause of Colonel Stakhovich's retreat from Chung-lu-yen-tai was the success of the Japanese 6th and 3rd Divisions against the troops on his left. During the night the 1st and 2nd Batteries of the Russian 3rd Artillery Brigade had been moved across the river to a new position west of the village of Lang-tzu-tai. A battalion of the 137th Regiment had been sent from the corps reserve to General Zashchuk, as already explained, and the local reserve which was at Wu-li-chieh had been reduced to a battalion of the 138th Regiment from Shih-li-ho and two squadrons of the 51st Dragoons. As almost the whole of the XVIIth Corps had been absorbed into the firing line during the fighting on the 11th, General Bilderling made an urgent appeal† for a brigade of the 6th Siberian Corps to be sent to Liu-tang-kou, and in answer to his representations the 2nd Brigade of the 55th Division was sent off at dawn. It reached its destination at 10 a.m., when the commander placed himself under the orders of General Volkov.

No night operations took place in this quarter of the field, but the Japanese availed themselves of the darkness to push forward their trenches closer to the defended villages in their front.

\* It is not at all clear to what force these troops belonged. The Japanese estimate that the left detachment of the 4th Division was attacked at one time by about a brigade and a half. This estimate seems to be excessive.

† It is not clear whether this appeal was sent directly to the officer commanding the corps, or to the commander-in-chief.

Just before sunset on the 11th the 1st Battalion of the 45th Regiment was sent from the brigade reserve to join the troops in Yang-chia-wan. Thence it started forward about 9 p.m. up the bed of the Sha Ho, until it reached the junction of that river and the Shih-li Ho, almost due west of Erh-shih-chia-tzu, where, without disclosing its presence, it was able to entrench itself some six hundred yards from the walls. Meanwhile, the remaining two battalions had advanced from Yang-chia-wan directly towards Erh-shih-chia-tzu and Lang-tzu-tai. Twice they were checked by heavy fire, but before dawn they too had established themselves in trenches some six hundred yards from the Russian line, whose exact position was first betrayed by wreaths of tobacco smoke which were seen arising from it. To the east, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment had also been stopped at least once; but by daylight they were nearly five hundred yards nearer to the Russian defences than they had been at sunset. Such was the situation in front of General Zashchuk's section of the defence when General Bilderling received the commander-in-chief's order to retire to the main position.\* The enemy was already established within a few hundred yards, and the moment there was light enough to see the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Japanese 45th Regiment poured a withering fire upon the defenders of Erh-shih-chia-tzu. To move now was evidently out of the question, and General Bilderling decided to stand his ground until night if he could possibly manage to do so. As had so often happened during the earlier battles, the morning was foggy, and the Japanese gunners were at first unable to distinguish their target; but about 6 a.m. the 3rd Battery of the 6th Artillery

The Japanese  
6th Division.

Regiment opened fire from Yang-chia-wan against Russian infantry near Lang-tzu-tai. Gradually the other batteries of the 6th and 13th Regiments joined in until, by 7.15 a.m., all the seventy-two guns were in action. The return fire of the Russian artillery was ineffectual, and it was soon found that the new emplacements which had been taken up during the night by the 1st and 2nd Batteries of the 3rd Artillery Brigade were quite unsuitable. To the west their fire was masked by the village of Lang-tzu-tai; behind them was a swamp which rendered retreat impossible; and there was no commanding point from which their fire could be directed. Soon they began to suffer severely, but the infantry received some assistance from the four batteries near Chien-liu-tang-kou. Five other Russian batteries were also engaged, but the Japanese fire slowly gained the mastery, and at 8.30 a.m. was turned against the village of Hsiao-tung-tai and the river bed in rear of it, where the Russian reserves were posted. With this assistance the two battalions of the right wing made good progress, until they were more than a mile north of Erh-tai-tzu. On their right, the left flank of the Japanese 3rd Division was established in Nan-kuan-tzu, where it was encountering fierce opposition from the Morshansk Regiment in Yen-tao-niu-lu;

\* See p. 71.

but the garrison of Erh-shih-chia-tzu seems to have been completely ignorant of the danger which was threatening it from the river bed up which the 1st Battalion of the 45th Regiment was slowly working its way round between the right of General Zashchuk's force and Colonel Stakhovich's detachment in Chung-lu-yen-tai. About 9 a.m., on hearing of this movement for the first time, General Zashchuk sent one company from his reserve to strengthen the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment, and another to extend the threatened flank. At the same time he moved the remainder of his sectional reserve across a small ravine towards his right.\* From west, south, and south-east the Japanese 6th Division was now enclosing the defenders of Lang-tzu-tai, Hsiao-tung-tai, and Erh-shih-chia-tzu in a semi-circle of fire. The gunners redoubled their efforts, and word went round the infantry lines that the villages were to be assaulted on the first sign of any weakening of the defence. Soon the fire became so hot that the two Russian battalions left Erh-shih-chia-tzu, but the 9th Regiment still held out stubbornly in Hsiao-tung-tai and in the trenches to the west.

About 10 a.m. the commander, Colonel Krishtopenko, was killed, and very soon afterwards General Zashchuk was wounded. Colonel Vannovski of the general staff, who was with the 51st Dragoons, was appointed by General Volkov to the command of the section, but for some time longer General Zashchuk continued to direct operations. Meanwhile, further reinforcements reached the Japanese firing line. The 23rd Regiment had been sent from the army reserve to Erh-tai-tzu, and so soon as that village was reached the 3rd Battalion was sent up between the 13th and 45th Regiments. To the west, Ta-yu-chung-pu had been taken by the 4th Division, and that success enabled the 1st Battalion of the 13th Regiment to make a rapid march behind the firing line until about 11 a.m. it came up on the left of the 1st Battalion 45th Regiment, whence it was able completely to enfilade the Russian position. The Japanese artillery advanced in close support of the infantry, and to add to his difficulties, General Zashchuk heard that General Grekov and Colonel Stakhovich were in retreat†; but as he still hoped that some relief might be obtained from an attack by the 6th Siberian Corps he determined not to leave Lang-tzu-tai. It soon became clear that no help was to be expected from the 6th Siberian Corps, and from the walls of Erh-shih-chia-tzu the Japanese were pouring their fire into the flank of the 9th Regiment. At last General Zashchuk gave orders for a retreat. The reserves of the 9th Regiment were to hold the walls of Lang-tzu-tai, while the firing line withdrew across the river bed. The moment the men of the 9th Regiment began to leave their trenches the Japanese fire increased, and the Russian ranks were decimated at close range. Nevertheless the retreat was conducted in comparatively good order. One of the last to leave was General Zashchuk, who was supported by his staff

The 11th and 13th Companies of the 12th (Velikolutski).

† So far as Colonel Stakhovich was concerned this report was not true.

officers to Lang-tzu-tai, where he handed over command to Colonel Vannovski. Nothing now could stay the retreat. On all sides the Japanese were pouring over the advanced trenches. The four companies which opposed the Japanese attack from the west were crushed; three companies of the 12th (Velikolutzk) Regiment which were in reserve were powerless to help and the rout became general. Only at Yen-tao-niu-lu the Morshansk and Zarsk Regiments still held out against the Japanese 3rd Division, and as they kept up a galling fire from the walls the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Regiment turned against them, and helped to drive them from the village at 2 p.m.

News of the fall of Lang-tzu-tai reached General Okubo in Yang-chia-wan at 1.25 p.m., and fifteen minutes later he issued orders for the 24th Brigade, with a battalion of the 6th Artillery Regiment, the divisional cavalry, and a company of engineers, to take up the pursuit, through Hsiao-tung-tai to Liu-san-chia-tzu.\* About this time, also, it became known to General Okubo that the enemy in front of the First Army was in retreat, that the Fourth Army had captured the hills north and east of Mang-chia-fen, and that the 4th Division on his left was resuming its attacks at Chung-lu-yen-tai. At all points, therefore, except in front of the 3rd Division, affairs had taken a very favourable turn for the Japanese.

The time spent in bringing up fresh troops to carry on the pursuit afforded the Russians a much-needed breathing space, and enabled them to restore some semblance of order in their ranks. About a mile north of Lang-tzu-tai a group of villages and the bed of a stream offered a rallying point for the retreating troops.

There they were met by a squadron of the Chernigov Dragoons, and so soon as someone was found to assume the direction of affairs, three battalions were formed from the regiments which had been most heavily engaged. One battalion was made up from the 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment, and was posted on the left of the new position under Lieutenant-Colonel Khartulari; a second battalion, formed chiefly from the 12th (Velikolutz) Regiment, took post on the right under Lieutenant-Colonel Reinbot. The third battalion, composed of men of both the 10th and 12th Regiments was placed in reserve behind the right flank. Messages were then sent to right and left, as well as to the 2nd Brigade of the 55th Division at Chien-liu-tang-kou, saying that Colonel Vannovski meant to retake the lost villages, and asking for support. Colonel Stakhovich assented,† but a less favourable reply

\* The infantry still under the commander of the 24th Brigade consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 48th Regiment, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 23rd Regiment.

† It was, apparently, in answer to this appeal that Colonel Stakhovich made his advance (see p. 75). Colonel Vannovski, however, waited to hear whether any other troops were coming to his assistance. The whole counter-attack therefore lacked both weight and cohesion. For Colonel Martuinov's account of the fighting round Yen-tao-niu-lu see *Vospominaniya o Yaponskoi Voynye*, p. 268, *et seq.*

came from Colonel Martuinov who was in Yen-tao-niu-lu and was in great anxiety about his right flank, which had been exposed by General Zashchuk's retreat. Meanwhile a battalion of the 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment joined Colonel Vannovski, and the ammunition pouches were replenished from some carts which were found by the dragoons. About 2 p.m., the 219th (Yukhnov) Regiment was seen marching from Chien-liu-tang-kou. Instead of joining Colonel Vannovski this regiment moved on past his left straight toward Lung-wang-miao. It had but recently reached the front, and marched to the attack in broad daylight, over a perfectly open plain, drawn up in two lines with the men shoulder to shoulder. On the way it met the 139th (Morshansk) and 140th (Zaraïsk) Regiments, under Colonel Martuinov in full retreat from Yen-tao-niu-lu. After allowing them to pass through his ranks, the colonel of the 219th changed direction to the right, apparently in compliance with a message from Colonel Vannovski, and advanced, still in the same formation and unsupported by artillery, against Lang-tzu-tai, where five or six Japanese battalions and eleven batteries awaited the onset. Until the Russians were within seven hundred yards not a shot was fired. Then the word passed down the Japanese ranks and in a moment sixty-six guns and several thousand rifles poured their hail of bullets into the serried ranks. The unfortunate Yukhnov Regiment, whose first experience of the war this was, hesitated, returned a desultory and harmless fire, and after suffering enormous losses,\* turned and fled, carrying with it portions of Colonel Vannovski's force which was coming to its assistance.

The Yukhnov Regiment took no further part in the fighting, but with some difficulty order was again restored among the other battalions. Almost immediately afterwards the 139th (Morshansk) Regiment, which had retired as far as Chien-liu-tang-kou, was sent to Colonel Vannovski's assistance, and about 3 p.m. another advance began. The earlier counter-attack had shown General Okubo that his enemy was not yet crushed, and he had consequently added the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment, a battalion of the 6th Artillery Regiment, and two batteries of the 13th Artillery Regiment, to his pursuing detachment, thus bringing up its strength to five battalions, two squadrons, and eight batteries. The Russians had not proceeded far when they encountered this force. As before, the Japanese held their fire until the enemy were within comparatively close range, when a well-directed fire quickly shattered his ranks. It was now clear to every one that it was quite hopeless to make any further attempt to recover either the guns or the villages, even if the men could again be induced to do so, and a general retreat began in the direction of Sha Ho station, covered by some companies of the 138th and 9th Regiments which for a time held the river bed against the Japanese pursuing detachment. The defeat of the

\* Officers, 3 killed, 19 wounded; men, 92 killed, 666 wounded, 74 missing.

Yukhnov Regiment had been sufficient to convince General Volkov that the advanced position on the Shih-li Ho was untenable, and even before this last reverse he had issued orders for a general retirement to the main position. Colonel Vannovski had hardly given instructions for the withdrawal of his own section when he received the directions of his corps commander, which were as follows\* :—

“The position we are now in is to be held until dark. The XVIIth Corps will then withdraw to the line Pan-chiao-pu—Liu-tang-kou — Chien-liu-tang-kou — Hung-ling-pu. This position will be held by the 35th Division, with its artillery, from Pan-chiao-pu to Chien-liu-tang-kou (both inclusive). A brigade of the 55th Division will carry on the defence as far as Hung-ling-pu, with Colonel Stakhovich's force in that village. The 3rd Division will be in reserve at Shu-lin-tzu. Colonel Stakhovich will keep touch with the 6th Siberian Corps, and the commander of the 35th Division will be responsible for the maintenance of communications with the Xth Corps. The second line transport of the XVIIth Corps will be drawn up in column of route along the railway at daybreak, with the rear wagons at Su-chia-tun, the 35th Division transport leading, and the 3rd Division in rear. Divisional ambulances to be established at Liu-sheng-pu and Sha Ho station. The hospitals which are now at that station will be moved away to the north. The Artillery Park Brigades will be at Liu-sheng-pu and Sha Ho station. A telegraph and heliograph station will also be set up there. At the beginning of the battle I will be at Sha Ho station.”

It is quite evident that these orders were framed under a total misapprehension of the extent of the disaster which had overtaken the right of the XVIIth Corps. The units of the 3rd and 35th Divisions were hopelessly intermingled, and hardly a single regimental commander had all his battalions under his own hand. Most of General Dobrzhinski's regiments had been handed over at one time or another to General Yanzhul, and the only organized force at his disposal consisted of the three battalions of the 137th (Nyejin) Regiment, which were already on the position he had been ordered to hold, and two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment, which had just retired from Lung-wang-miao. Nothing but the coming of night could put any limit to the completeness of the Japanese success, or save the Russian right wing from a crushing disaster; but as there was no longer any distinction between the various sections of the defence, it is now necessary again to return to the early morning and to follow the operations of the Japanese 3rd Division against the centre and left of General Yanzhul's line.

After having been expelled from the main village of Yen-tao-niu-lu, the left wing of General Oshima's division clung to the

\* These orders were sent to the commanders of the 3rd, 35th, and 55th Divisions, and to Colonel Stakhovich.



outlying hamlet known as Nan-kuan-tzu. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 18th Regiment entrenched themselves along the northern face, and the 33rd Regiment extended for a thousand yards east of the houses, but was unable to push its right as far as the railway as it had been ordered. The 3rd Battalion of the 18th Regiment went into brigade reserve. The divisional commander with the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 34th Regiment was at Shuang-tai-tzu. On the right wing it had originally been intended to make an advance at 6.30 a.m. in concert with the 5th Division, but when it became known that that division had been withdrawn from the fighting line, and that only the Yamada detachment remained in its place, it was decided to entrench and to make the subsequent advance dependent upon the success of the 6th Division on the left. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 6th Regiment and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 34th Regiment entrenched themselves three hundred yards north of Hsiao-hsien-kou, carrying their works east and west of the Mukden road, and connecting them to the village by a zigzag approach. While so engaged they were discovered by some patrols of the enemy, and his guns opened upon them from the northern side of Shih-li-ho; but most of the shells flew high and casualties were few.

During the night the 3rd Artillery Regiment left its positions near Shuang-tai-tzu, and before daylight the 1st and 2nd Battalions occupied fresh emplacements on the Wu-li-tai-tzu hill and west of Hsiao-hsien-kou respectively. Just west of the railway and a little to the north of the Wu-li-tai-tzu—Shuang-tai-tzu road stood the captured howitzer battery, and a little further to the west were the captured field guns. In these positions the wings of the Japanese 3rd Division awaited dawn. At no point were the combatants separated by much more than a thousand yards, and at many places, particularly at Yen-tao-niu-lu, they were very much closer.

The left wing of the 3rd Division was the first to be engaged. There the battle reopened about 6 a.m. with an outburst of rifle fire from Yen-tao-niu-lu against the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment. As the light improved it became evident that the strength of the Russians in and around that village had been considerably increased during the night, and fighting had not been in progress for more than half an hour when the divisional reserve began to move forward from Shuang-tai-tzu under heavy fire. By 7 a.m., the five battalions in the Japanese firing line were all engaged and very soon afterwards the artillery joined in. Without the assistance of the 6th Division, which was fully occupied in the attack upon Hsiao-tung-tai and Erh-shih-chia-tzu, the left of the 3rd Division was not strong enough to oust the Morshansk Regiment and the two battalions of the Zaraisk Regiment from Yen-tao-niu-lu, and from time to time reports reached General Oshima that columns of the enemy could be seen near Wu-li-chieh. As the 6th and 34th Regiments were still in their trenches north of Hsiao-hsien-kou, the right of the 33rd Regiment was without infantry sup-

port and was believed to be in some danger. At 8.30 a.m., with great difficulty and with heavy loss, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment forced its way into the firing line. So terrific was the hail of bullets which greeted the battalion as soon as it attempted to move, that section rushes were abandoned and the men were compelled to cross the fire-swept zone in two's and three's as opportunity offered. Almost at the same time the commander of the division and the remainder of his reserve fell back towards Shuang-tai-tzu. Realizing that until the Russians could be cleared out of Yen-tao-niu-lu there was no chance of achieving any success at Shih-li-ho, General Oshima transferred the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Regiment from his right wing to his divisional reserve. With the help of the artillery the Japanese gradually began to establish their superiority, and at 10 a.m., on hearing that a column of the enemy could be seen retreating from Hsiao-tung-tai, General Oshima gave orders for a general assault to be delivered at noon, which should have as its ultimate objective Lung-wang-miao and South Wu-li-chieh. The fire of the artillery was directed upon those two villages, as well as against Yen-tao-niu-lu. Soon after 11 a.m., the commander of the 3rd Division heard that Erh-shih-chia-tzu had fallen and that the attack upon Lang-tzu-tai was making good progress. Part of the artillery with the 6th Division was then turned against Yen-tao-niu-lu and about 12.30 p.m. an attempt was made to rush the trenches. Again the Japanese were beaten back, but by this time the two battalions of the 13th Regiment, which had wheeled to the west after the capture of Hsiao-tung-tai, were beginning to make themselves felt.

Colonel Martuinov, the senior officer present, had received from General Glasko\* permission to withdraw if his position became untenable. With Lang-tzu-tai in Japanese hands, and the appearance of a fresh enemy threatening to enfilade his right flank, it appeared to Colonel Martuinov that further resistance would only imperil his ultimate retreat. First a battery of artillery was sent off towards Chien-liu-tang-kou; then the 139th (Morshansk) Regiment withdrew from Yen-tao-niu-lu, and, without attempting to hold Lung-wang-miao, marched straight away to the north followed by the two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment; finally the seven companies of the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment fell back to Lung-wang-miao. During the retreat the Morshansk and Zaraisk Regiments met the 219th (Yukhnov) Regiment which was about to make its ill-fated effort to recover Lang-tzu-tai and the abandoned guns; but although they were in good formation and had suffered little loss they offered it no assistance, and held on their way towards the main position.

The first Japanese troops actually to enter Yen-tao-niu-lu seem to have been the two battalions of the 13th Regiment, which came into the fight from the west. Immediately afterwards came the 18th and 33rd Regiments which, after sweeping through the village, crossed the Shih-li Ho to the attack of Lung-wang-miao.

\* Colonel Martuinov, *Vospominaya o Yaponskoi Voinye*, p. 300.  
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Word was promptly sent to the right wing to co-operate in the general movement, and at the same time General Yamada was ordered to attack towards Hung-chia-chuang so as to prevent the Russians in that neighbourhood from giving any assistance to the garrison of Shih-li-ho. That important village was still held only by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions of the 11th (Pskov) Regiment, but the 8th Battery of the 35th Artillery Brigade had been sent to join the 3rd Battery of the 6th Artillery Brigade. For a time these two batteries bore almost the whole weight of the hostile artillery fire, but so soon as the actual advance began the Japanese guns devoted their entire attention to the infantry. The ground in front of the Russian trenches for more than a thousand yards was perfectly open, and but for the help of the artillery the attack would simply have been swept away by rifle fire. So long as the artillery only was in action the Russians were secure in their trenches, but the moment they were forced to show themselves in their efforts to beat off the infantry attack they suffered heavily from the Japanese shrapnel. One company of the Japanese 34th Regiment made its way across the railway bridge, and took the defence in flank, while the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Regiment and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 34th Regiment (less the single company already mentioned) carried out the frontal attack. By the time the first named battalion was within two hundred yards of the defences it had lost two hundred and twenty of its officers and men; but nothing could withstand this perfectly methodical attack which was carried through with ruthless determination. Until 3.30 p.m., the Russians stood their ground, but the sudden appearance of the company of the 34th on the north bank of the river decided the fight. A battery which had been most gallantly served, and had inflicted much loss upon the attack, was taken in flank and many of its horses were killed. Then the men began to leave their trenches, and in a few minutes all was over. The artillery bombardment was kept up until the last possible moment, and for a time the village was enveloped in a cloud of dust thrown up by bullets and by smoke from bursting shell. On the first sign that the defence was beginning to waver the infantry dashed forward to the assault. The last few hundred yards were covered almost without loss, and when at last the Japanese reached their goal the Russians had fled leaving four guns and five ammunition wagons in the hands of the victors. A few men still held out in the northern part of the village, and about a company was on the small hill to the east, but these were soon overcome and the artillery was then brought up to Shih-li-ho to assist in the pursuit.

By 4 p.m., the whole of the XVIIth Corps was in full retreat along the line of front from Chung-lu-yen-tai in the west as far as the Mandarin road in the east. The confusion of units which had taken place during the two days of heavy fighting rendered control even more difficult that it would have been otherwise, and the details of the retirement are impossible to follow; only in

Retreat of  
the Russian  
Western Force.

Colonel Stakhovich's force there was still both control and cohesion. So soon as Colonel Vannovski's counter-attack had been routed, and the final retreat began, Colonel Stakhovich prepared to evacuate Chung-lu-yen-tai covered by the fire of the two battalions of the Zaraisk Regiment which were under his command. The guns, a battalion of the Bolkhov Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the Pskov Regiment fell back through Hung-ling-pu, where they were met by portions of the 220th (Yepifan), 219th (Yukhnov), 138th (Bolkhov), and 9th (Ingermanland) Regiments, and opened fire upon Chung-lu-yen-tai as soon as it had been occupied by the Japanese. Covered by this fire, the men of the Zaraisk Regiment withdrew and between 5 and 6 p.m. lined the walls of Hung-ling-pu. On their left there were two battalions of the Nyejin Regiment which had been in reserve, then a composite battalion of the Bolkhov Regiment; close to Chien-liu-tang-kou were some more companies of the Yepifan Regiment, and beyond that village were four batteries of the 6th Artillery Brigade, the remainder of the widely-scattered Yepifan Regiment, and some men of the 51st (Chernigov) Dragoons. A little further east Liu-tang-kou was held for a time by the seven companies of the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment; but when the Russian commanders were able to formulate any definite plan it was decided that an attempt should be made to concentrate the 3rd Division at Shu-lin-tzu, while the 35th Division, acting as a rear guard, was to hold the carefully prepared main position as long as possible. In accordance with this plan Liu-tang-kou was handed over to two battalions of the 140th Regiment which had been engaged all the morning at Yen-tao-niu-lu. The left of the line was still undefended, but as the 3rd Battalion of the Nyejin Regiment happened to be at Liu-san-chia-tzu it was brought forward to the right bank of the stream which ran along the front. Behind this hastily improvised screen the retreat continued in the utmost confusion. It soon became evident that there was no chance of being able to re-form the 3rd Division so near to the enemy as Shu-lin-tzu, and that the retreat must be continued beyond the Sha Ho.

When passing that river by the narrow military bridge which had been thrown across at Ta-kuai-chi-pu,\* the crowded columns came under the fire of the Japanese artillery which had been sent forward in pursuit by the 6th Division; but night put a stop to the fighting and thereby saved the Russian XVIIth Corps from annihilation.

The news of the defeat caused the utmost consternation at Sha-ho-pu. The fall of the advanced position had been to some extent foreseen, but that the main position should be carried in the same day had not been considered possible. More than five hundred wounded were sent hurriedly to the north, and the general confusion was increased by the countless carts and wagons which had been collected along the road and the railway. All these had to be cleared away so as not to block the retreat of the troops. The protection of the station was entrusted to three

\* Called in some accounts Han-kuei-pu.

battalions of the 36th (Orel) Regiment which had been hastily summoned from the Xth Corps, and were subsequently joined by two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment and a battery of artillery.\* General Dobrzhinski in person directed the evacuation of the transport and, under his supervision, by 3.30 a.m. on the 13th not a single vehicle remained south of the Sha Ho. As the troops marched in from the south some sort of order was restored. Three battalions of the 10th (Bolkhov) Regiment were posted to the east of the railway with their left at La-mu-tun, and six companies of the 139th (Morshansk) Regiment which had reached Lin-sheng-pu were again sent forward to act as a rear guard between Shu-lin-tzu and Ta-kuai-chi-pu, with orders to fall back at daylight upon the main body of the division. Most of the remaining troops came in during the night and took post as best they could from Lin-sheng-pu, by Ta-liang-tun, to Ku-chia-tzu. The 6th Siberian Corps fell back to Lan-shan-pu and Feng-chuang-tzu,† where the 2nd Brigade of the 55th Division, which had been lent to General Bilderling, arrived early on the morning of the 13th.

After the capture of Shih-li-ho the Japanese did not follow their retreating foe with any great vigour. The night was exceptionally dark, supplies of both ammunition and food were running short, and as the Russian rear guard between Pan-chiao-pu and Chien-liu-tang-kou showed a bold front the pursuit came to an end about 7 p.m. At that hour the two battalions of the 6th Regiment which had taken part in the attack upon Yen-tao-niu-lu had been transferred from the left to the right of the 3rd Division and were a little to the south of Pan-chiao-pu.‡ The 18th and 33rd Regiments were just north of Wu-li-chieh, while General Oshima with the divisional reserve was at Shih-li-ho. To the west, two battalions of the 6th Division had crossed the river-bed near Chien-liu-tang-kou, leaving the rest of the pursuing detachment in, and to the south of, that village. General Okubo with the main body of his division was in Lang-tzu-tai and Hsiao-tung-tai. Still further west, the right flank of the 4th Division§ was at Chung-lu-yen-tai, the left flank at Hsiao-tai; General Tsukamoto with the artillery and three companies of the 37th Regiment was at Ta-yu-chung-pu. The 4th Cavalry Regiment was at Li-ta-jen-tun, in touch with two squadrons of General Akiyama's cavalry brigade which was still at Shen-tan-pu.

\* The 2nd Battery of the 35th Artillery Brigade.

† Also called Tien-tzu.

‡ The southern outskirts of this village were entered by the Japanese about 10 p.m.

§ The 9th Brigade, which belonged to this division, was still in the Second Army reserve at Meng-hu-lu-tun.

## CHAPTER XL.

THE 12TH OCTOBER.—THE FIGHT TO THE EAST OF THE  
MANDARIN ROAD.

(Map V/5.)

THE disaster to the XVIIth Corps on this day proved to be the decisive factor in the battle. At other points the Japanese had been able to hold their own or even to gain ground, but their numerical inferiority was against them, and the days and nights of constant fighting and marching must have produced such exhaustion that local success could hardly have been converted into victory. It has already been shown how the withdrawal of the 5th Division from the fighting line into Marshal Oyama's reserve, left only the Yamada detachment, strong in artillery but weak in the other arms, between General Oku's right and the main body of the Fourth Army on San-kuai-shih Shan and Nan Shan, a distance of some four miles. Opposed to this force was General Ryabinkin's advanced guard, which, as before, was holding the line of the Shih-li Ho in prolongation of the left of the XVIIth Corps as far as Ying-pan, where the 34th (Syev) Regiment was posted. In addition to the infantry reinforcement which he received during the night,\* three batteries of the 9th Artillery Brigade were sent to him in exchange for the 6th and 8th Batteries of the 31st Artillery Brigade which had suffered so severely in the action on the 11th. General Ryabinkin's local reserve was in Hsin-chuang and on the principal position stood the main body of the Xth Corps, now reduced to ten battalions,† and the remaining three batteries of the 9th Artillery Brigade.‡

The change in the Japanese dispositions had the effect of checking the offensive against the Xth Corps, and for some hours only the guns were engaged. From early dawn, however, General Sluchevski was the recipient of a series of contradictory orders which undoubtedly contributed to the misfortunes of the day. Instead of issuing his instructions only to the commanders of the two wings of his army General Kuropatkin, as on other occasions, continued to communicate directly with the various corps. It had been arranged overnight that the advanced position was still to be held, but at 6.25 a.m. General Sluchevski received from army head-quarters a copy of the message to General Bilderling,§ in which the commander-in-chief

\* Two battalions of the Syev Regiment. See p. 71.

† At Hung-pao-shan, 36th (Orel) Regiment, and two battalions of the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment.

‡ At Ning-kuan-tun, 33rd (Elets) Regiment.

§ The rest of the Xth Corps, under General Mau, had been handed over to General Zarubaiev.

§ See p. 71.

pointed out the danger which was threatening from the turning movement by the Japanese Second Army, and ordered an immediate retreat to the main position. At the same time General Sluchevski was ordered, also by the army staff, to collect a reserve of at least a division "to be used with caution." In compliance with this altered plan, he decided to withdraw his advanced troops, and promptly reported his intention to the commander of the Western Force. The withdrawal was to begin from the left, but at 8.15 a.m. a note came in from General Bilderling saying that notwithstanding General Kuropatkin's wishes, he intended to hold the line of the Shih-li Ho until dark. Almost immediately afterwards two more orders arrived. The first, which was again from the commander-in-chief, told General Sluchevski to keep his reserve behind his left flank, and to be prepared to help General Mau with a brigade if necessary. The second, from General Bilderling, told him to place his reserve behind his right flank, where it would be in a position to come up between the Xth and XVIIth Corps if necessary. Not knowing what was required of him General Sluchevski did not immediately cancel his orders for the retreat of the advanced guard, but at 10.40 a.m. he acceded to General Ryabinkin's request to be allowed to remain on the Shih-li Ho until dark, as it would be impossible to move sooner without suffering heavy loss. So as to do his best to satisfy the orders as to his reserve he told General Gershelmann to send a battalion of the 36th (Orel) Regiment to Ning-kuan-tun, and to move the 33rd (Elets) Regiment from that village to a position on the left flank whence it could go to General Mau's assistance if required. Possibly in consequence of this order to retire, but probably because its position at Ying-pan was imperilled by the loss of San-kuai-shih Shan, the Syev Regiment fell back during the morning to Ta-kou.

While General Sluchevski was carrying on this correspondence with his superiors, his batteries near Hsin-chuang were engaged with the artillery of the Yamada detachment. All the morning the Japanese infantry remained inactive near Ku-shu-tzu; but so soon as it was known that the 3rd Division was about to attack Wu-li-chieh and Shih-li-ho, the commander of the 5th Division, General Ueda, added the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment to General Yamada's command, and ordered him to advance in force towards Hung-chia-chuang. Almost at the same time as General Ueda was planning his next forward step General Sluchevski received two more orders from the commander-in-chief and General Bilderling. For once there was no contradiction, for while the former told him merely to prepare six or eight battalions, without guns, to go to the support of the right of the army, the latter ordered him at once to put a brigade of infantry at the disposal of the Western Force. To meet this new demand two battalions of the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment were withdrawn from the advanced guard; the 36th (Orel) Regiment was sent from the reserve towards Sha-ho station\*; and the 33rd (Elets) Regiment

\* See p. 86.

was brought back from the left flank of the corps and posted between Ning-kuan-tun and Hung-pao-shan.

By this time it was rapidly becoming evident that the XVIIth Corps could not hold its ground much longer, and even before General Yamada's attack began to develop Retirement of General Ryabinkin, seeing that his right would the Xth Corps. soon be unsupported, was leaving the advanced position. The Syev Regiment at Ta-kou was the first to go; and as it was not in action at the time it had no difficulty in passing through Shuang-tai-tzu and taking up a fresh position east of Ning-kuan-tun. It was followed by the five batteries of the 9th Artillery Brigade, which were covered as they retired by the 123rd (Koslov) Regiment. Two battalions of this regiment then went into local reserve north of Hung-pao-shan, while the other two were taken to form a corps reserve in rear. The last troops to fall back were the four battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment, which did not begin to move until both flanks were in danger of envelopment; but its retreat was covered by the artillery,\* and it reached Hung-pao-shan with very little loss.† In contrast to the unfortunate corps on its right, the Xth Corps was not pressed by the Japanese, and on reaching the main position it was able to present a firm front, and thereby helped to check both the Yamada detachment and the right of the 3rd Division. General Sluchevski was, however, quite ignorant of the true state of affairs. Until evening he was apparently under the impression that the retreat was being carried out in accordance with the plan which had been agreed upon, but about 7 p.m. he heard for the first time that the XVIIth Corps was retiring in great disorder upon the line of the Sha Ho. By this time he had no more than eighteen battalions under his own command,‡ and as he did not consider that force sufficiently strong to justify him in attempting to remain in the main position he reported to the commander-in-chief that he intended to retire. Order and counter-order were received in quick succession. General Kuropatkin, who does not seem to have been fully informed of the progress of the battle on either wing of the army, wished General Sluchevski to maintain himself on the Hung-pao-shan—Ning-kuan-tun line; while the commander of the Western Force wished him to fall back to the Sha Ho. At 11.15 p.m., definite orders for the retreat came from General Bilderling, and as they reflected his own reading of the situation, he at once complied. About midnight rain began to fall in torrents, but by 5 a.m. the Xth Corps was again established on the left of the XVIIth, the last regiment to reach the new position being the 33rd (Elets), which was joined

\* Five batteries, 9th Artillery Brigade, and the 6th and 8th Batteries 31st Artillery Brigade; 56 guns in all.

† The losses in General Ryabinkin's advanced guard were; 34th (Syev) Regiment, 16 men wounded, 1 missing; 123rd (Koslov) Regiment, 2 men killed, 22 wounded; 124th (Voronej) Regiment, Colonel Solomka and 1 other officer wounded, 3 men killed.

‡ 1st Brigade, 31st Division, was with General Mau attached to the 4th Siberian Corps; six battalions had been sent to General Bilderling.



during the retreat by two batteries under Colonel Sliusarenko, which had been acting with the central force.\* While General Sluchevski was awaiting permission to retire, the 33rd Regiment was furiously attacked by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 41st Regiment supported by the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment. The commanders of both the leading Japanese battalions were killed, and the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. The Yamada detachment then retired to Hsin-chuang, where it bivouacked for the night in fighting formation. The main body of the Japanese 5th Division† bivouacked south of the Shih-li Ho, in the neighbourhood of Chuang-chia-a-tzu where the artillery of the Yamada detachment, except the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment, was ordered to assemble before dawn.

Moving gradually eastward the battle begins to leave the plains, and to mount into the hills where the main body of the Fourth Army and the left of the First Army were opposed by the 1st Brigade of the 37th Infantry Division and by General Mau, who on this day found his brigade transferred to the third commander under whom he had served since the 5th October. Having started these operations as advanced guard to the Xth Corps, to which he properly belonged, he had on the 9th October been placed under General Zarubaiev with whom he remained until the 12th when he was attached to the 1st Corps.

During the night, San-kuai-shih Shan had been lost and the Russian 145th Regiment had retired in good order but with a loss of nearly one-third of its numbers, to Tung-shan-kou. The 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment, which had been acting with General Mau's brigade since the previous evening, was on the hills east of Pei-san-chia-tzu, and the remainder of the 37th Division, was distributed as follows:—

At Pei-san-chia-tzu—

1st Battalion, 147th (Samara) Regiment and two companies  
148th (Caspian) Regiment.

Near Tung-shan-kou—

2nd, 3rd and 4th‡ Battalions, 147th (Samara) Regiment;  
thirteen companies, 148th (Caspian) Regiment; 43rd  
Artillery Brigade (six batteries).

The other division of this corps was the 22nd which throughout the morning remained in reserve at Kuo-shan-ssu. All night long the staff of the 37th Division, and presumably that of the 22nd Division also, had been in ignorance of the movements of the troops to east and west, but when day dawned some companies of

\* 1st and 2nd Batteries, 9th Artillery Brigade. *Questions de Tactique d'Artillerie*, p. 57 *et seq.*

† i.e., the 21st Brigade and the 11th Regiment less the 2nd Battalion. Great care was to be taken that this concentration should be concealed from the enemy.

‡ This battalion had previously acted as escort to the commander-in-chief. It was on the heights east of the village; the 3rd Battalion was escort to the artillery which was west of the village.

the Xth Corps could be discerned a considerable distance to the right, and General Mau's brigade was discovered to be established on Lo-ta Shan and Shuang-tzu Shan.\* General Mau was very soon engaged with the right of the Fourth Army and left of the First Army, but the troops of the Russian 1st Corps were not attacked.

By Marshal Oyama's orders the Fourth Army had been directed, after capturing San-kuai-shih Shan, to turn against Nan Shan. This General Nodzu proceeded to do so soon as order had been restored in the ranks, and, as the 10th Division had suffered very heavily in the night attack, the fresh duty fell to the lot of the 10th and 11th *Kobi* Brigades. The 10th Division and the 3rd *Kobi* Brigade were held in reserve on and near San-kuai-shih Shan. The objective of the infantry attack was the line of heights to the east of Yang-cheng-sai and Mang-chia-feu, and to protect the flank, which was open to attack from the north, a battalion of the 15th Artillery Regiment was posted near Ta-pu whence it opened fire against the Russian artillery near Tung-shan-kou. The other battalion and the 10th Artillery Regiment (mountain guns) supported the infantry. One Russian battery which was on a hill to the east of Tung-shan-kou was soon made to change position, but the others were securely entrenched and suffered no loss. During the morning they were joined by Colonel Sliusarenko's two batteries which seem to have acted quite independently, and as the attack was not pressed in their direction they had no difficulty in holding their own.

Meanwhile the full weight of the infantry attack fell upon General Mau on Nan Shan and Lo-ta Shan. The Japanese advance was begun by the 3rd Brigade which had captured Temple Hill on the afternoon of the previous day. Six companies of the 29th Regiment, which had been lent by the 3rd Brigade, acted under General Okasaki's command. At 4 a.m., these six companies moved against the heights east of Erh-a; on their left the 16th Infantry Regiment attacked along the southern spurs of Nan Shan; while the 30th Regiment, less two companies in brigade reserve, assailed the same hill from the west. General Okasaki, with his reserve, left west San-chia-tzu and followed in rear of the centre of the 16th Regiment. In front of General Mau's main line of defence a battalion of the 121st (Penza) Regiment and two battalions of the 122nd (Tambov) Regiment were holding a forward line of trenches, with some companies of the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment prolonging the line to the west. As the Japanese advanced, the Russian companies on outpost duty fell back and uncovered the fire of the main position. The six companies of the 29th Regiment occupied the spur of Lo-ta Shan, south-east of Erh-a, almost without opposition, and the 16th Regiment surprised the piquets of the 146th Regiment on the southern slope of Nan Shan. The 30th Regiment at first met

Also called Djosan in some accounts.

with serious resistance, probably from part of the 146th Regiment, but when the 16th Regiment gained a footing on the hill the rest of the defenders fell back in a northerly direction. By this time the 11th *Kobi* Brigade had come up into line from the direction San-kuai-shih, and the 30th Regiment was then brought round behind the 16th into the centre of General Okasaki's attack. Nan Shan was quickly captured by the 16th Regiment, and was then handed over to the Fourth Army. Thence the 11th *Kobi* Brigade continued the attack against the 121st (Penza) Regiment and the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment on Shuang-tzu Shan, and the whole of the 15th Brigade was able to turn against the 122nd (Tambov) Regiment on Lo-ta Shan, where the 29th Regiment was encountering determined opposition.\* The line which General Mau was holding was very strong, and the enfilade fire from the Russian batteries near Tung-shan-kou told heavily on the assaulting infantry.

The whole of the artillery of the 2nd Division was engaged in supporting the attack of the 3rd Brigade further to the east, leaving the batteries of the Fourth Army to assist the attack on General Mau, and to deal with the hostile guns near Tung-shan-kou. Seeing that a heavy attack was coming in the direction of Yang-cheng-sai, two Russian batteries† were moved forward into the centre of the position on Lo-ta Shan. There they came into action against the 11th *Kobi* Brigade on Nan Shan, and the Japanese attack was effectually checked at all points. About midday three Japanese batteries crossed the valley from Pan-lashan-tzu to a new position north of Temple Hill whence they engaged ten guns which had been shelling the 15th Brigade from the neighbourhood of Shao-ta-kou; but even with this accession of strength the infantry were unable to gain another yard of ground. Just about the same time General Mau received a message from General Kuropatkin, whose whole attention seems to have been engrossed by the events in the centre to the neglect of the very serious state of affairs which was developing on his right, saying, "Your position is already advanced compared with the general front; you must therefore hold your ground obstinately, but you must not move forward without my permission." A little later another dispatch was received from the chief of General Kuropatkin's staff saying that General Zarubaiev was compelled to fall back, and that if General Mau was unable to hold on he was to retire to the line Ying-shou-tun—Shih-miao-tzu. Notwithstanding the fact that neither the Penza nor the Tambov Regiments had suffered any serious loss, General Mau decided about 4 p.m. that the time had come to avail himself of this permission to retreat, and he had just begun to do so when he received an order from the 1st Corps telling him at once to reoccupy his abandoned trenches. This he was able to do, and at nightfall the

\* General Nishijima also sent a battalion of the 29th *Kobi* Regiment from the divisional reserve to San-chia-tzu, but it does not appear to have taken any part in the fighting.

† Of the 43rd Artillery Brigade.

Japanese were in exactly the position which they had gained soon after daylight. In the various attempts to carry the heights in front, the Japanese 15th Brigade had lost five hundred and sixty-nine men, probably about 12 per cent. of its numbers, and had expended one hundred and ten thousand rounds of ammunition. A heavy storm broke about midnight, and under the cover it afforded General Okasaki made one more effort to gain possession of Lo-ta Shan, but the Tambov Regiment did not permit itself to be surprised, and the attack was repulsed. A similar attempt which was made against Shuang-tzu Shan about 9 p.m. was likewise beaten.

As some compensation for the check to his left brigade, General Nishijima was able, during the morning of the 12th, to bring his 3rd Brigade across the Shang-liu-ho-tzu valley into line with the troops which had already gained a footing on the northern side. During the previous night General Matsunaga had at last wrested San-cheng-tzu Shan from the enemy and had driven him to the hills above Shao-ta-kou whence he now overlooked the valley. On the hills just to the east of that village, with his right separated from General Mau by a side valley which cut deeply into the Russian position, was General Kossovich with the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment, and two batteries. On his left General Shileiko with the 9th (Tobolsk) and two battalions of the 10th (Omsk) Regiment was falling back in front of the Japanese Guard Division\* ; and on the eastern flank of the 4th Siberian Corps was General Mishchenko who had fallen back from the neighbourhood of Mien-hua-pu towards Hei-niu-tun, where General Levestam had assembled a reserve consisting of the 5th (Irkutsk), 8th (Tomsk), and 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiments. The 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was also retiring, but was keeping rather further to the east. Although, to avoid confusion, it might be wise to treat the attacks by Generals Okasaki and Matsunaga against Generals Mau and Kossovich as separate actions, they must really be considered in their wider aspects as parts of the whole series of operations by the 2nd and Guard Divisions against General Zarubaiev's corps, which, with General Mishchenko's cavalry, formed the centre of the Russian front. Looked upon in this light it will be convenient to disregard for once the actual distribution of the Japanese troops in their line of battle and, leaving General Matsunaga's brigade for the time being on San-cheng-tzu Shan, to turn at once to the Guard Division.

So soon as General Kuroki had become convinced that Watanabe Yama and the hill to the east could not be taken during daylight, he ordered General Asada to desist from making the attempt and to resume his attack at night. At the same time he indicated the village of Tu-men-tzu as the ultimate objective of the Guard Division. Immediately on receiving these instructions, General Asada ordered his right

The Japanese  
3rd Brigade.

The Japanese  
Guard Division.

\* See p. 95.

column, the 1st Brigade, to capture the hill north of Mien-hua-pu before daybreak ; while the left column, the 2nd Brigade, was to advance along Watanabe Yama and to seize Pa-chia-tzu. As there was reason to believe that the principal strength of the enemy was in front of the 2nd Brigade,\* the 1st Brigade was to time its advance by the troops on the left. The advance was to have begun at 2.30 a.m. but the night was very dark, and the ground over which the orderlies had to carry their dispatches was so intricate that orders were delayed and the first movements did not take place until nearly an hour after the proper time.

The right column then advanced down both sides of the Mien-hua-kou valley, the 1st Regiment being directed upon the village of Mien-hua-pu, and the 2nd Regiment upon the hills to the east. Contrary to expectations no resistance was encountered. On reaching the main valley General Izaki, the commander of the brigade, could hear rifle firing some distance away to the west, and then had to decide whether he would wait until the troops on his left were also ready to cross, or whether, taking advantage of the opportunity, he would disregard General Asada's orders and gain a footing on the further hills before daylight. The former was undoubtedly the safer course, but the latter if successful would place him considerably nearer the goal which had been assigned by General Kuroki to the Guard Division. He took the risk, and by 7 a.m. was in occupation of Shan-cheng-tzu Ling, the only enemy encountered on the way being a body of cavalry† which retired in a north-easterly direction from Mien-hua-pu.

The 4th Guard Regiment was almost equally fortunate. One battalion was kept in brigade reserve, while the other two battalions assembled at 2.30 a.m. near the eastern foot of height 774. Thence they moved down into the main valley towards the hills just east of Pa-chia-tzu. Lest they should suddenly meet the 3rd Regiment which was on their left the men were ordered not to fire, but bayonets were carried fixed as it was fully expected that the position which had been held against them during the day would not be surrendered without a stern struggle. The ground was very rough and movement was slow. At every step it was thought that the advance would be detected, and that the regiment must almost immediately be involved in a hand to hand fight. The sound of heavy firing on the left increased the strain ; but the expected did not happen, for the enemy had disappeared, and the only casualties were occasioned by stray shots from Watanabe Yama. As the skirmishing line approached the valley, the position of Pa-chia-tzu could be made out by the glimmer of camp fires about a mile to the north-west. Hitherto the two battalions had moved one behind the other at a distance of a hundred yards ; but day was already beginning to dawn, and as it seemed certain that

\* From observations made during the 11th, it was estimated that there were five battalions and a cavalry regiment in front of the right column, and two infantry regiments and two cavalry regiments in front of the left column. Three batteries were located near Shang-liu-ho-tzu, one near Pa-chia-tzu, one at Mien-hua-pu.

† Probably General Mishchenko's rear guard.

the regiment would soon be exposed to both rifle and artillery fire three companies of the rear battalion were brought up into the front line, and in this formation, with only one company in the second line, the valley was crossed. On nearing the northern side about fifty Russians charged out from Pa-chia-tzu, but were speedily put to flight; and, as the Japanese pursued, two hundred more were seen to be holding a steep ridge east of the village. Without waiting to fire the Japanese charged with the bayonet, the company on the left making for Pa-chia-tzu while the others stormed up the slopes. A battery which was seen approaching from the west was fortunate to escape from the fire of the company in Pa-chia-tzu with the loss of only three wagons; and then the whole eight companies swept forward in line until they were not more than two hundred yards from Shang-liu-ho-tzu. There the commander checked his advance as he was quite ignorant of the whereabouts of the 1st Brigade, and his own right was open to attack from the north. Moreover in his present position he was able to inflict considerable loss upon a body of Russians who were retreating from Watanabe Yama in front of the 3rd Regiment.

Seeing the danger in which the 12th (Barnaul) Regiment had been placed by this rapid advance against the left of the 4th Siberian Corps, General Shileiko placed those of his troops which had retired during the night on the hills to the south and east of Yen-san-sai,\* while General Mishchenko with the cavalry moved still further to the east.

At other points the Russians had evacuated their trenches before the Japanese Guard Division had come down upon them; but the 3rd Regiment caught the last of the rear guards† isolated on the southern side of the valley. When forming for the attack, the 1st Battalion of this regiment was kept in brigade reserve, and one company of the 2nd Battalion was in regimental reserve. Of the remaining seven companies, the 3rd Battalion was to attack from point 774 directly along the ridge, while the three companies of the 2nd Battalion were to move below the eastern slope and to take the enemy in flank.

The advance began at 3 a.m., but the ground to be traversed by the two battalions was so utterly different in character that the formations adopted showed an unusual contrast. The 2nd Battalion in the valley had two companies one hundred yards apart in the front line, and the third company about fifty yards in rear of the centre. The 3rd Battalion had to cross a very difficult piece of ground before reaching the Russian trenches. The hill 774, from which the attack started, is connected with Watanabe Yama by a narrow razor-backed ridge, whose sides slope steeply to east and west. To move on a wide front was impossible, and the battalion was, therefore, drawn up with two companies on either side of the ridge. Each of the leading com-

\* Two battalions of the Omsk Regiment which had been with General Mishchenko seem to have joined General Shileiko.

† Apparently part of the 9th (Tobolsk) Regiment.

panies threw out a section, deployed in rank entire, about fifty yards to the front; behind them came the two other sections of the leading companies in column of fours; the two remaining companies, also in column of fours, followed about a hundred yards in rear. When the advance began, General Watanabe sent three companies from his brigade reserve in a north-westerly direction to protect his left flank, and to drive off a party of the enemy which was believed to be holding a detached post in that direction. Meanwhile, the main force advanced as arranged. When the leading sections of the 3rd Battalion arrived within from fifty to a hundred yards from the enemy's position they were ordered to open fire and the others lay down. After a while the cease fire was sounded, and the two leading companies were deployed in the first line. The advance was then resumed, and when within forty yards of the trenches the sound of whistles was heard. Immediately the Japanese threw themselves on the ground and opened fire. Rifle flashes and hand-grenades showed the position of the enemy's flanks, and to overlap and envelop them one section was sent up from the supports to each wing of the Japanese firing line. In crossing the next twenty yards many men were lost, but the 2nd Battalion came up into line on the right, and the two columns closed almost simultaneously upon the Russian position. In scaling the steep eastern slope of Watanabe Yama the 2nd Battalion had had a very difficult task to perform. After marching some distance down the valley, it wheeled sharply to the left. Just as the wheel was concluded fire was opened both from the crest in front and from the right flank. Three volleys were fired in reply, and then the line charged with the bayonet. Twice the assault was beaten off, but when the 3rd Battalion came up along the ridge another effort was made to carry the hill. A terrific hand-to-hand fight resulted. In many cases the Japanese wrenched the rifles from the hands of the defenders, or when unable to do that they managed to get the bayonets off the muzzles. Whether the Russians were outnumbered in the struggle it is impossible to say, nor is it known whether they were aware of the danger from the 4th Guard Regiment, which was threatening their retreat; but when at last the ridge was won a hundred and eight of the defenders were lying dead on the crest of the hill, while three hundred more were found on the western slope down which they had retreated. The losses in the battalion which had stormed the heights from the east amounted to ten officers, of whom five were killed, and one hundred and ninety-two men, of whom sixty-two were killed\*; those of the battalion which had delivered the frontal attack have not been ascertained, but they were certainly less severe.

For a time the Japanese followed their retreating foe, but at daylight they halted to rest and to take some food. By 10 a.m., the whole of the 3rd Regiment was in Pa-chia-tzu, and again in touch with the 4th Regiment, which was on the spur near Shang-liu-ho-tzu. Two batteries of artillery which had crossed the plain

\* Most of the casualties were caused by hand-grenades.

were in action on the spur above Pa-chia-tzu; another battery was in the plain, and a fourth was preparing to open indirect fire from an admirable position behind a low spur which ran down from Hachimaki Yama into the valley below. About this time a report came in to the divisional staff that a strong force of Russian cavalry and infantry could be seen in the Sha Ho valley near Wai-tou-shan-pu. If this information were correct it might mean that the 1st Brigade was in danger. For some hours it had been out of touch with the rest of the division, and as there was no means of communicating with it, General Asada detached two companies of the 3rd Regiment to Hua-kou-ling Shan to act as a flank guard.

Such was the situation when the 3rd Brigade of the Japanese 2nd Division prepared to cross the valley directly against the ridge upon which General Kossovich's firing line was posted. During the night the six batteries of the 2nd Artillery Regiment had taken up a position in line a little to the north-east of Pan la-shan-tzu, but for some hours after daylight they did not open fire. At 7 a.m., the infantry of the brigade\* left the hardly-won summit of San-cheng-tzu Shan and reached the shelter of Fu-chu-yao† without drawing fire. At 10 a.m., when the two batteries of the Guard Division were established above Pa-chia-tzu, half the artillery of the 2nd Division opened fire. A Russian battery north of Shao-ta-kou was soon silenced, but others near Tu-men-tzu and on the hills north-east of that village continued to reply. Until 11.30 a.m., the Japanese infantry was crowded behind the houses and trees of Fu-chu-yao; but although the Russian shrapnel burst all round the village the loss of life was very small. Had the Russian gunners had high-explosive, or even common shell, the effect of their fire might have been very different. At 11.30 a.m. General Matsunaga gave the word to advance. Immediately, the men broke from behind their cover and raced across the six hundred yards of perfectly open ground between Fu-chu-yao and the shelter of the hills and ridges on the further side. In many respects the principal features of General Okasaki's attack of the previous afternoon were faithfully reproduced. The speed at which the men moved and the rapidity with which the danger zone was crossed again enabled them to perform, with comparatively slight loss,‡ a feat which must otherwise have proved very costly. Twice or thrice only did the assailants halt as they crossed the fire-swept zone, and on reaching the other side, without halting to re-form, dashed straight at the enemy on the nearest ridge.

For several hours the Barnaul and Semipalatinsk Regiments

\* 4th Regiment on the right, one and a half battalions 29th Regiment on the left. Divisional head-quarters with two battalions of the 29th *Kobi* Regiment spent the night at a village south-east of Ta Shan. Another reserve battalion was sent in the morning to San-chia-tzu, to support the one and a half battalions of the 29th Regiment attached to the 15th Brigade.

† Called in some accounts Chien-chiao-cheng.

‡ The loss is said to have been 29 killed and 213 wounded.

(4725)



had been exposed to the fire of the 15th Brigade from the west, the 2nd Guard Brigade to the east, and the concentrated bombardment of eight batteries of artillery. The colonel and four other officers of the Barnaul Regiment had been killed, twelve officers had been wounded, and the casualties among the men numbered nearly four hundred. The impossibility of holding the ridge had been foreseen, and General Zarubaiev's reserves had prepared a second position on the hills to the north, where they were joined between 9 and 10 a.m. by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 147th (Samara) Regiment and two batteries of the 43rd Artillery Brigade.\* Thus when General Matsunaga's brigade attacked, the defenders were already meditating retreat. For once there was no hand-to-hand fighting, and when the Japanese reached the crest the Russians were retiring in good order, through a tornado of shot and shell, to their second position. The whole of the Guard and 2nd Divisions were now established on the northern side of the valley. At every point the Russians were giving way, and at 12.15 p.m. a report reached General Kuroki telling him that the Guard Division was on the hills east of Tu-men-tzu, where it was opposed only by about two infantry battalions and four guns, and that the Fourth Army had reached Mang-chia-fen. So far as the Fourth Army was concerned the report was not quite true, and, coupled with the latest success by the 3rd Brigade, it gave the commander the impression that the battle was progressing rather more favourably than was actually the case. He knew that General Inouye, on his right, was still in difficulties, but hitherto there had been no troops available to send to the assistance of the 12th Division. Now, however, he felt that his left might safely be weakened, and at 1 p.m., he ordered General Nishijima to detach one of his brigades to fall upon the flank and rear of the troops which were operating against the right of the First Army. Of the two brigades available the 3rd appeared to be the more conveniently placed, and at 2 p.m., just as he was contemplating a further advance, General Matsunaga received instructions to "move to the right as quickly as possible and occupy the pass at Chao-hsien Ling." To break off the engagement and then to march up an open valley fully exposed to the fire of the Russian artillery was clearly impossible, so General Matsunaga decided, apparently with the approval of his superior, to maintain his position until nightfall and to move to the right under cover of darkness.

While the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies were closing in from all sides upon General Zarubaiev, General Kuropatkin was carrying on an animated correspondence with the commander of the Eastern Force, with regard to the disposal of the reserves. At the beginning of the day the only body of troops remaining under the control of the commander-in-chief was the 22nd Infantry Division. He was still ignorant of the fact that General Stakelberg had abandoned the offensive on the night of

The situation  
on the eastern  
flank.

\* From the 37th Division.

the 11th,\* and so far as he was aware the attack was still progressing favourably. In these circumstances it appeared probable that the 2nd Siberian Corps would not be required to support the Eastern Force, and that it would be better employed in co-operation with the 4th Siberian Corps. With this object he wrote to General Stakelberg at 5 a.m. in the following terms—“Immediately upon the receipt of this order you are to send all the available reserve of the 2nd Siberian Corps to join the 4th Siberian Corps until further orders. One battalion and some artillery should secure the Ti-ti Shan, and if possible ten battalions should be sent to the 4th Siberian Corps.” This dispatch did not reach its destination until 11 a.m., and it was crossed by a report which was sent off at 6 a.m. from Hsiao-shih-chiao-tzu by General Stakelberg. In it he stated that “The situation has undergone no alteration during the night. The troops of the Eastern Force are still in the same positions. The 1st Siberian Corps has one regiment in reserve; General Ivanov has five battalions. My general reserve, the 2nd Siberian Corps, is between Hsiao-shih-chiao-tzu and Hsia-ping-tai-tzu with a regiment holding the road from Shang-ping-tai-tzu to Nanshan-pu and rather nearer to the latter village. Heavy rifle and artillery fire has just opened in the direction of my right flank. Should the 4th Siberian Corps be compelled to fall back and in doing so to expose my right, and should the enemy take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him to attempt to penetrate between the two corps, I will at once assume the offensive with the whole of my reserve (14 battalions) from Pien-niu-lu-pu against his right flank. The 1st and 3rd Corps will hold the Japanese to their present positions. It is most desirable that the 4th Siberian Corps should co-operate with me by attacking the left flank of any hostile troops which may interpose between us.”

This message, it will be noticed, gave no true picture of the state of affairs in the eastern front, for it expressly omitted to state that the plan of carrying the passes by assault had proved impracticable. The most that it did was to imply that General Stakelberg was contemplating a possible counter-stroke with his reserve, in preference to persevering with the direct attack by the 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps. Before it reached army head-quarters General Kuropatkin, who evidently anticipated an early success by the Eastern Force, had instructed General Zarubaiev that, if he found himself unable to withstand the Japanese advance, the direction of the retreat was to be towards Erh-tao-kou, about three miles north of Feng-chi-pu, and had authorized him to demand, in the name of the commander-in-chief, that the 2nd Siberian Corps should be sent to the latter village, every foot of ground was to be disputed with the enemy, and a resolute stand was to be made on the heights south of Ho-ma-tang. The possibility that the 2nd Siberian Corps might be withdrawn from his command was communicated to General Stakelberg by the commander-in-chief in a dispatch which, moreover, ended by saying, “I have

\* See General Stakelberg's orders, p. 44.

to-day ordered General Gerngross\* to come to the help of General Zarubaiev by moving a brigade to his extreme right." Not only, therefore, was General Stakelberg faced by the possibility of his reserve being requisitioned at any moment by the 4th Siberian Corps, without further reference to the commander-in-chief, but also found that orders were passing directly from army headquarters to his subordinate.† At 9.45 a.m., General Stakelberg again put before the commander-in-chief his own views as to how his force might best be employed, saying, among other things, "Should the 4th Siberian Corps continue its retreat towards the Ho-ma-tang position, I will support it with the 2nd Siberian Corps. With this intention I have moved a regiment from my reserve to a position west of Pien-niu-lu-pu, where it is facing south-west. My reserve artillery is at Pien-niu-lu-pu. If necessary I intend to attack the right flank of the enemy as he follows the 4th Siberian Corps."

It would appear that, after hearing General Stakelberg's views, General Kuropatkin came to the conclusion that he must call upon the 22nd Division, for at 1.30 p.m. Lieutenant-General Affanasovich was ordered to send a brigade with a division of artillery to support the 4th Siberian Corps. The 85th (Viborg), 87th (Neishlot), and a division, *i.e.*, four batteries, of the 7th Artillery Brigade were at once sent off eastward. The 85th Regiment and the artillery reached the neighbourhood of Hei-niu-tun about 7 p.m., and were there met by orders to bivouac and to act as reserve to the 4th Siberian Corps. The 87th was halted about 4 p.m. at Ying-shou-tun, where the 1st Battalion was placed at the disposal of General Mau. Meanwhile, so soon as it had become evident, about 11.30 a.m., that a retreat to the Ho-ma-tang position was inevitable,‡ General Zarubaiev had taken advantage of the authority vested in him by the commander-in-chief to order the 2nd Siberian Corps to Feng-chi-pu. Some two and a half hours later, on hearing that reinforcements were on their way from the 22nd Division, he wrote to General Kuropatkin suggesting that it might be as well to cancel the order, as he considered that he was now sufficiently strong to extricate himself from the Japanese attacks.

Long before this new view of the situation could be communicated to him, General Stakelberg had reported to the commander-in-chief that§ "To protect myself as well as the 4th Siberian Corps against any possibility of the Japanese

\* General Gerngross commanded the 1st Siberian Corps, and was directly under the command of General Stakelberg.

† The correspondence was conducted by telegram, but the average time taken by a message from General Kuropatkin to General Stakelberg, or the reverse, seems to have been about four and a half hours.

‡ *i.e.*, when the Japanese 3rd Brigade was on the point of advancing to the attack. General Zarubaiev informed General Stakelberg of the step he had taken, but his message was not received until 7 p.m.

§ This report was really in reply to the dispatch in which General Stakelberg had been informed that the 2nd Siberian Corps might be required by General Zarubaiev.

penetrating between us in the direction of Chao-chien-hu-tun\* and Pien-niu-lu-pu, I have sent the 2nd Siberian Corps to a position south of Tang-chia-tun—Su-ma-pu-tzu, where it will face to the south-west and be in touch with the 1st Siberian Corps by way of the Chao-hsien Ling. During the night I intend to withdraw as many men as possible out of my firing line to strengthen my corps reserve, so as the better to protect the right flank of the 1st Siberian Corps. Owing to the excellent posts of observation in the hands of the enemy, it would be difficult to do this without revealing the fact that we are withdrawing some of our reserves. The general reserve, *i.e.*, the 2nd Siberian Corps, in strength seven battalions, is between Ta-tzu-pu and Wai-tou-shan-pu at the foot of the northern slope of the Pagoda Hill, where it is concealed from the Japanese. I have no reserves under my own command, as I am keeping the 2nd Siberian Corps in readiness to march to some intermediate position whence it can be placed at the disposal of the commander of the 4th Siberian Corps whenever he should ask for it in Your Excellency's name. In this connexion, I consider it my duty to point out to you that, so soon as the 2nd Siberian Corps moves from its present position, the range of hills between Chao-chien-hu-tun and the Chao-hsien Ling will be stripped of troops, and entirely open to attack."

Without waiting for this reply to his earlier messages, General Kuropatkin sent off yet another at 1.15 p.m. to the commander of the Eastern Force, "General Zarubaiev has been compelled by the enemy to retire from the Shang-liu-ho-tzu—Pa-chia-tzu position towards Yen-san-sai and Ho-ma-tang. I am sending him the 22nd Infantry Division. Immediately upon the receipt of this order, send the 2nd Siberian Corps by forced march to Chao-chien-hu-tun, and further if the situation of the 4th Siberian Corps should render it advisable to do so. The situation of the 1st Siberian Corps seems to me to be precarious. It must be allowed to retreat independently, without close co-operation with the left of the 4th Corps. Let me know your intention with regard to co-operation between the 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps." Not long after the dispatch of this missive, General Kuropatkin heard that General Zarubaiev had no further need for the assistance of the 2nd Siberian Corps. As the day was then drawing towards its close, and as General Matsunaga and the Japanese 3rd Brigade had suspended the attack, he appears to have taken a more favourable view of the general situation; for at 5.45 p.m., apparently in total ignorance of the disaster to his western wing, he wrote to General Stakelberg saying, "The XVIIth and Xth Corps have held their own at all points until sunset. The 4th Siberian Corps, by falling back a little, has come into line with the other troops, and now that it has been reinforced by some fresh regiments, has occupied a very strong position. I have no news for you. You need not carry out my orders with regard to the 2nd Siberian Corps, now that I have reinforced the 4th Siberian with parts of

\* Called in some accounts Yen-sin-tun.

the 1st Corps. I hear that the 1st Siberian Corps is now in touch with General Zarubaiev's left."

The result of all this correspondence was that during the 12th October the 2nd Siberian Corps was again unused, and at night it was still on the hills between Shang-ping-tai-tzu and Wai-tou Shan, in readiness either to cover a retreat or to co-operate with the centre or left of General Kuropatkin's army.

Turning now from General Stakelberg's reserves to his fighting line, it has already been seen that General Zarubaiev's decision to retreat across the Shih-li Ho, during the night of the 11th-12th had had the effect of causing the commander of the Eastern Force, who had already abandoned the idea of another night attack, definitely to suspend his advance, and to pass to

General Stakelberg's final attack on the passes.

the defensive. Nevertheless, apparently to conceal this change of plan, several isolated assaults were delivered against certain points, and the general bombardment of the Japanese position was resumed at daylight. About 4 a.m., the advanced trenches at the Tu-men-tzu Ling were attacked by the 34th and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. The assailants, using hand-grenades, fought with great determination, and a few resolute men at one moment succeeded in effecting a lodgment at the western end. There, however, they were dominated by other trenches to the east, and in a few minutes they were forced to retire down the slopes. Some were unable to escape and, since at night they were still in the Japanese trenches, they presumably surrendered. One hundred and thirty-three of their comrades, including three officers,\* were found dead in front of the trenches.

At the Ta Ling, the Japanese had a harder task to hold their own. At 3 a.m., a considerable body of the enemy, estimated at a regiment,† was seen by the Japanese outposts to be advancing up the path towards the pass. Not a shot was fired until the hostile column was only about four hundred and fifty yards from the top. Then the mountain guns at the pass opened with great effect and checked the attack. For the next two hours nothing more happened, but at 5 a.m., the isolated knoll Pa-ma Shan, which became known later as Gunki Yama or Standard Hill, some three hundred yards in front of the main line of defence, was rushed and a company of infantry which was on outpost duty was cut to pieces after a sharp tussle. The attack soon became general, and the Japanese commander decided that Pa-ma Shan must be retaken. The two mountain guns were moved from the pass to a position two hundred and fifty yards to the west, whence they shelled the table-topped hill upon which the Russians had established themselves. With this support, a Japanese colonel, carrying the standard of his regiment, led forward to the assault three com-

\* One of whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Pekuto, chief of the staff of the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, who was directing the attack.

† This attack was delivered by the 22nd East Siberian Rifle Regiment, now reduced to a composite battalion, and five companies of the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment. Russian accounts make no mention of this first outburst of firing.

panies, including the remnant of the outpost which had been driven in earlier. Before going far he was badly wounded in the chest and one leg, and almost immediately afterwards he was struck by two more bullets. The major seized the standard, but being wounded in his turn, he entrusted it to the adjutant, who was shot almost at once. A private took his place, and shortly before 7 a.m. the flag was planted triumphantly on the top of the hill. When the Russians retired, one hundred and twenty-nine were left lying dead on the hill-top and on the ground to the north of it; the Japanese in this little affair alone had seventy killed and two hundred wounded.

Simultaneously with the attack upon the Ta Ling the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Siberian Division under General Mardanov made an attempt to effect a lodgment in the Japanese position just north of Ming Shan. On the previous evening this brigade had been sent from the reserve with orders to cross the river, recross, and await orders at the foot of the hills. The guides lost their way in the darkness, but after wandering about until 3 a.m. they brought General Mardanov to the neighbourhood of the appointed rendezvous. Apparently, it was not yet known that the general night attack by the Eastern Force had been given up, and an assault was delivered about 5 a.m. The Russians as usual attacked with the utmost gallantry. Again and again the officers, who fought in their shirt sleeves, led their men to the summit only to be beaten back with heavy loss. An outpost on the Japanese right was stormed, but during the night the defenders had so far improved their main line of works that at the end of an hour's fighting there were only forty casualties in this section.\* While it was still dark the assaulting columns drew off, and at daybreak the Japanese could see the enemy facing them sullenly from trenches on a ridge not three hundred yards away. For some hours longer the Russian artillery distributed its fire upon the position on either side of the Tai-tzu, but about 10 a.m. the arrival of the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade from Chiao-tou gave the final blow to the Russian chance of success, and by nightfall the left of General Kuropatkin's army was in retreat.

The last stage to be described in this long day's fighting is the action of Generals Samsonov and Liubavin on the south side of the river. From early morning Russian patrols sent in word that the enemy was approaching from south and south-west; and the officer in command at Wei-ning-ying reported that a hostile force had been located between six and seven miles to the southward. This force was Prince Kanin's cavalry brigade which, reinforced by about twelve hundred and fifty men hastily collected from the line of communication, had left Chiao-tou at 3 a.m. After brushing aside a few patrols the brigade arrived opposite Pen-hsi-hu a little before 10 a.m. An hour and a half later Prince Kanin's machine guns were brought quietly up on to the ridge, and suddenly opened fire upon two battalions of Russian infantry at a range of about fifteen hundred yards. This attack, which seems to have

Arrival of the  
Japanese 2nd  
Cavalry Brigade.

\* About three hundred Russian dead were found in front of this section

come as a complete surprise, was then turned against the Russian advanced trenches, with the result that the left was forced to beat a somewhat hurried retreat. In view of the reports which had already been received as to the approach of other hostile forces, General Liubavin began to realize that his position was becoming precarious. Japanese infantry was crowning the heights to the south and, under fire from several directions, the Russian guns were man-handled out of action for a distance of over two hundred yards. An immediate retreat up the river was impossible as it would expose the flank of the troops on the other bank, but so soon as General Samsonov heard that the infantry was in retreat he withdrew towards Wei-ning-ying, followed by Prince Kanin's cavalry. A running fight was kept up until 6.30 p.m. when Prince Kanin drew off to the Chiao-tou—Pen-hsi-hu road, leaving his opponents to make good their retreat across the river during the night.

The opportune arrival of the Japanese 2nd Cavalry Brigade was but the *coup de grâce* to a plan which delay and hesitation had already doomed to failure. Twelve hours earlier General Failure of the Stakelberg had definitely abandoned a movement Russian offensive. which had ceased to have any prospect of success; but it was not until Prince Kanin's horsemen appeared on the heights to the southward that the defenders of Pen-hsi-hu knew that they were safe. On the evening of the 7th October the situation had seemed so hopeless that the officer in command had actually retired when he heard that reinforcements were hurrying to his assistance. Before daylight on the 8th the hills were reoccupied, and for the next four days the slender garrison held its own against vastly superior numbers. The fighting was hottest on the 11th, on which day the 14th Regiment alone had a hundred and forty-six men killed and six hundred and thirty-two wounded; and when it finally ceased on the afternoon of the 12th the weak battalion of the 39th *Kobi* Regiment, which had at first been entirely without support, had practically ceased to exist, only some eighty unwounded men being able to take their place in the ranks.

## CHAPTER XLI.

## THE 13TH OCTOBER.—THE BEGINNING OF THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.

(Map V/6.)

By 7 p.m. on the 12th October, Marshal Oyama had definitely gained the upper hand and henceforth it was he who dictated the course of the battle. In five days, from the 5th to the 10th, General Kuropatkin's Western Force had advanced some twenty miles from the Hun Ho to the Shih-li Ho, while his Eastern Force had reached the Tai-tzu and threatened to turn the Japanese right. So soon as the general plan of battle had become intelligible to him, but while it was still far from clear, Marshal Oyama had moved out from his camps to meet the Western Force half-way, leaving a weak force to hold the passes on his own right. The two armies may be said to have come into collision on the 10th, and by the evening of the 12th the Russian right wing had been hurled back to the Sha Ho; the left wing had abandoned the offensive and was meditating retreat; but in the centre the 4th Siberian Corps supported by the 1st Corps, was still holding a salient position where it was in danger of being crushed between the Japanese Fourth Army on the west, and the 2nd and Guard Divisions on the east.

On the other hand it is evident that Marshal Oyama had not been able to carry into effect his intention, which had been foreshadowed in his orders of the 10th, to break the Russian line of battle somewhere near the railway; but the inactivity of the 6th Siberian Corps and of General Dembovski's detachment had enabled him to envelop the right of the XVIIth Corps. Even before this disaster had occurred the 4th Siberian Corps had begun to fall back across the Shih-li Ho, and General Stakelberg had initiated his preparations for retreat. The first step towards the final reverse may, therefore, be said to have been General Shileiko's retirement from heights 774 and 787 which eventually enabled the Japanese to penetrate as far north as Ma-erh Shan. There the right of the Guard Division was dangerously exposed to an attack of the 2nd Siberian Corps, while the wide gap between it and the 12th Division was guarded only by the Guard and 2nd Division Cavalry under Colonel Kasa. Meanwhile the Japanese 3rd Brigade was hurrying from the ridge above Hsia-liu-ho-tzu, up the valley of the Shih-li Ho against the flank of the Russian Eastern Force which was believed to be in retreat.

In the matter of reserves the Russians were better off, numerically at least, than were their opponents. To the west, General Dembovski had not fired a shot, nor had the greater part



of the 6th Siberian Corps. In the centre, the 22nd Division was intact although its units were scattered. The 2nd Siberian Corps, to the south-west of Pien-niu-lu-pu, was available for use in support either of General Zarubaiev or General Stakelberg, and in the extreme south-east, when the order for retreat was issued, General Ivanov still had the 11th and 12th East Siberian Rifle Regiments under his own control. In contrast to this great reserve of strength, the only force under the immediate control of the Japanese commander-in-chief, was the 5th Division, which had been withdrawn from the fighting and was in the neighbourhood of Chuang-chai-a-tzu. Some small local reserves there still were. In the Second Army, the 19th Brigade had not yet been engaged; in the Fourth Army, the 3rd *Kobi* Brigade had had only twenty-seven men wounded; but in the First Army the only fresh infantry was the 11th *Kobi* Regiment which had come from Chiao-tou with Prince Kanin.

Such, in a few words, was the general condition of the two armies when Marshal Oyama issued the following order for the 13th\* :—

Marshal Oyama's  
orders for the  
13th October.

- (1) The enemy in front of our armies is believed to be in retreat towards Mukden. Fighting still continues in the direction of Li-shu-ti-hsia and Pen-hsi-hu. The First Army intends to detach to the east part of the Guard and 2nd Divisions, as well as the Kigoshi detachment which was on the right flank of the First Army, to cut off the retreat of the enemy in the direction of Li-shu-ti-hsia. At 2.20 p.m. a large column of the enemy could be seen advancing south-eastward from Huang-chia-tien.†
- (2) Our armies will pursue the enemy as far as the left bank of the Sha Ho.
- (3) The First Army should pursue and endeavour to reach a line from the left bank of the Sha Ho through Hsiu-chia-wen to Pei-kou, and if practicable to occupy the hill north of Feng-chi-pu with a part of the army. I approve the plan of cutting off the retreat of the enemy in the direction of Li-shu-ti-hsia, and hope for the immediate execution of the plan in accordance with the scheme forwarded to me from the First Army commander.
- (4) The Fourth Army should pursue the enemy in front, and endeavour to reach the line from the hill east of Pu-tsao-a to Chang-ling-tzu. A special reconnaissance should be carried out in the direction of Huang-shan-ling.
- (5) The Second Army should pursue and, if practicable, gain the line Sha-ho-pu—Lin-sheng-pu, and send a strong detachment to Kuan-lin-pu to protect the left flank

\* The exact hour of issue of these orders is not known; they reached General Oku at 7.50 p.m.

† This statement would appear to refer to the movements of the Russian 22nd Division.

against a possible attack from the direction of Su-hu-chia-pu. Should the enemy at Sha-ho-pu be in a well-defended position, with all kinds of field works, the army should not attempt to capture the village, but should hold the line to the left of, and in close co-operation with, the Fourth Army.

- (6) The general reserve, *i.e.*, the main body of the 5th Division, will remain in readiness near Chuang-chia-a-tzu, in a position where it cannot be observed by the enemy. The Yamada Detachment, which threatened the enemy in the direction of Hung-chia-chuang, should endeavour to advance towards Huang-chia-tien after establishing connexion with the right of the Second Army.

The mountain artillery regiment and foot artillery corps should prepare to rejoin the 5th Division.

- (7) The following are to be the lines of demarcation between the different armies :—

- (a) Between the First and Fourth Armies—Ta Shan (north-west of Feng-chi-pu), Ho-shang-kou, Yang-cheng-sai, Pan-la-shan-tzu, Chi-tai-tzu, Hsiao-ta-lien-kou. These villages will be available for use by the First Army.

- (b) Between the Fourth and Second Armies—Shan-kan-tzu (north-east of Sha-ho-pu), San-tao-kang-tzu, Huang-chia-tien, Hung-pao-shan, Hung-chai-chuang, Shan-wo-pu, and Yen-tai station. These villages will be available for use by the Fourth Army.

- (8) The head-quarters of the commander-in-chief of the Japanese armies will be at Yen-tai.

In order to preserve the continuity of the story, it will be as well, instead of returning to the Japanese left, to resume the narrative at the point where it was left off when the 3rd Siberian Corps had retired across the Tai-tzu. Moreover, since practically the whole of the fighting on the 13th took place to the east of the Mukden high road, the operations of the Japanese Second Army are of less importance than are those of the troops under Generals Nodzu and Kuroki.

General Kuroki's intention for the 13th, of which Marshal Oyama expressed approval, was conveyed to his army in the following order, which was issued from the head-quarters of the First Army at 6 p.m. on the 12th :—

- (1) The Fourth Army has already occupied the height north of Mang-chia-fen and the line of hills west of that place.

The Second Army is fighting a winning battle near Pan-chiao-pu and will advance towards Sha-ho-pu.

- (2) I intend to pursue the Russians, hitting them as hard as possible.
- (3) The Guard Division will press back the enemy towards Hsiu-chia-wen and Hsing-lung-tun, south of Feng-chi-

pu; and if possible will occupy with a detachment the height north of the last named village.

The 2nd Division will push forward along the line Pei-kou to Ho-shang-kou, and will try to occupy Ta Shan. So soon as this has been effected the two divisions will concentrate their forces and prepare to push on further. The 3rd Brigade which is at present moving against the Russians in front of the 12th Division will continue to carry out previous orders.

The inadequacy of the means of communication between the various sections of the Russian army is forcibly illustrated by the fact that long after the above orders had been issued by the Japanese commanders General Kuropatkin still believed that it was possible to resist the Japanese advance with his western wing, on the Hung-pao-shan—Hung-ling-pu line, while his eastern wing continued to prosecute its attacks against the passes. It was not until the morning of the 13th that he learned, for the first time, that this plan was no longer practicable. Throughout the night his only anxiety had been with regard to his centre, whence it was reported that General Mau had again evacuated the Lo-ta Shan without permission. At daylight, however, a true report of the previous day's fighting reached army head-quarters, which had been moved from the neighbourhood of Tung-shan-kou to Liu-chiang-tun on the left bank of the Sha Ho. Then General Kuropatkin heard that the Xth and XVIIth Corps had been driven back to the Sha Ho, and that even on the eastern flank the Japanese had become the aggressors.\* The serious position in which the 1st Corps and the 4th Siberian Corps were placed was thus suddenly revealed, but the opportunity for a successful counter-attack against the right of the Guard Division was less easy to realize.

At 3.55 a.m. on the 13th, a second message was received from General Stakelberg, who was at Pien-niu-lu-pu, in which he stated that "The further retreat of the 4th Siberian Corps exposes my rear. I must therefore ask that measures shall be taken to secure my right flank and my rear. I can do nothing myself as I have no reserves."† These messages left no room for doubt as to the complete failure of the Eastern Force, and at 10 a.m., probably about half an hour after the second had come in, General Kuropatkin sent the following instructions: "The XVIIth Corps has met with a reverse and has retired behind the Sha Ho. This blow, coupled with the unsuccessful operations of the eastern wing and its failure to capture the passes, compels me to abandon the task which I had allotted to the troops under your

\* The wording of the message from General Stakelberg is not known, but it appears to have contained an assurance that he was prepared to fight to the last on the position to which he had fallen back on the evening of the 12th, and that there would be no retreat.

† When this message was dispatched General Stakelberg had not heard that the 2nd Siberian Corps was again placed under his orders (see p. 99). This information did not reach him until 9.45 a.m., although it had been sent off at 10.15 p.m. on the 12th.

command and to order their retreat northward in order to establish closer connexion between them and the rest of the army. You are to break off all operations in the passes, and to concentrate your troops in a position where they will cover the left flank of the army. This concentration must be carried out as rapidly as possible, as any further disaster to the right wing may necessitate a retreat to Mukden to-morrow. Please convey to Rennenkampf my orders to go to San-chia-tzu to protect the army from an advance in that direction . . .”\*

Many hours before this order was received General Rennenkampf and the cavalry were in full retreat. General Petrov's brigade took the mountain road; while part, if not all, of the cavalry followed the shorter but more exposed route along the river, which had to be forded twice before San-chia-tzu could be reached. Rain fell in torrents, and in places the road was almost washed away, but the Russians were so far fortunate that their retreat was not harassed by Prince Kanin, who contented himself with occupying the hills south of Wei-ning-ying. North of the river, a company of Russian infantry was seen at daylight near Ho-ti-kou, but when it retired about 7 a.m. the only bodies of the enemy which were visible from the Japanese position in front of Pen-hsi-hu were General Rennenkampf's rear guards which stayed on the hills above Wei-ning-ying until dark.

At the Ta Ling and Tu-men-tzu Ling the Russian artillery kept up an incessant, but practically harmless, bombardment of the Japanese trenches from daylight until nightfall. Two weak attacks were also made upon the northern pass a little before dawn. Otherwise no serious infantry operations were undertaken, but General Stakelberg announced in resolute language both to General Gerngross and General Ivanov that he had no thought of retreat. The arrival of General Kuropatkin's message put a different complexion upon the situation, and about midday orders were issued for a general withdrawal of the whole of the Eastern Force during the coming night.

Fortunately for General Stakelberg the Japanese 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade were in no condition to interfere with his movements. To meet the attacks of the Russian Eastern Force they had been strung out over a front of nearly thirteen miles, and it was quite impossible for the exhausted men to strike at or to keep in touch with the retreating foe. The only danger which might have threatened the Russian movement was from the direction of the Chao-hsien Ling where, at daylight on the 13th, the flank guard had been attacked, with great determination but without success by General Matsunaga's brigade.

This brigade† had marched all night through pouring rain

\* von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei*, Vol. II, p. 122. Apparently the line Pien-niu-lu-pu—Kao-tai Ling was suggested as the best available for the Eastern Force.

† See p. 98. The composition of the brigade was, 4th Regiment, one and a half battalions, 29th Regiment, two field batteries, one troop of cavalry, and two companies of engineers. The rest of the 29th Regiment was attached to the 15th Brigade.

The maps were practically useless, and once at least General Matsunaga lost his way; but at 5 a.m. his advanced guard was within two hundred yards of the Russian position, which was held against him by the 3rd and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments. The amount of work which had been done by General Matsunaga's men during the previous forty-eight hours is astonishing. They fought all through the 11th. On the night of the 11th-12th they stormed San-cheng-tzu Shan. On the 12th they attacked across the Shih-li Ho valley, and effected a lodgment on the foot-hills on the further side. Starting at 7 p.m. that evening, they made a long night march, which, a little before daybreak, brought them to the foot of a formidable mountain pass, which they then proceeded to attack. A heavy thunderstorm was raging, and by the aid of the lightning the commander of the brigade was able to make out the general lie of the Russian position; and at 6.30 a.m., although his guns were still far to the rear, he sent forward his infantry to the assault. The slopes were steep and slippery, and it soon became evident that without the aid of artillery there was no chance of success. At 7 a.m., the two field batteries reached Shang-yin-chiang-pu, and immediately came into action near the road, using both shrapnel and high-explosive shell. When the trenches had been steadily bombarded for about an hour the infantry again attacked, but with no better success, and General Matsunaga then decided to abandon the attempt. About midday it was reported that a body of the enemy was coming down from the Hsin-kai Ling against his left. To meet this threat Colonel Kasa's cavalry\* came up between the 3rd Brigade and the right of the 3rd Guard Regiment, and General Matsunaga posted a portion of his reserve on the hills to the north of the road. This show of resistance proved sufficient, and as the attack was not seriously pressed the two forces faced one another without any change of position until night.

General Kuroki's bold attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat had therefore failed. The false report that General Nodzu's army had reached the heights north of Mang-chia-fent† had induced him to withdraw a brigade from his left in the hope of bringing off a decisive *coup* against the enemy on his right; but by doing so he had weakened the rest of his line to such an extent that, as will be seen later, he narrowly escaped a serious disaster.

Meanwhile, the correspondence between Generals Kuropatkin and Stakelberg still continued, and the difficulties occasioned by the want of any well-considered plan cannot better be described than in the report of the commander of the Eastern Force dispatched to the commander-in-chief soon after midday. "To-day at 9.45 a.m.," wrote General Stakelberg, "I received the

\* A composite force made up from the Guard Cavalry Regiment and 2nd Cavalry Regiment.

† See p. 98.

instruction of the chief of the staff of the army, dated 10.15 p.m. 12th September, saying that the 2nd Siberian Corps was again placed under my orders. Thereupon I immediately arranged to send part of it towards the right of the 1st Siberian Corps to check a turning movement which was developing against the Chao-hsien Ling. One regiment and a battery was to be left on the heights which enclose the Pien-niu-lu-pu valley on the south; the rest of the reserve was to stay at Pien-niu-lu-pu. At 11.5 a.m., I received your second dispatch of 5 a.m. this morning, in which I was instructed to send without delay the whole of the available reserve of the 2nd Siberian Corps to join the 4th Siberian Corps. By that time my arrangements which had been made in accordance with your earlier dispatch were already being carried out. Nevertheless, I sent off six and a half battalions with four batteries and a squadron of dragoons to the help of the 4th Siberian Corps. Soon afterwards I sent another battalion and a half. This detachment, which was under Lieutenant-General Alexeiev, was taken from my general reserve (south of Tang-chia-tun) and directed towards Hua-kou.\* The rest of the 2nd Siberian Corps is holding the heights south of Pien-niu-lu-pu in rear of the 1st Siberian Corps. I have this moment received your orders of 10 a.m. for a general northward retreat. I will carry it out at nightfall."

At last, as the result of this prolonged interchange of orders and reports, the 2nd Siberian Corps was deployed for attack.†

Both time and direction were well chosen. The Japanese Guard Division was already heavily engaged, and when this fresh enemy was sent against its right flank the 3rd Regiment, after holding its own till 6 p.m., was driven off the hills. Partly owing to darkness and partly, no doubt, owing to the decision to retreat during the night, General Alexeiev failed to follow up this success. A more determined commander, or one trained in a different school of war, might possibly have interpreted the letter of his orders in a more liberal spirit; but the retreat was to begin at 7 p.m., and he knew that the troops on his left would soon be on the move. General Stakelberg's orders were explicit. The 2nd Siberian Corps was to march to Tai-chia-miao-tzu, leaving a rear guard at Tsai-chia-tun; the 1st Siberian Corps was to take up a

\* Ha-mi-tan in the report quoted. The place referred to cannot be exactly identified, but the actual direction of this movement was towards Hua-kou.

† The 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, two and a half battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, a battalion of the Chita Regiment, and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade were in the front line, two battalions of the 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, the 213th (Orovai) Regiment, and the 6th Battery of the 26th Artillery Brigade were in reserve, two companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and a battalion of the 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment were left on the hills south-west of Pien-niu-lu-pu; the 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was already with the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment on the Chao-hsien Ling. Part of this force was engaged with General Matsunaga's flank guard at the Hsin-kai Ling.

defensive line from Kuan-tai to Fei-tsun-pu, with its rear guard at Kang-ta-jen-san; the 3rd Siberian Corps was to establish itself between Pan-miao Ling and Pa-chia-tzu, with rear guards at Hou-lu-tzu-kou, Wang-fu Ling, and Hua-ling. What the effect of pushing home the attack might have been it is impossible to say. General Matsunaga's brigade would have been in serious danger; he had already been repulsed with heavy loss from the Chao-hsien Ling, his flank guard at the Hsin-kai Ling was engaged with the enemy, and his rear was protected from attack only by Colonel Kasa's cavalry.

The situation of the Japanese Guard Division would have been hardly less unpleasant. Immediately it became known on the night of the 12th that the attack was to be continued on the next day, General Asada issued the following orders to the Guard Division:—

- (1) The remainder of the 3rd Guard Regiment and a battery, under General Watanabe, will occupy the line Hua-kou-ling Shan—Yen-lung Shan\* to protect the right of the division. This detachment will be recalled as soon as possible.
- (2) The 1st Brigade to advance at 6 a.m. and attack Ma-erh Shan with a detachment while the main force attacks Chien Shan.
- (3) One battalion of the 4th Regiment to advance in line with the left of the 1st Brigade against the enemy on the hills east of Tu-men-tzu.
- (4) The artillery to assist the attack by the battalion of 4th Regiment from its present positions.
- (5) The divisional reserve, *i.e.*, the two remaining battalions of the 4th Regiment, under Colonel Iida, will assemble near Shang-liu-ho-tzu.
- (6) Divisional head-quarters will be at Pa-chia-tzu.

In accordance with these orders the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment was pushed out to Ma-erh Shan, and the remainder of the 1st Brigade was detailed to carry out the main attack. Two battalions of the 2nd Guard Regiment were to move up northward and turn Chien Shan from the east, while two more battalions, one from each regiment, engaged the enemy in front.

As Ma-erh Shan was unoccupied the 1st Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment performed its task without any difficulty, but Chien Shan and the hills east of Tu-men-tzu were held by the 4th East Siberian Regiment, with General Mishchenko's cavalry watching the flanks.† The turning movement was discovered by the cavalry about 8 a.m., and as it was seen that the Japanese were in considerable strength an appeal was made for

\* Four companies of this regiment were already on the line indicated. Two had been sent early in the day, and two more followed later.

† To the north the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 1st Chita Cossacks faced nearly due south, almost at right angles to the infantry; the 5th and 6th Squadrons with the guns were near Yen-san-sai; the 4th Squadron acted as escort to four guns which were behind the right flank. Beyond

reinforcements. There was no time to lose, and two battalions of the 85th (Viborg) Regiment with a battery of artillery were at once sent off to the left flank where they came under Colonel Pavlov, who took command of all the troops in that neighbourhood. Thanks to this prompt action the danger of being enveloped was averted, and eventually a heavy enfilade fire was brought to bear both upon the battalion on Ma-erh Shan and upon the two battalions which were making the frontal attack upon Chien Shan. These two battalions were also taken in flank by the Russian guns north of Tu-men-tzu, and as their own artillery at Shang-liu-ho-tzu and Pa-chia-tzu was too far off to afford them any assistance, it began to look as though so far from enveloping the Russian left they would themselves be enveloped. At this moment the right of the Guard Division was so much in advance of the rest of the Japanese line that any reverse, however slight in itself, could not fail to be widely felt.

The action of General Asada's left column brought no encouragement. It began with an attack by the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Guard Regiment against a weak force of the enemy estimated at two companies,\* on the hills north of Tu-men-tzu to the west of the main road. The Russians began to extend their line to the hill north-east of that village, and as they appeared to be in considerable strength the Japanese battalion suspended its advance and began to throw up entrenchments. About 8 a.m., it was noticed that the Russians had occupied a knoll north of Chung-kao-li-kou, where they threatened to interpose between the two columns of the Guard Division. General Asada, seeing the danger to which his right column was exposed by this move, placed the whole of the 4th Guard Regiment, except two companies, under Colonel Iida and ordered him to turn the enemy out. An open valley, fifteen hundred yards in width, lay in front of the Russian position, but was crossed with the loss of only two men killed and four wounded, although the time taken is stated to have been from twenty to twenty-five minutes.† Without pausing to fire the Japanese advanced until they were within a hundred and fifty yards of the nearest Russian riflemen. Two outlying heights were carried at the point of the bayonet and then, in company with the battalion of the 1st Regiment, a furious assault was made upon the highest point of the ridge.

The 4th East Siberian Regiment was desperately pressed in front and on the right flank, and some of its companies were reduced to seventy men or less. At one point the Japanese advanced to within twenty paces of a Russian breastwork, and the defenders, whose ammunition was beginning to give out, dropped their rifles and took to stones. The Japanese artillery was too

the right of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment were two companies of the Tobolsk Regiment and two squadrons of the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment. Three squadrons of the last named regiment acted well in general reserve.

\* Possibly two companies of the Tobolsk Regiment.

† Without more accurate information the immunity of the Japanese from loss during this operation is difficult to explain.

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far off to render any material assistance to the infantry, which suffered heavily from the accurate fire of the Cossack guns. In the battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment the colonel and all the company commanders were killed or wounded, and the command of the battalion devolved upon a subaltern. Nevertheless the attack must have been successful had not a battalion of the Viborg Regiment and a battery of the 7th Artillery Brigade come to General Mishchenko's assistance. The attack was then repulsed, and the 4th Guard Regiment fell back about eight hundred yards leaving a hundred and sixteen of its numbers lying dead in front of the Russian trenches.\*

About 2.50 p.m., General Kuroki heard for the first time that the report as to the Fourth Army having reached Mang-chia-fen on the previous day was not in accordance with the facts. At the same time reports from the Watanabe detachment showed that heavy columns were moving against the right flank of the Guard Division, and in the centre of the attack the 1st Brigade could make no progress. So threatening did the whole situation appear that General Asada gave up all idea of again attacking Chien Shan, and drew back his right column to the hills north-east of Pa-chia-tzu, and reported to General Kuroki that he was being attacked on three sides. The unfavourable turn which the battle was taking, so far as the First Army was concerned, had already been reported to Marshal Oyama,† and soon after 3 p.m. General Kuroki was informed that the 2nd Independent Battalion of Foot Artillery was hurrying to his assistance. A little later he heard that he was to be reinforced by the main body of the 5th Division,‡ and the welcome

Critical situation  
of the Guard  
Division.

\* In addition, this regiment had 332 men wounded. The total loss in the Guard Division on this day was 175 killed and 535 wounded.

† According to one account, a message intended for General Kuroki, describing the difficult situation in which the Guard Division was placed, reached the commander-in-chief by mistake and led him to dispatch his reserve to the threatened point.

‡ The 11th, 21st, and 42nd Regiments, 5th Artillery Regiment, and two engineer companies.

The orders to the commander of the 5th Division were as follows :—

- (a) The enemy, in strength, is attacking the Guard Division from Feng-chi-pu, and has placed our right flank in a dangerous situation. The Matsunaga detachment at Chao-hsien Ling has also been surrounded by the enemy. The G.O.C. First Army has no strong reserve.
- (b) I intend to give all my reserve to the First Army commander so as to restore the situation in his front.
- (c) You should advance at once with the main body of the division, except the following troops, towards Pan-la-shan-tzu, where you will come under the command of the G.O.C. First Army :—
  - 41st Infantry Regiment.
  - 5th Cavalry Regiment.
  - One battalion 14th Artillery Regiment.
  - 4th Foot Artillery Regiment.
  - 5th Battalion (less one company) Engineers.

These troops, other than the head-quarters of the 9th Brigade, should remain in their present position and come under the command of the

news was communicated at 4.30 p.m. to General Asada. The reinforcements could not arrive for another two hours, but as the left of the Guard Division might be considered safe he was instructed to stretch out a helping hand to General Matsunaga whose position at the Chao-hsien Ling was seriously threatened by the action of the 2nd Siberian Corps.

By the time the 5th Division reached Pan-la-shan-tzu the danger had passed. The Russians failed to realize the opportunity which the isolated position of the Guard Division afforded them; and, as the commander-in-chief had made up his mind to retreat, the pressure was relieved and the 5th Division went into bivouac at San-chia-tzu, where the commander received orders to maintain close connexion between the left of the Guard Division and General Okasaki's brigade to the west.

From the moment when General Matsunaga began his night march to the Chao-hsien Ling until nearly 5 p.m. on the 13th, the line of hills between Shang-liu-ho-tzu and the left of the Guard Division, a front of about a mile, was held only by a single battalion of the 29th *Kobi* Regiment; while to the west of the Shang-liu-ho-tzu — Tu-men-tzu road, the 15th Brigade was preparing again to assault the Lo-ta Shan. The morning was spent by the Japanese in completing their arrangements, and during this lull an extraordinary piece of good fortune favoured the Russian arms. Shortly before midnight General Mau's brigade\* for the second time fell back from the hills which it had held on the 12th, and daylight on the 13th found it occupying a line between the villages of Ho-ma-tang and Mang-chia-fen, leaving the right of the 4th Siberian Corps without protection. It so happened that General Okasaki had at one moment actually decided to renew his attack under cover of the storm which raged for several hours, but closer reconnaissance led him to believe that the approach to the Russian position was too narrow and steep for a night attack. Had he carried out his first intention he would have been unopposed and many lives would have been saved. To the Russians the delay was invaluable. General Mau was peremptorily ordered to retake the hills, and since the Japanese had not seized their opportunity he had no difficulty in resuming his former position by about 9 a.m. As the result of the fighting of the past few days the brigades and regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps had lost much of their organization, and the arrival of several battalions from the 1st Army Corps, which had already been broken up, added to the confusion of units. On the hill south of Ho-ma-tang was General Kossovich with a mixed force of about eleven battalions drawn from the 5th (Irkutsk), the 11th (Semipalatinsk), the 8th (Tomsk) and 147th (Samara) Regiments. A little further to the east was

Yamada detachment. It is important to recall the Yamada detachment as soon as possible.

\* The 121st (Penza), 122nd (Tambov), and 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiments and a battalion of the 87th (Neishlot) Regiment.

(4725)

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General Shileiko with about three and a half battalions of the Omsk and Tobolsk Regiments. The 12th (Barnaul) Regiment was in reserve near Ho-ma-tang.\*

The position of the 4th Siberian Corps was dominated by the Lo-ta Shan, and General Okasaki decided that his first measure must be to gain possession of that hill. With this object, three batteries of the 2nd Artillery Regiment moved to a fresh position near Erh-a whence they opened fire at daylight, but the Russian guns were too numerous to be beaten down.

While the artillery of either side strove to obtain the upper hand, General Mau was able to re-establish himself on Lo-ta Shan, and when General Okasaki was ready to move, at 2 p.m., the Russian position was held as strongly as ever. Two battalions of the 16th Regiment, under Colonel Taniyama, were told off for the assault, and a battery† which had been kept in reserve came into action north of San-cheng-tzu Shan. In addition to the artillery in the front line General Zarubaiev had posted three batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade on the hills a mile and a half north of Ho-ma-tang whence they joined in the fight at a range of about three miles. Until 3 p.m., the Japanese made no attempt to leave their trenches. At that hour the 1st Battalion of the 16th Regiment, with the 2nd Battalion in support, began to scale the slopes which in many places were so steep that the defenders could not command them without standing up to fire. One of the Japanese batteries near Yang-cheng-sai was at once directed to turn its attention to the enemy's infantry, leaving the other two to cope with his guns. Just about this time General Mau, for the third time, began to evacuate the position, but again the movement was stopped before it was too late.‡ Apparently the Russian troops were seen as they returned towards the hill, for it is reported that "about this time a Russian infantry brigade was seen approaching the north-eastern slopes of Okasaki Yama§ and sending up reinforcements to the Russians holding the mountain tops."|| General Okasaki met this movement by sending the 3rd Battalion of the 16th Regiment to the support of Colonel Taniyama, who at once pushed his 2nd Battalion up into line with the 1st, which by 3.30 p.m. was within sixty or seventy paces of the nearest Russian trenches. A succession of long rushes carried the 2nd Battalion across a comparatively open stretch of ground until it joined the 1st Battalion at the foot of the steepest part of the slope. The stiffest part of the task still lay before them. The men were crowded together on a narrow

\* Each section of the defence had four or five batteries of artillery, but neither the number nor the distribution of the guns is known.

† Apparently the 3rd Battery, 2nd Artillery Regiment.

‡ Captain P. Sukhanov. *Proceedings of the Military Society, St. Petersburg*, Part I, 1907. In this account the time of General Mau's retreat is given as 3 p.m.; owing to the difference between the Russian and Japanese times it is difficult to arrive at the exact state of the battle when the Russian troops began to withdraw.

§ After the battle Lo-ta Shan was named Okasaki Yama by the Japanese soldiers.

|| *Reports from British Officers*, Vol. I, p. 608.

front, where they offered an easy target to the Russian infantry on Shuang-tzu Shan, and to the artillery in General Kossovich's section. From the trenches on the hill-top, the defenders were firing steadily into the living mass below, regardless of the fact that to do so they themselves had to stand upright under the concentrated fire of every Japanese gun and rifle which could be brought to bear upon them. Foot by foot the Japanese worked their way forward. Two companies crept round the shoulder of the hill to attack the Russian left, and by 4 p.m. the distance between the opposing lines had been reduced to about thirty yards. For the next three-quarters of an hour the Japanese were unable to advance a single step. Their artillery kept up a fierce bombardment of the crest, and now and then a shell, not quite so accurate as the rest, burst in the midst of the assailants as they crouched for shelter behind the rocks and boulders on the hill-side. So close together were the targets that for a time it was impossible to tell from Temple Hill, where General Okasaki had established his head-quarters, which were Russian shell and which were Japanese. Suddenly, through the dense cloud of smoke and dust in which the top of the hill was shrouded, two officers and a few men were seen to dash forward from the companies on the Japanese right flank and lie down within a few yards of the Russian trench. The artillery fire was stopped, and the decision was left to the infantry. A desperate fight raged for ten minutes, while General Okasaki and his staff waited for the result. Some men used the bayonet, others emptied their magazines, and when more orthodox weapons failed them they seized the stones which lay around and hurled them into their opponents' faces. As usual the Russians fought with grim determination. Nothing could have exceeded their valour. At one time they drove their assailants some yards down the slope, and for a few seconds it appeared to the anxious onlookers on Temple Hill as though after all the attack was doomed to failure. Another effort and the capture of Lo-ta Shan. Russians might have gained the day, but at the critical moment a few of the Japanese, seizing a favourable opportunity, again darted up the slope. The rest followed and the position was won.\*

By 5.35 p.m. all three Japanese battalions were pouring their fire into the retreating enemy and into the trenches in Shuang-tzu Shan, where the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 147th (Samara) Regiment were heavily engaged with the right of the Fourth Army. By its distinguished conduct in this attack, the 16th Regiment won for itself a *kanjo*, or written approval, the highest award which it was in the power of the commander-in-chief to bestow; and as a tribute of praise from the army, the captured hill at once became known as Okasaki Yama. Such honour can never be won except at heavy cost in lives. On the top of the hill about a hundred Russians lay dead amidst a

\* During the night General Mau reassembled his own brigade and the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment at Erh-tao-kou. The battalion of the 87th (Neishlot) Regiment seems to have rejoined its own main body. See footnote, p. 115.

debris of empty ammunition boxes, rifles, haversacks, prayer books, and black loaves, and it was noted that a large proportion were non-commissioned officers. On the slopes below, the bodies of eighty-five Japanese marked the line of advance, while two hundred and forty-three were wounded.\* Compared to the assault on Temple Hill these numbers are small, but almost the whole of them were borne by six sadly attenuated companies. On the morning of the 11th, the 16th Regiment went into action two thousand four hundred strong. On that day it had fifty-four men killed, and four hundred and eleven wounded; on the next day forty-six men were killed and two hundred and forty-five wounded. On the morning of the 13th, therefore, it cannot have numbered in its ranks much more than sixteen hundred men, and of these three hundred and twenty-eight fell before night. One thousand and eighty-four casualties in three days.

So soon as Lo-ta Shan had been captured, General Okasaki brought up his reserves to the attack of General Kossovich's force on Lien-hua Shan. On the left was the shattered

Retreat of the remnant of the 16th Regiment, then the 30th, 4th Siberian Corps then a battalion and a half of the 29th, and on to the Sha Ho. the right was the *Kobi* battalion which had been

left behind by General Matsunaga; the other battalion of the 29th *Kobi* Regiment appears to have formed the reserve. As the attack across the open valley would probably entail further heavy loss, General Okasaki, on second thoughts, resolved to wait until darkness should render his task less formidable. But although he could not know it his enemy had already determined to retreat. At 11.20 a.m., simultaneously with his order to General Stakelberg for the withdrawal of the Eastern Force, General Kuropatkin wrote to the commander of the 4th Siberian Corps:—"During the night the Japanese drove the XVIIth Corps back to the Sha Ho; the Xth Corps followed the XVIIth. I am compelled to order you to leave your position south of Yen-san-sai, and to select another further to the north." As usual, no movement was to take place until the evening, and during the last hour of daylight the Russians suffered heavily from enfilade fire from Lo-ta Shan. At 6 p.m., the first battalions to move began to leave the trenches. Soon afterwards the Japanese resumed their advance and another fierce bayonet fight took place between the 29th and 30th Regiments on the one hand, and the Russian rear guards on the other. In this struggle the Japanese were again successful, and by 8 p.m. they were in complete possession of the hill. To cover the retreat, and possibly to conceal the intentions of the commander, several counter-attacks were made during the night, but the main body of the Russian corps did not halt until it reached the village of Feng-chi-pu on the Sha Ho. Why it should have been thought necessary to carry the retreat so far is not clear. By doing so,

\* Including six officers killed, among whom was Major Nikoia, the commander of the 1st Battalion, and nine wounded. 212,950 rounds of rifle ammunition were expended in this attack.

General Zarubaiev ceased to lend any support to the 1st Corps on his right; and a large gap in the centre of General Kuropatkin's line of battle was left unguarded except by a rear guard under Major-General Novikov,\* near Tai-kuan-tun, and by General Mishchenko, who also retreated during the night to Hsiao-ying-shou-tun.

Except for the battalions which operated in conjunction with the 4th Siberian Corps and General Mau's brigade, the 1st Corps was not seriously engaged on this day.†

The Russian Ist Corps. some hours after daylight hostilities were confined to an artillery duel between the six and a half batteries which still remained with the corps, aided

by two Cossack batteries, and General Nodzu's guns on and near San-kuai-shih Shan.‡ Between the right of General Mau's brigade and the 148th (Caspian) Regiment on the left of the main body of the 1st Corps, there was a considerable gap which was watched only by mounted scouts. The 1st Battalion of the 147th (Samara) Regiment was in touch with the 148th; then came the 88th (Petrov) Regiment a little further to the west, where it remained until about midday, when it was moved to Ta-shan-ssu§ to get into touch with the Xth Corps. The 86th (Wilmanstrand) and 145th (Novocherkask) Regiments were in reserve near Ho-shang-kou and Kuo-shan-ssu.§ The 7th Siberian Cossacks were on the right flank.

About 10.30 a.m., the Japanese observed certain signs which were interpreted to mean that the Russians were meditating a retreat. An advance was immediately begun,

Operations of the Japanese Fourth Army. but as Shuang-tzu Shan was found to be held in force General Nodzu decided to postpone the direct attack until he could work round the

Russian right, which had been laid bare by the retreat of the Xth Corps. To enable this movement to be carried out in safety the 34th *Kobi* Regiment was brought up from the reserve into the centre of the firing line and was ordered to carry the hills west of Mang-chia-fen. The distribution of the Japanese was then somewhat peculiar, as for once units were broken up and brigades were intermingled. On the right was the 40th Infantry Regiment; then came a composite force under Major-General Oki, consisting of the 10th *Kobi* Regiment of the 10th *Kobi* Brigade, and the 22nd and 43rd *Kobi* Regiments of the 11th *Kobi* Brigade. In the centre was the 34th *Kobi* Regiment of the 3rd *Kobi* Brigade; and on the left was another composite force under

\* The composition of this rear guard was 85th (Viborg) Regiment, 87th (Neishlot) Regiment, two batteries 7th Artillery Brigade, one battery 43rd Artillery Brigade, three squadrons.

† 85th (Viborg), 87th (Neishlot), two battalions 147th (Samara) Regiment attached to 4th Siberian Corps; 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment and four guns 43rd Artillery Brigade attached to General Mau.

‡ Apparently the 15th Artillery Regiment, 10th Artillery Regiment, and 1st Battalion 14th Artillery Regiment.

§ Kuo-shan-ssu is generally called Tun-san-tsy on the German and Russian maps, perhaps owing to a confusion between Kuo-shan-ssu and Ta-shan-ssu; the latter place is about a mile to the north of the former and is called She-shan-tzu in some accounts.

Colonel Moji consisting of the 12th *Kobi* Regiment of the 11th *Kobi* Brigade, and the 20th and 40th *Kobi* Regiments from the 10th *Kobi* Brigade.\* The 10th Regiment followed in support of the centre, with the 20th Brigade and remainder of the 3rd *Kobi* Brigade in reserve.

About midday the firing died away on both sides while the men ate a little food, and soon afterwards General Meiendorf was ordered by General Kuropatkin to withdraw the troops which were south of Tung-shan-kou to the heights north-east of that place, and to get into closer touch with the Xth Corps on the Sha Ho. In consequence of this order the Petrov Regiment was moved from Ta-shan-ssu to Pu-tsao-a, and its place was taken by the 145th; the 148th and 1st Battalion of the 147th fell back quickly to their new line, covered by the fire of the two Cossack batteries. These movements were carried out in broad daylight without any interference from the Japanese, and by 4.30 p.m. the principal strength of the 1st Corps was established between Hsiao-ying-shou-tun and Ta-shan-ssu.

As the result of this change of the Russian dispositions the only Japanese troops to be seriously engaged in this neighbourhood were those which came into conflict with the right of General Mau's brigade on Shuang-tzu Shan. The 34th *Kobi* Regiment in the centre and the Moji detachment on the left were able to push on steadily, encountering little or no opposition, until at sunset they were again facing the 1st Corps at comparatively short range.

In the open plain to the west of the hills in which the Japanese Fourth Army was operating, the character of the

battle on this day underwent a change as  
 The Russian complete as that of the country. To the east  
 Western Force. both the 4th Siberian Corps and the Japanese  
 Guard Division were at one time in a position of

extreme danger, from which they were only extricated after very stiff fighting. Generals Meiendorf and Nodzu were much less seriously engaged on Shuang-tzu Shan and the Mang-chia-fen heights, and on leaving the hills the battle was confined almost entirely to the artillery. The strain of the previous two days had been tremendous, and even if the assailants had been physically able to keep up the pressure it is probable that the need for supplies of food and ammunition would have prevented any immediate advance. The respite thus afforded was of immense value to General Bilderling, as it enabled him to collect the scattered battalions of General Kuropatkin's right wing and to restore some organization in his subordinate commands.

Very early in the morning of the 13th General Sluchevski asked that the six battalions† which had been sent from the 9th

\* The principal fighting fell to the 20th and 43rd *Kobi* Regiments; the former had 17 killed, and 55 wounded, the latter 30 killed and 120 wounded. The 40th Regiment seems to have been held back during the attack, since although from its position on the right of the Fourth Army it might have been expected to suffer severely, it had, in fact, only ten casualties.

† 36th (Orel) Regiment, 2 battalions 35th (Bryansk) Regiment. See p. 88.

Division to the XVIIth Corps might be returned to him; but as these troops were then acting as the general reserve of the right wing General Bilderling was unable to spare them. Instead, he promised that if the necessity should arise not only should these battalions be sent back, but that others from the XVIIth Corps should also come to General Sluchevski's assistance. In these circumstances the commander of the Xth Corps arranged to hold the position which had been prepared from La-mu-tun to Chang-ling-tzu, a distance of rather more than four miles, with fourteen battalions and eleven batteries,\* keeping four battalions in reserve at Sha-ho-pu.† The first line of defence was divided into two sections, the right under General Vasilev, who had been prevented by sickness from taking any previous part in the battle, and the left under Colonel Shitkovski, and the general direction of affairs was apparently delegated by the corps commander to General Gershelmann. Before night, the right of the Japanese 3rd Division, crossing in front of the Yamada detachment, occupied the village of Hou-tai, whence it menaced the right of the 1st Corps. To meet this danger two battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment were moved from General Sluchevski's reserve to the ridge a mile and a half south-east of Chang-ling-tzu, where they came into touch with General Meiendorf.

Beyond the right of the Xth Corps, General Bilderling disposed his troops in two lines, from La-mu-tun‡ to Lin-sheng-pu and from Ssu-fan-tai to Ku-chia-tzu. In the front line were the 137th (Nyejin), 138th (Bolkhov),§ and 139th (Morshansk) Regiments, with six batteries of the 35th Artillery Brigade. In reserve at Ying-wo were two battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment, and the six battalions belonging to General Sluchevski. During the day the reserve was joined by Colonel Stakhovich with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Zaraisk Regiments and the 1st Battery of the 35th Artillery Brigade, and by four companies which had become separated from the main body of the Bolkhov Regiment in the turmoil of retreat. The defence of the second line was entrusted to the 3rd Division supported by twenty-eight guns of the 3rd Artillery Brigade; but of the infantry, the unfortunate 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment could muster only a single battalion, and the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment was reduced to half its original strength. These three battalions were placed behind Ssu-fan-tai, with the 11th (Pskov) and 12th (Velikoluts) Regiments between that village and Ku-chia-tzu.

For some reason, which it is not easy to fathom, a report was sent in to General Bilderling about 3 p.m. that strong Japanese columns were moving westward from the railway, and led him to

\* Six batteries 9th Artillery Brigade, five batteries 31st Artillery Brigade. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th Batteries of this brigade had been lost at Liao-yang.

† Two battalions 124th (Voronej) Regiment, 1st Battalion 33rd (Elets) Regiment, 4th Battalion 34th (Syev) Regiment.

‡ Both the Xth and XVIIth Corps had troops in La-mu-tun.

§ Less four companies.



believe that the XVIIth Corps was again to be the object of the main attack. As the 6th Siberian Corps was not under his orders he could not reckon upon its assistance, so he at once arranged to carry on his second line of defence from the left of the 3rd Division at Ssu-fan-tai through Ying-wo to Kuan-tun, and to throw up a redoubt at Han-chia-pu. The 36th (Orel) Regiment was then told off to garrison the new defences, and before night the two battalions of the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment and a battalion of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment were sent into the first line at La-mu-tun. To the west, the 6th Siberian Corps had one brigade at Feng-chuang-tzu, another in Lin-sheng-pu, and the third behind its right flank. This corps still formed an independent command at the disposal of the commander-in-chief, but at 9 p.m. it was at last placed under General Bilderling, a measure which might have had great influence upon the course of the battle had it been carried out forty-eight hours sooner. The whole extent of front covered by the Xth and XVIIth Corps on the morning of the 13th October was, therefore, something over eight miles. The left flank was in touch with the 1st Corps, and a strong corps was echeloned in rear of the right.

The gradual shifting of the Japanese forces towards the right left only the Yamada detachment and the Second Army for the attack of the Russian western wing. After its fierce night encounter with the Eleys Regiment\* the former force took but little part in the operations. It was at first ordered to advance to Huang-chia-tien, and at 6.30 a.m. Hung-pao-shan was occupied without opposition. Towards midday General Yamada reached Hsin-chuang with his reserve, and a little later a weak flank guard was pushed out to Wang-chia-lu-tzu. The detachment was still in this position when the difficult situation in which the Guards were placed by the attack of the 2nd Siberian Corps induced Marshal Oyama to put the 5th Division at the disposal of the First Army and to recall General Yamada.

The principal factor which influenced the movements of the Japanese Second Army was a report, which was received during the night of the 12th-13th, that a fresh Russian force of about one and a half divisions had arrived from the north and was preparing a defensive position on the hills to the east of Chien-huang-chia-tien. The force in question was, of course, the Russian 1st Corps, and to meet it the Japanese Second Army began to take ground to its right. With this intention, the right detachment of the 3rd Division was directed to attack Hung-pao-shan, supported by the left flank detachment and by the 3rd Artillery Regiment. The divisional reserve† was ordered to assemble at Shih-li-ho, and the captured 6-inch howitzers to take up a position east of that village by 6 a.m. In the centre of General Oku's army the 6th

\* See p. 90.

† 34th Regiment, 4th Battery 13th Artillery Regiment, the captured field battery and the four captured 6-inch howitzers. These batteries subsequently left the 3rd Division and rejoined the Second Army reserve.

Division was to send a pursuing detachment towards La-mu-tun, and to assemble its main body at Liu-tang-kou. Similarly, the 4th Division was to follow the enemy towards Lin-sheng-pu while its main body was to assemble at Chang-liang-pu.

As has already been indicated, the movements of the Second Army on the 13th were far less vigorous than had been the case on the 11th and 12th. The advance of the 3rd Division had hardly begun when it became evident that the enemy who had been encountered overnight at Pan-chiao-pu was in retreat, and that Hung-pao-shan hillock was already in the hands of the Yamada detachment. As there was no longer any need to attack that hill, General Oshima drew in the 18th Regiment to his reserve, which then moved up to Pan-chiao-pu, and directed the 5th Brigade, with two squadrons of cavalry and three batteries, to pursue up the Mandarin road towards Sha-ho-pu. As far as Pa-chia-tzu the 5th Brigade advanced unchecked, but at that point the vanguard came under heavy artillery fire from the direction of Kan-chia-la-tzu and La-mu-tun. Heavy columns could be seen making their way northward from Sha-ho-pu, and clouds of smoke which were rising above the village were taken to mean that the Russians were destroying their stores preparatory to a further retreat. It was obviously desirable to push forward without delay; but in view of the fact that the Fourth Army was still considerably in rear of the 3rd Division, General Oku decided that his first duty was to assist General Nodzu so far as it was in his power to do so. In this opinion he was supported by the commander-in-chief, and the 19th Brigade (less two battalions) and the 13th Artillery Regiment were then given to General Oshima, who was ordered to attack towards Huang-chia-tien. However, it soon became evident that the Russian infantry and artillery were in great strength, and that the three batteries with the pursuing detachment were quite insufficient to cope with the heavy fire which was directed upon them. In these circumstances a flank march across the enemy's front, protected only by the 5th Brigade, was so full of risk that General Oku resolved to pass the main body\*

of the 6th Division from Liu-tang-kou, behind the 3rd Division, to Chien-huang-chia-tien, whence it was to attack towards Chang-ling-tzu. For this purpose the 13th Artillery Regiment and the captured 6-inch howitzers were added to the 6th Division, and the 19th Brigade was taken back from the 3rd Division into the army reserve.

To cover this move, the 3rd Division was to attack the hill east of Kan-chia-la-tzu, supported by the six divisional batteries at Pa-chia-tzu. The 34th Regiment was sent from the reserve to Chiang-pu-tun. One battalion of the 33rd Regiment worked its way as far forward as Hou-tai, with the result that, as already narrated, General Bilderling moved two battalions of the Voronej Regiment from Sha-ho-pu to the hills on his left; but it soon

\* i.e., one squadron 5th Cavalry Regiment, 11th Brigade, one battalion 6th Artillery Regiment.

became apparent that the Russians were far too strongly posted for an isolated effort by a single division to have any prospect of success, and the reports from right and left showed clearly that the enemy could only be driven from the new position which he had taken up by another regularly organized assault. Moreover, the supplies of shrapnel shell were very nearly exhausted, and the sodden condition of the roads made it hopeless to expect any more before midnight. To attempt to push home the attack of the 3rd Division unsupported on either flank would mean a useless expenditure of lives, and, after a careful consideration of all the conditions, General Oshima proposed that the advance should be suspended until dawn on the 14th; and in the meanwhile, pending General Oku's sanction, which was not received until 11.30 p.m., his troops entrenched themselves for the night in San-chia-tzu, Hou-tai, and Chiang-pu-tun.

When the main body of the 6th Division was transferred from the centre to the right of General Oku's army, connexion between the 3rd and 4th Divisions was maintained only General Koizumi's by a mixed brigade under General Koizumi,\* whose instructions were to follow the Russians towards La-mu-tun; subject to the understanding that if he should find them occupying an entrenched position he would not be expected to attempt its capture. Leaving his bivouac at 6 a.m., General Koizumi sent his cavalry across the Sha Ho to reconnoitre the right bank, while his infantry occupied Liu-san-chia-tzu and Hsiu-chiang-tun after driving out a weak force estimated at a squadron of cavalry and two infantry battalions. About 11 a.m., the advanced guard of the brigade reached Shu-lin-tzu where it came under artillery fire from the Russian guns near La-mu-tun. From Shu-lin-tzu a company of the 48th Regiment pushed forward to Sha-ho station, and immediately set to work to place it in a state of defence. Two more companies followed, and General Koizumi was preparing to advance upon La-mu-tun when he heard that the main body of the division had been directed to move to the eastward. This was news of great importance. In his front the enemy, whose artillery was much superior to his own three batteries, was holding a strong position in considerable force. On his left, the 4th Division was also encountering strong opposition, and the reserves of the Second Army were being concentrated for an attack towards Changling-tzu. In these circumstances General Koizumi's rôle became primarily defensive and, after throwing a company across to the right bank of the Sha Ho, the main body of the 24th Brigade and the artillery prepared to pass the night in Shu-lin-tzu.

Meanwhile the 11th Brigade and the 1st Battalion of the divisional artillery were marching toward Chien-huang-chia-tien. On the road they were joined by the 13th Artillery Regi-

\* 24th Brigade, less the 1st Battalion 48th Regiment, which was still with the 4th Division, two squadrons 6th Cavalry Regiment, one battalion 6th Artillery Regiment.

ment,\* the captured field gun battery, and the captured battery of 6-inch howitzers. Towards midday, the Main body of the brigade was met by several mounted dispatch riders, one of whom brought a *kanjo* from the 6th Division, commander-in-chief, praising the 6th Division for its conduct on the 12th. The officers were assembled while General Okubo read out the message which conveyed this coveted honour. When the march was resumed he rode on ahead of his men, and joined Generals Oku and Oshima, who were watching the fight from the little hill above Hung-pao-shan. The head of the brigade reached Wang-chia-lu-tzu about 6 p.m.; the batteries were at once brought into action, and the leading infantry was deployed for the attack upon Chang-ling-tzu. About 9 p.m., part of the 13th Regiment was close to Huang-chia-tien, and soon afterwards the 45th Regiment found that Chien-huang-chia-tien was held by the 20th *Kobi* Regiment which had been sent out from the Fourth Army. As Generals Oku and Nodzu were now again in touch the advance was suspended, and many of the troops bivouacked for the night within eight hundred yards of the Russian trenches.

Unlike the two divisions on its right the Japanese 4th Division still preserved the formation, in two wings and a reserve, which it had adopted from the beginning of the battle. Advance of the Japanese 4th Division. As the duty of the left wing† was still principally protective, its orders were to leave Hsiao-tai at 6 a.m., for Wan-chia-yuan-tzu; while the right wing,‡ moving at the same time, was to march upon Lin-sheng-pu. The reserve§ was ordered to assemble, also at 6 a.m., at its alarm post, and to take the road to Chung-lu-yen-tai, where it was to be joined by the three companies of the 8th Regiment which had acted with the left wing on the 12th.

The advance of the left wing was delayed, as detachments of the enemy could be seen in San-chia-tzu and Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, apparently supported by artillery five hundred yards north of the latter village.|| Since the companies of the 8th Regiment were not to move until the left wing was able to do so, they also remained at Hsiao-tai facing the Russians in Wan-chia-yuan-tzu; but the divisional cavalry after being relieved at Li-ta-jen-tun by advanced troops from General Akiyama's brigade, marched to

\* Five batteries of this regiment acted with the 6th Division on the 12th; at dawn, on the 13th they were withdrawn to the general reserve of the army, but were returned to the 6th Division when it was decided to attack Chang-ling-tzu.

† Two squadrons 4th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Battalion 48th Regiment.

‡ 8th Regiment (less 3rd Battalion), 37th Regiment (less 2nd Battalion and one company), 2nd Battalion 4th Artillery Regiment, two companies engineers.

§ 2nd Battalion and one company 37th Regiment, one company 8th Regiment (increased to one battalion at Chung-lu-yen-tai), 1st Battalion 4th Artillery Regiment, and one company engineers.

|| It is difficult to make out exactly what troops can have been in Wan-chia-yuan-tzu and San-chia-tzu, as the only mention of them comes from Japanese sources. It would appear probable that the cavalry belonged to General Grekov's brigade, and the infantry to Colonel Stakhovich, who did not join his corps until midday. See p. 121.

Ta-ping-chuang, where it was in close touch with the left flank detachment which was threatened by a body of Russian cavalry. About 9.30 a.m., the Russian horsemen could be seen leaving Hei-lin-tai to join the infantry in Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, and soon afterwards the artillery went away to the north, possibly because its retreat was beginning to be menaced by General Tsukamoto's right column. The commander of the left column immediately began his long-delayed advance, and so soon as Wan-chia-yuan-tzu had been occupied, about 2 p.m., the 4th Cavalry Regiment was pushed on to Pao-tzu-yen, whence an officer's patrol was sent on towards Kuan-lin-pu.

Meanwhile the right column, followed by the reserve, had passed through Chung-lu-yen-tai and entered Hung-ling-pu, where it established connexion with General Koizumi. After leaving the latter village the vanguard came under fire from Russian batteries near Lin-sheng-pu and Ta-liang-tun, but by 11 a.m. Chi-shao-tun and Chang-liang-pu were both in Japanese hands. There the right column was considerably in front of the left, and as strong bodies of the enemy were discovered as far west as Kuan-lin-pu, it was deemed advisable to rest content for the present with what had been gained. Even when the left column came up into line about 2 p.m., no further advance was undertaken; but at 5.10 p.m., General Tsukamoto was ordered to make an attack upon the Lin-sheng-pu—Ta-liang-tun line, apparently with intention of distracting the attention of the defenders from the movement of the 6th Division towards Huang-chia-tien. To carry out this purpose, the 4th Artillery Regiment was given to the commander of the right column, but before the orders could be carried into effect they were countermanded by General Oku, who had decided to postpone the attack until dawn.

As had been the case on the previous days of the battle, the troops on the western flank of either army played an insignificant part in the operations on the 13th and their story is quickly told. Taking first the Japanese, the Akiyama detachment brought the party which had been on the right bank of the Sha Ho across to Shen-tan-pu, whence the main body marched eastward at 4 a.m.; Li-ta-jen-tun was entered about 7.30 a.m., but on turning northward the enemy was found to be in occupation of both Fu-chia-chuang-tzu and Hei-lin-tai, supported by at least a battery at San-chia-tzu, and with cavalry, presumably General Grekov's, near Chin-chia-tun. Preparations were made to drive him from these villages, but before the hour named for the attack he retired, as already related, and General Akiyama occupied Hei-lin-tai without opposition. There he passed the night with his outposts in touch with scattered bodies of the enemy in Pao-hsiang-tun, Yang-shu-lin-tzu, and Meng-ta-pu.

On General Kuropatkin's extreme right, General Dembovski made a similar eastward movement which brought him into somewhat closer touch with General Bilderling; his advanced guard taking position at Hsin-tai-tzu, while his main body moved across the river to Ta-wang-kuan-pu.

Although it may be said that the 13th October brought no decided advantage to either side, it was so far favourable to the Japanese that Marshal Oyama had been relieved of any anxiety as to the safety of his right flank. At the close of the day the Russian Eastern Force was definitely in retreat, and the arrival of the 5th *Kobi* Brigade, which had come with all possible speed from Antung, enabled him to add considerably to the 12th Division. In the centre the Japanese Guard Division must be deemed fortunate to have extricated itself so easily from the dangerous situation in which it had been placed by General Stakelberg's counter-stroke; for Marshal Oyama's order to the 5th Division to go to General Kuroki's aid shows how fine an opportunity was missed when the 2nd Siberian Corps resumed its retreat, instead of pushing on in pursuit of the 3rd Guard Regiment. Such success as was gained by this counter-attack was more than balanced by the loss of Shuang-tzu Shan and Lo-ta Shan; and the unnecessarily long retreat of General Zarubaiev's corps offered Marshal Oyama an opening of which the full results were not yet apparent. This error, coupled with skilful movement of the Japanese Second Army reserves and the main body of the 6th Division towards Huang-chia-tien placed the Russian 1st Corps in great peril.

Elsewhere the day may be said to have favoured the Russians, for the exhaustion of the Japanese Second Army had enabled General Bilderling to restore order in the western wing, and again to show a bold front to his victorious opponents. Moreover the Japanese left had been stripped of its reserves, and General Dembovski's detachment at Ta-wang-kuan-pu, if handled with resolution, was well placed to deal an effective blow at the weak 4th Division.\*

\* During this day the leading troops of the Japanese 8th Division detained at Liao-yang; this division did not, however, take any part in the battle.

## CHAPTER XLII.

## THE 14TH OCTOBER. THE JAPANESE ADVANCE TO THE SHA HO.

(Map V/7.)

ALL through the night of the 13th-14th October, the troops of the Russian Eastern Force were in full retreat. Except for the difficulty of finding the right roads, and the intricacy of the mountain country, the march was unchecked, for the exhaustion of the Japanese supplies and ammunition, even more than the fatigue of the men, made pursuit impossible. The position on

Situation of the Russian Army at dawn on the 14th October. the line of the watershed between the Sha Ho and the Hun Ho, upon which General Stakelberg intended to take his stand, was considered by the commander-in-chief to be too far to the north to afford the necessary support to the remainder of

the army. The destination of the various corps was therefore changed and a new line was selected south of the Sha Ho. Progress was slow, but about dawn on the 14th the 3rd Siberian Corps was between the Hsin-kai Ling and Kao-kuan-sai where it was ordered to entrench, the 1st Siberian Corps was a little to the south of Pien-nui-lu-pu, and the 2nd Siberian Corps carried on the line to the north-westward. General Rennenkampf, who was retiring from San-chia-tzu, guarded the eastern flank.

In the centre, the 4th Siberian Corps was still on the march towards Erh-tao-kou covered by General Mishchenko's cavalry, and followed by General Mau's brigade, which seems to have lost connexion with the 1st Corps and was moving in the direction of Huang-shan. The positions of the remaining Russian troops underwent no alteration except that in the west of the battlefield, General Grekov had been ordered to place himself on General Dembovski's right, instead of between that commander and the 6th Siberian Corps, as had hitherto been the case. On the extreme right of the whole of General Kuropatkin's army, General Kossakovski was at Ashenyula,\* where he had been since the very beginning of the battle.

From the moment when General Stakelberg accepted defeat at the hands of General Inouye and the garrison of Pen-hsi-hu his own force was at once in a position of some danger. The enveloping movement which he had made entailed a somewhat vulnerable line of retreat, but the check administered to General Matsunaga's brigade at the Chao-hsien Ling deprived Marshal Oyama of any chance of cutting him off from the remainder of General Kuropatkin's army. Moreover, the vigour of his artillery action on the 13th had concealed his true intention, and as late

\* This name, which cannot be identified, was given by the Russians to a group of about twenty villages between the Hun Ho and Liao Ho.

as the evening of that day the Japanese commander-in-chief still hoped to win a considerable success on his own right. The changing fortunes of the battle had necessitated the shifting to the eastward of a considerable portion of the Japanese army, and the reports from the 4th Division and Marshal Oyama's orders. from General Akiyama must have shown Marshal Oyama that his weak left flank was in danger of envelopment. Even so he would not rest content merely with repelling the Russian attack, and soon after sunset he issued the following orders to his army commanders :—

- (1) The enemy in front of the Second and Fourth armies is gradually retreating northward offering resistance. The attack of the enemy against the First Army has slackened a little.
- (2) My intention to occupy the line of the Sha Ho is as firm as ever, and I wish this to be done as quickly as possible.
- (3) Each army must, therefore, continue its action so as to attain the desired end. It is especially necessary for the 12th Division to bring its operations to a satisfactory conclusion. The Yamada detachment will assemble at Chuang-chia-a-tzu at dawn and await further orders.
- (4) The head-quarters of the commander-in-chief will be at Yen-tai to-morrow.

When the sound of battle died away on the evening of the 13th, General Kuroki, like his commander-in-chief, seems to have anticipated that the break was only temporary, and his orders\* foreshadowed another stiff fight before the Sha Ho could be reached. Daylight on the 14th revealed the fact that the enemy had disappeared to the northward, and the 3rd Brigade and 5th Division were at once hurried forward in pursuit. No fresh orders seem to have been sent either to the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, or to the 12th Division, nor are their movements on this day of any importance beyond the fact that they reached San-chia-tzu and Shang-shih-chiao-tzu respectively. The 3rd Brigade, with its left protected by Colonel Kasa's cavalry,

\* General Kuroki's orders, issued at 11 p.m. on the 13th, ran as follows :—

- (1) The Russian force in front of the 12th Division is still in the same position. The Russian guns near the Ta Ling increased in numbers to-day. In front of the main force of the First Army there are large bodies of Russians at Feng-chi-pu and Ta-tzu-pu, their advanced line being close to us.
- (2) The army is to continue its attack towards Feng-chi-pu from daybreak on the 14th.
- (3) The Guard Division will attack east of the Shang-liu-ho-tzu—Feng-chi-pu road, and the 2nd Division will advance west of the same road.
- (4) The main force of the 5th Division will concentrate at Shang-lui-ho-tzu by 7 a.m. on the 14th, and will remain in general reserve.
- (5) The G.O.C. will be on the hill east of Pan-la-shan-tzu from 7.30 p.m.

(4725)

I



marched to Shang-ping-tai-tzu; and the 5th Division, which had left Pan-la-shan-tzu for Shang-lui-ho-tzu at 5.30 a.m., went straight on to the Sha Ho, where it arrived at midday after exchanging a few shots with some outposts of the 2nd Siberian Corps. By this time General Stakelberg had resumed his retreat and as there was no sign of strong opposition General Ueda begged that he might press on across the river. Marshal Oyama's orders were, however, clear. The Russians had made good their escape, and the Japanese commander had no intention of going beyond the limits which he had set to his own operations.

The movements of the Guard Division differed but little from those of the troops on its right. A battalion of the 2nd Regiment was sent out to the eastward before daylight, but for some reason, said to have been the difficulty of reconnaissance, the main body made no move until 10.30 a.m., when the 4th Regiment was ordered to leave Tu-men-tzu and to take up a position between the Shang-liu-ho-tzu—Feng-chi-pu road and Chin-chung Shan. The 1st Brigade, marching half an hour later, was to carry on the line to Fei-shan-tun. As this brigade advanced, covered by the flank guard, the enemy was seen to be holding Ti-ti Shan and a force of unknown strength was discovered in the Sha Ho valley. This was the last of the Russian Eastern Force,\* whose retreat had been somewhat delayed by further correspondence between General Stakelberg and the commander-in-chief.

General Stakelberg's plan for the 14th was to concentrate the 3rd Siberian Corps at the Kao-tai Ling, and to continue the retreat of the 1st Siberian Corps as far as Fei-tsun-pu.† The march had already begun when an order came from General Kuropatkin telling him to send twenty-five battalions to Lo-hsiu-sai-tun, five miles north-west of Feng-chi-pu, to act as a general reserve under the commander-in-chief. Assuming, from this message, that it was General Kuropatkin's intention to undertake some fresh offensive action, he sent an officer of his staff to headquarters to report that he "intended to concentrate his whole force, and, if the commander-in-chief attacks towards the south, to co-operate by moving in a south-westerly direction against the Japanese right flank." As this plan did not happen to fit in with General Kuropatkin's views, he reiterated his previous order, and General Stakelberg then recalled the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division which had reached Ying-pan. To make up, so far as was possible, the force required, the 19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, as well as the 213th (Orovai) Regiment, which had been temporarily attached to General Zasulich's command, were taken from the 2nd Siberian Corps. These twenty-two battalions were then sent off under General Gerngross, and entered Lo-hsiu-sai-tun on the 15th. The 3rd Siberian Corps eventually halted near the Kao-tai Ling with its advanced guard

\* Part of the 2nd Siberian Corps and the corps cavalry under Major General Grekov.

† About five miles north-east of Pien-niu-lu-pu.

and General Samsonov's cavalry on the line Chang-chi-sai—Hua Ling. The head-quarters of the 1st Siberian Corps were fixed at Ying-pan, with the main strength on the hills to the south of Kang-ta-jen-shan, and a few posts still on the south side of the Sha Ho near Pien-niu-lu-pu.

Meanwhile, after the successful counter-stroke of the previous day against the Watanabe detachment, the 17th and 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiments had received a whole series of orders, alternately telling them to hold, and to retreat from, Wai-tou Shan and the neighbouring hills. Since 5 p.m. on the 13th they had twice been ordered to retire across the Sha Ho, and just before the Japanese came in sight, they had for the second time been instructed to hold their ground. With a considerable force threatening his right flank, General Izaki, the commander of the 1st Guard Brigade, did not consider it advisable to continue his advance, and halted his main body while a strong detachment assisted the flanking battalion to clear the heights. The Russian outposts dropped back upon their main body in the valley without waiting to be attacked, and General Izaki then resumed the march, but some hours had been lost, and it was nearly 5 p.m. when his leading troops joined hands with the 4th Regiment near Tai-kuan-tun. This regiment had occupied Chin-chung Shan about 1 p.m. after driving off a weak outpost. It was then seen that Ma-chuan-tzu Shan was held in strength,\* and that another body of infantry at Ho-shang-kou was opposing the advance of the 2nd Division. The enemy was too strong to be attacked by the 4th Regiment† alone, so while awaiting the arrival of the 1st Brigade the artillery was brought into action near Ta-ying-shou-tun. Four batteries‡ shelled Ma-chuan-tzu Shan, while three others turned their attention to the enemy in front of the 2nd Division. Later on one gun was hoisted to the top of Chin-chung Shan, whence it brought an effective fire to bear upon the opposite hill. Just as the 1st Brigade reached Tai-kuan-tun a violent thunderstorm entirely blotted out the landscape, and for a time made all movement impossible. When it passed away the daylight was failing fast, and when General Asada's two columns moved forward together, General Mishchenko slipped away in the direction of Erh-tao-kou. Ma-chuan-tzu was then occupied, by the Japanese, and as his instructions forbade him to cross the Sha Ho, General Asada ordered his troops to go into bivouac near Ta-ying-shou-tun and Chin-chung-tun with their outpost line on the surrounding hills. The movements of the Watanabe detachment on this day are a little uncertain, but it appears to have rejoined the Guard Division before night, and to have gone into reserve at Hsia-hei-niu-tun.

\* The troops on Ma-chuan-tzu Shan belonged to General Mishchenko's cavalry and the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which was acting with him.

† One battalion of the regiment was in divisional reserve.

‡ One of these was probably the Hijikata Battery.

In addition to the Guard Division, General Mishchenko was also engaged on this day with the 15th Brigade of the 2nd Division.\* Through his patrols, General Okasaki heard, before daybreak, that the enemy had left Miao-pu-tzu, but so soon as his leading troops appeared on the hill north of that village, they were fired upon by a battery† on Ma-chuan-tzu Shan. Two Japanese batteries were then brought on to Miao-pu-tzu Shan, and two more in the valley a little to the east, whence they attempted to silence General Mishchenko's six guns. The Cossack battery remained in action until midday, when it withdrew to replenish its supply of ammunition, and the Japanese guns were then turned against Hsi-kou Shan. The Japanese infantry advanced, in co-operation with the Fourth Army, and it began to look as though they would thrust their way into the space which had been left vacant between General Mishchenko's Brigade and the 37th Division by General Mau's retreat. To meet this threat, the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was brought hastily from Feng-chi-pu to the heights above Hsiao-ying-shou-tun, where it arrived in time to avert the danger. Although the Japanese 15th Brigade did not push on with any great vigour, the check was only temporary, for soon after 4 p.m. the Russian 37th Division began to retire, and as General Mishchenko was then meeting attacks from three different directions, he also gave orders for a gradual retreat, covered by the cavalry. As the Russians retired the Japanese 15th Brigade moved forward, in line with the left of the Guard Division and the right of the Fourth Army, to the hills which bordered the valley of the Sha Ho. Thence the troops on outpost duty were able to look down into Feng-chi-pu, the village which had been named as the objective of the First Army in Marshal Oyama's orders of the 9th October. After five days of continuous battle, General Kuroki had frustrated the Russian attempt to cut his line of communication at Pen-hsi-hu, and had pushed forward the front of his own army from the neighbourhood of the Yen-tai mines to the banks of the Sha Ho. With the rear guard action at Ma-chuan-tzu Shan, the share of the Japanese First Army and the Russian Eastern Force in the second great land battle came to an end, and on the night of the 14th October, General Kuroki's troops bivouacked on a line which, with one slight variation, they were to hold for many weeks.

With the disappearance from the battlefield of General Mau's Brigade and the 4th Siberian Corps, a dangerous gap was created between the Russian Eastern Force and the 1st Corps on the hills about Kuo-shan-ssu. Moreover, several of General Meiendorf's regiments had been taken from his own command, and they too had been carried across the Sha Ho in the confusion of the night retreat. Of the 22nd Division, only the 88th (Petrov)

The Russian 1st  
Corps left  
unsupported.

\* The 29th *Kobi* Regiment and the battalion of the 39th *Kobi* Regiment which had been with the 2nd Division since the night of the 12th, rejoined the First Army reserve on this day.

† The 1st Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery.

Regiment remained with its own corps; the 85th, 86th, and 87th Regiments had all retired with General Zarubaiev, and during this and the following day were gradually collected by the commander-in-chief at San-chia-tzu, where they came under his own control. Of the 37th Division, three battalions of the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment had gone off with General Mau, but were recalled later in the day, in time to take part in the action. Thus on the morning of the 14th, General Meiendorf found himself deprived of close support on his left flank, while with four regiments of infantry and about nine\* batteries of artillery he was holding a dangerously advanced position more than four miles in length and exposed to attack on both flanks. Connexion with the Xth Corps on his right was maintained only by the two battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment, which had been sent overnight to the hills west of Pu-tsao-a, and by the 7th Siberian Cossack Regiment.

Against this very vulnerable point in General Kuropatkin's line of battle, Marshal Oyama had massed the Fourth Army, without the 5th Division but with two *Kobi* brigades in its place, and the 11th Brigade of the 6th Division, as well as the 15th Brigade which might well have been employed in this direction had its assistance been required. So soon as there was sufficient light, the commander of the 10th Division reconnoitred the Russian positions, and found them so ill-concealed that six batteries were at once located. Thereupon three battalions of field guns and one of mountain guns were brought into action near Mang-chia-fen, while the artillery with the 11th Brigade took the defenders in flank. The control of the attack does not, however, appear to have been perfect, for the 11th Brigade, acting under the orders of its divisional commander, advanced some hours before the Fourth Army was able to lend it any support. As it moved across the open it was enfiladed by artillery near Chang-ling-tzu, met in front by rifle fire, and finally brought to a standstill. Soon afterwards the 88th (Petrov) Regiment and a battery were withdrawn from the Russian firing line, and ordered to join the commander-in-chief at San-chia-tzu, where a formidable reserve was gradually being collected. This movement appears to have been observed by the Japanese, and to have been interpreted by them as the beginning of a retreat, but as General Nodzu was not yet ready to move the action was still restricted to the artillery. By this time the Russian Xth Corps was being driven in, and, as the Japanese Fourth Army appeared to be content with fighting a holding action, General Kuropatkin ordered the 37th Division to strike a blow against General Oku's right flank and announced that he personally was about to lead two or three regiments of the 22nd Division against the enemy in the direction of Nan-kang-tzu. Unfortunately for the success of this plan, the 37th Division was in no condition to fill the rôle which had been assigned to it.

\* Six batteries 43rd Artillery Brigade, 4th Battery 7th Artillery Brigade, 2nd and 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Batteries.

Many of the senior officers were absent from their commands, through sickness or other causes; the artillery bombardment from front and right flank was gradually mastering the batteries of the 43rd Artillery Brigade, and the infantry was beginning to waver. Signs of demoralization were first seen in the ranks of the 145th (Novocherkask) Regiment, whence the infection spread to other battalions, and an unlucky misunderstanding led to the retreat of the 148th (Caspian) Regiment. Profiting by all this confusion, the Japanese 11th Brigade again attacked, and occupied the western portion of the position, almost without loss,\* about 11 a.m. Soon after midday, General Nodzu, having all but silenced the hostile guns, sent forward his infantry, with the Oki detachment on the right, and the Moji detachment on the left.† The front of the position was held by three battalions of the 147th (Samara) Regiment, and the left by the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment, neither of which regiments were greatly affected by the unsteadiness of other portions of the division. The struggle was consequently somewhat stiffer than on the hills to the west, but the retreat of the Caspian Regiment made it necessary to transfer part of the Tsaritsin Regiment to the right of the Russian front. This movement again laid bare the Russian left, with the result that when the 30th Regiment of the Japanese 15th Brigade joined in the attack, it was very lightly opposed. With both their flanks turned

Rout of the the battalions in the centre did not wait for the Russian 1st Corps. final assault. The order to retreat appears to have been given about 2 p.m., but it was not until more than two hours later that the Japanese reached the crest of the hills, and even then a few more or less scattered sections and individuals were carrying on an independent rear guard action. The Japanese artillery was rushed forward in support of the infantry and poured a destructive fire from two sides into the retreating foe. The retreat soon became a rout, and in some battalions approached a panic. As was so often the case in this war, the defeated troops owed their escape from annihilation to one of those fierce thunderstorms which broke about sunset, and which, on this occasion, enabled them to reach the right bank of the Sha Ho. The greater part of this unfortunate division reassembled towards night at Erh-tao-kou and San-chia-

\* 13th Regiment, 5 killed, 59 wounded; 45th Regiment, 1 killed, 10 wounded. It is very difficult to reconcile the Russian and Japanese accounts of this action, particularly with regard to time. The Russians seem to claim to have held out some hours after the Japanese state that they had gained possession of the hills.

† The composition of these two detachments had been somewhat altered since the previous day. The Oki detachment comprised the 11th *Kobi* Brigade (less the 12th *Kobi* Regiment), the 10th *Kobi* Regiment, the 10th Regiment, and the 40th Regiment. The Moji detachment comprised the 10th *Kobi* Brigade (less the 10th *Kobi* Regiment), and the 12th *Kobi* Regiment. The 20th and 39th Regiments were in reserve. The movements of the 3rd *Kobi* Brigade on this day are not known, but its loss was only one man wounded.

tzu,\* but many of the men could not be rallied until they reached Huang-shan, where the head-quarters of General Meiendorf's corps had been established. Nine ammunition wagons remained in the hands of the Japanese as the result of the day's operations, which cost the 10th and 11th *Kobi* brigades, the troops most heavily engaged, a loss of six hundred and seventy-nine men killed and wounded. As soon as the Fourth Army was established on the hills, the 11th Brigade had completed its task and was ordered to withdraw to the west of Chang-ling-tzu. Some hours earlier the 1st Battalion of the 13th Artillery Regiment and the captured howitzers had been sent to Chang-hsin-tien to assist the 24th Brigade in its attack upon La-mu-tun; and at 2.50 p.m. the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Regiment was posted north of Huang-chia-tien to support the 3rd Division, whose left appeared to be threatened by a concentration of the enemy near Nan-kang-tzu. Before nightfall the main body of the brigade had been collected at Huang-chia-tien, the 3rd Battalion of the 45th Regiment had joined the 1st Battalion some three hundred yards to the north, and the 13th Regiment was holding some rising ground just south of Chang-ling-tzu, supported by the 2nd Battalion of the 13th Artillery Regiment at Wang-chia-lu-tzu.

It will be remembered that on the afternoon of the 13th, the strength of the position held by the Russian Xth Corps had appeared to defy attack and that, acting upon the advice of General Oshima, the commander of the Japanese Second Army had consented to try to effect a surprise at daybreak. Later in the day, to support this attack, the 4th Regiment of Foot Artillery and the Siege Artillery Park had been placed at General Oku's disposal, but it was recognized that they could not reach Pan-chiao-pu before 8 a.m. The point at which General Sluchevski's line was to be broken was between the village of Kan-chia-la-tzu,† and the Hou-tai hillock. For this purpose the division was to assemble before dawn‡ with its right detachment, the 34th Regiment, just north of Hou-tai village, and the left detachment, *i.e.*, the 5th Brigade, carrying on the line to the westward with its flank companies just across the Mandarin road. The 3rd Artillery Regiment was to take post at Chang-hsin-tien, where also the 18th Regiment and the head-quarters of the 17th Brigade were to remain in reserve. At 3 a.m., a Russian patrol approached Hou-tai village and for some reason opened fire. Believing that an attack was imminent, a violent fusillade, in which the artillery joined, broke out from one end of the position to the other, and lasted for about twenty minutes. This was followed about three-quarters of an hour later by a second outburst of firing from some companies of the 123rd (Koslov) Regiment which were holding a line of trenches between the Hou-tai hillock and Kan-chia-la-tzu. As yet the Japanese had made no move-

\* The two battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment which had been detached from the Xth Corps also retired with the 37th Division.

† Called Yu-chia-la-tzu in some accounts.

‡ *i.e.*, about 6 a.m. at this season.

ment in force, but patrols were probably moving in front of the outpost line, and these no doubt were mistaken for hostile columns.\* The strain of the last few days had been tremendous, and after the second of these two apparently imaginary attacks, Lieutenant-Colonel Karpov, who was responsible for the defence of the Hou-tai hillock, handed over his duties to an officer of the neighbouring regiment and marched off his men, the 4th Battalion of the 34th (Syev) Regiment, to Sha-ho-pu. No report of this strange proceeding was made either to General Vasilev, who was in charge of this section, or to Colonel Smolenski, the commander of the artillery division north of Kan-chia-la-tzu. Soon afterwards Colonel Karpov was followed by three companies of the Koslov Regiment, which had also been placed under his orders for the express purpose of holding the hillock, with the result that when the Japanese advanced about 6 a.m., they gained possession of this vitally important point almost without losing a man. Thence the 1st Battalion of the 34th Regiment moved north-eastward to protect the flank of the main force from counter-attack, while the other battalions, and part of the 33rd, brought an oblique fire to bear upon the trenches to the westward and upon the defences of Kan-chia-la-tzu. Thoroughly surprised by this unexpected fire, the remainder of the 123rd (Koslov) Regiment gave way easily before the Japanese 6th Regiment. The village was quickly cleared, and then three battalions† dashed out at the northern side against the Russian artillery. The only warning which Colonel Smolenski had even now received was the sound of firing in the village, and when the leading Japanese troops appeared through the morning mist he was unable to convince himself that they were really the enemy until they were within a hundred and fifty yards of his entrenchments. Fire was opened with shrapnel fused to zero, but without stopping to reply the Japanese hurled themselves upon the batteries. The result was never in doubt for a moment, although the Russian gunners and three companies of infantry which were acting as escort fought with the utmost desperation. Colonel Smolenski was among the first to fall, and in a few moments the 5th and 6th Batteries had ceased to exist. In the former battery all the officers and sixty-four men, in the latter four out of five officers and fifty-nine men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. The 4th Battery, which was the furthest to the west, was the last to be attacked, and its loss amounted only to two officers and sixteen men. Seeing the hopelessness of their situation, the rest of the gunners made their escape, taking with them the breech-blocks and sights. The infantry escort suffered equally heavily. Of one company which began the action one hundred and fifty-eight strong all the officers, the sergeant-major, and one hundred and twenty three men were killed, wounded or missing; in the two others all

\* The Russian accounts speak of the 4th Battalion of the Syev Regiment having been attacked at 3 a.m., and again at 4 a.m., but the most reliable Japanese account states that the 34th Regiment only entered Hou-tai village at 5.30 a.m.

† 2nd and 3rd Battalions 6th Regiment, 3rd Battalion 33rd Regiment.

the officers were likewise killed or wounded, and the survivors fought their way out under the command of a sergeant-major. Seventeen guns,\* seven ammunition wagons, and a quantity of material were left in the hands of the Japanese.

Following close upon the heels of the flying enemy, part of the Japanese left wing entered Sha-ho-pu at 7.20 a.m., the Russians retiring hurriedly across the river to the northern portion of the village. There the fugitives, including apparently the battalion of the Syev Regiment, whose retreat had been the primary cause of the disaster, were rallied; and on the 1st Battalion of the 33rd (Elets) Regiment being brought up to man the walls the Japanese advance was at last checked. At this moment the Russians suffered a loss they could ill afford in the death of General Ryabinkin, one of the ablest of their commanders, who was shot through the head. Every man upon whom General Gershelmann could lay his hands was then in the firing line; not a single company remained either in the local or corps reserve, and the only possible source of help was the six battalions of the Bryansk and Orel Regiment which had been placed at General Bilderling's disposal on the 12th.† During the night General Gershelmann had heard that these battalions had been ordered to rejoin their own corps, and if they had started in good time they could not be far away; but as yet there was no sign of them and the need was very urgent. Fearing either that the order had failed to reach General Shatilov, who was in command, or that the brigade had lost its way in the darkness, two sections of Cossacks were dispatched to bring the missing battalions to Sha-ho-pu. Soon afterwards a staff officer was sent off to ask General Dobrzhinski to send to Pao-chia-a-tzu any troops which could be spared from the fighting line of the XVIIth Corps. This officer went first to the railway station south of Han-chia-pu, where he met General Volkov, the commander of the XVIIth Corps, who was amazed to hear that the General Shatilov's brigade had not reached the Xth Corps, as he had himself given the necessary orders during the previous day. The officer then proceeded to Lin-sheng-pu, where he found General Dobrzhinski, and from him he heard that the battalions of which he was in search had been already sent to rejoin their own command. Further inquiry seems to have elicited the true facts, namely, that the two battalions of the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment, except one company, were actually fighting in La-mu-tun, whence it was impossible now to withdraw them, and that although three battalions of the 36th (Orel) Regiment had left some hours earlier, the 4th Battalion had only just marched off.

General Shatilov and the three leading battalions reached Sha-ho-pu at 9 a.m., and for some time remained in reserve; but

\* Probably the remaining seven guns of this division had been lost or destroyed earlier. In addition to the loss of personnel and material, 136 horses are said to have been killed and 40 to have been wounded.

† See p. 88.



about an hour later the defenders of the northern portion of the village, being unable any longer to endure the Japanese fire, broke and fled to Pao-chia-a-tzu. Their places were taken by one of the newly arrived battalions and the time seemed to have come either to attempt to drive the Japanese out of the village by a counter-attack against the flanks, or to accept defeat and retire to Pao-chia-a-tzu. After some consideration, General Gershelmann made up his mind to adopt the latter course. Almost at the same moment the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Japanese Regiment entered Ku-chia-tzu and a good point of support was secured for General Oshima's right flank; but in spite of his rapid success, his position was extremely critical. The battalions\* in Sha-ho-pu had almost run out of ammunition; rifle and artillery fire was being poured into them from both flanks; the infantry on the north bank showed no sign of yielding; and the ground north of Kan-chia-la-tzu was so thoroughly commanded that they were themselves cut off from all support. Two batteries of the 3rd Artillery Regiment had been pushed up to Kan-chia-la-tzu and the other four to the Hou-tai hillock, but they were quite unable to master the Russian fire. To add to General Oshima's anxiety, reports began to come in from all sides indicating that the enemy was preparing a strong counter-attack.

At this point it is again necessary to follow the Russian movements. So soon as General Kuropatkin heard of the disaster to the Xth Corps, he realized that even the position on the north bank of the Sha Ho was no longer secure. Before reaching Sha-ho-pu the river makes a pronounced curve to the northward, round the bases of two hills which were soon to become famous. The tactical importance of these two hills was very great; for if the Japanese were once firmly established on them

General Kuropatkin's measures to restore the fight in the centre.

they would turn the flanks not only of the Xth and XVIIth Corps to the westward, but also of the 4th Siberian Corps near Erh-tao-kou. In the meanwhile this bend was guarded only by the two battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment, which were acting under the orders of General Meiendorf. It was not to be expected that they could resist the Japanese advance for long, and if the heights were to be saved, prompt action was imperative. General Mau, whose unexpected retreat had also become known to the commander-in-chief, was ordered to join General Sluchevski, his own corps commander, without delay; messages were sent to Generals Bilderling, Meiendorf, and Zarubaiev, urging them to hold their ground at all costs; and General Sluchevski was ordered to retake Sha-ho-pu. To this order the commander of the Xth Corps replied that his men were so much exhausted that he was contemplating a retreat from the north bank of the river in the direction of Pao-chia-a-tzu. Fortunately for the Russians, the commander-in-chief heard of this intended move just in time to

\* The 3rd Battalion 6th Regiment, and 2nd Battalion 34th Regiment were actually in the village. The 2nd Battalion 6th Regiment continued the line westward, and the 1st Battalion was on the outskirts of Kan-chia-la-tzu facing north-west.

prevent it from being carried out. General Gershelmann, who was already some distance on the way to Pao-chia-a-tzu, was ordered to return at once; while Colonel Shitkovski, who commanded the left section of General Sluchevski's fighting line, was told to reoccupy his former position on the left bank of the Sha Ho. At the same time General Kuropatkin announced that he was about to move, "with all the troops at his command," in the direction of Nan-kang-tzu, against the right of the Japanese Second Army. In a dispatch sent about the same time to General Gershelmann, General Kuropatkin added that for the present no more than four battalions were available, but that he hoped to arrive with eight or possibly twelve.

Since early morning, General Kuropatkin had been striving to collect the scattered regiments of the 22nd Division, but by midday only the 86th (Wilmanstrand), and two batteries\* were at hand. The 85th and 87th Regiments were believed to be on their way, but to wait for them might mean that the best opportunity for recovering the lost positions would pass. General Kuropatkin decided to act at once. From San-chia-tzu the 86th Regiment and two batteries first made their way to One Tree Hill. Thence they changed direction to the southward, so as to come into action on the right of the two battalions of the 124th (Voronej) Regiment. A simultaneous attack from the eastward was to have been made by the 37th Division, but, as already explained,† it was speedily rendered impossible by the action of the Japanese 11th Brigade and Fourth Army. On the other hand the 88th (Petrov) Regiment, which had been withdrawn from the fighting line, was found by a staff officer near Pu-tsao-a and was again brought forward. In this way ten battalions of infantry and the 2nd and 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossacks were massed, under the command of Colonel Sivitski of the 86th Regiment, against the right flank of the Japanese 3rd Division. Nan-kang-tzu and Chang-ling-tzu were both reoccupied; but by this time the Japanese 11th Brigade was free to turn against the new foe, and so soon as connexion was established with the 18th Regiment in Ku-chia-tzu the Russian advance was checked. During the afternoon the 87th (Neishlot) Regiment came up from the east and joined the commander-in-chief, who was watching the battle from One Tree Hill. Thence three battalions were sent forward between the right of Colonel Sivitski's force and the left of the Xth Corps, while the 2nd Battalion was dispatched to take part in the fight which was raging round Sha-ho-pu. Even with this addition to his strength, Colonel Sivitski could not drive the Japanese from the Hou-tai hillock, and as darkness approached he began to fortify the villages which he had taken. On his right the Xth Corps had failed in its attempts to recapture Sha-ho-pu, and at 9 p.m. Colonel Shitkovski was ordered again to retire across the river. By this movement Colonel Sivitski's right flank was left completely exposed, while the retreat of the 37th Division

\* The 4th and 5th Batteries, 7th Artillery Brigade.

† See p. 133.

had deprived him of all support on the left. By remaining where he was he would merely expose himself to a converging attack on the morrow, and in these circumstances he deemed it wise to withdraw during the night to the southern slopes of One Tree Hill, where he handed over his command to Major-General Novikov.

But for the resolute defence of the Hou-tai hillock, Sha-ho-pu must inevitably have fallen. The order to return to the attack reached Colonel Shitkovski and General Gershelmann while on their way towards Pao-chia-a-tzu. By that time the last battalion of the Orel

Critical situation  
of the Japanese  
3rd Division.

Regiment had returned from the XVIIth Corps, and General Gershelmann was able to send the whole regiment to the attack, supported by four batteries of artillery.\* The northern portion of the village was still held by the rear guard, and the walls and trenches were quickly lined by riflemen. Colonel Shitkovski seems to have recrossed to his former position south of the Sha Ho without difficulty, and from three sides a terrific fire was concentrated upon Sha-ho-pu, where companies of the 6th, 33rd, and 34th Regiments were soon almost inextricably mixed. At this point the river bed is not more than ninety yards in width, and from the cover on the northern bank the Russian rifles played with deadly effect upon the Japanese ranks. The situation was slightly improved when the 1st Battalion of the 13th Artillery Regiment reached Chang-hsin-tien, but by 3.30 p.m., every officer of the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment was either killed or wounded. La-mu-tun was still strongly held against General Koizumi's brigade, and unless it could be captured it seemed improbable that the 3rd Division would be able to hold its own. The violent thunderstorm which burst towards evening brought some slight relief to the Japanese, for it hampered the movements of the Russian troops which were gathering to the attack. Every report which reached Hou-tai, where General Oshima's head-quarters were established, told of the desperate plight of the firing line and appealed for reinforcements or for ammunition, and many contained suggestions that it would be wise to retire while there was yet time. About 5.30 p.m., the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Regiment joined the decimated companies in the village, and an hour later six companies of the 18th Regiment were sent to the left flank. General Oshima's reserve was then reduced to two companies only, and the Russian attacks were as fierce as ever. To all appeals for help General Oku turned a deaf ear, and his orders were imperative that cost what it might the 3rd Division was not to yield a foot of ground.

For some hours before sunset, General Sluchevski had been looking anxiously to the eastward for the appearance of General Mau's brigade; for at 2.30 p.m., he had heard from the commander-in-chief that it had again been placed at his disposal.

\* 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Batteries, 31st Artillery Brigade; 3rd Battery, 9th Artillery Brigade.

In urgent haste a message was dispatched summoning it to Chang-ling-tzu; half an hour later the order was repeated, but as the hours passed the strength of attack was becoming exhausted, and still the expected help was not forthcoming. At sunset the defence appeared to be as stubborn as ever, although in fact it was all but broken, and a staff officer was sent off to search for the missing brigade and bring it to Pao-chia-tzu. About 1 a.m., it was found at Fu-chia-tun, completely exhausted by its wanderings over the muddy roads. At 8 p.m., being thus uncertain as to the movements of his fresh troops, and seeing no prospect of achieving his object without them, General Sluchevski ordered his batteries to retire for the night to Pao-chia-a-tzu, and withdrew all the battalions which were south of the river to the northern bank. The Orel Regiment in Sha-ho-pu exchanged a desultory fire with the Japanese in the southern portion of the village, but elsewhere all was still.

Some idea of the terrible nature of the struggle for Sha-ho-pu may be gathered from the Japanese losses.\* Except for the comparative calm on the 13th, the 3rd Division had been engaged almost continuously since the morning of the 11th, and on the 14th the fighting reached its climax. In the 34th Regiment alone, one hundred and ninety-one officers and men were killed, and five hundred and sixty-one were wounded. In the 33rd Regiment, the numbers were fifty-four killed and three hundred and thirty-three wounded; and in the 6th Regiment, fifty-five killed and two hundred and seventy-one wounded. The close of day brought but little respite to the exhausted troops. Their trenches were sodden with rain so that rest was impossible, even the iron rations were finished, and drinking water was nowhere obtainable. Many of the wounded died from exposure; cold, hungry, and thirsty the survivors passed the night in utter misery, knowing only that they must resume the attack at daylight.

Throughout the day General Sluchevski's right flank rested on the village of La-mu-tun, where it was attacked by General Koizumi's mixed brigade,† which during the General Koizumi's absence of the rest of the 6th Division acted directly under the orders of General Oku.

During the previous night the usual reconnaissance had revealed to the Japanese that (1) defensive works on the south side of Lin-sheng-pu were held by at least one battalion of infantry; (2) the Sha Ho was everywhere fordable by infantry, and Lin-sheng-pu could be approached under cover of the banks; (3) the country between Shu-lin-tzu and La-mu-tun was perfectly open. It had been expected that the 4th Division would be in a position to attack Lin-sheng-pu at an early hour on the 14th; but from dawn that division was engaged with the enemy on its left and was not free to turn its attention in any other direction.

\* The Russian losses are unknown.

† Two squadrons 6th Cavalry Regiment, 23rd Regiment, 2nd and 3rd Battalions 48th Regiment, 2nd Battalion 6th Artillery Regiment, one company engineers.

With Lin-sheng-pu in Russian hands, and not employed in its own defence, any attack upon La-mu-tun was clearly impossible. Delay was equally undesirable since, as the result of its rapid advance, the 3rd Division was raked by fire from the villages and trenches on its left. The only course open to General Koizumi was, therefore, to move simultaneously against Lin-sheng-pu and La-mu-tun, and with this object the five remaining companies of the 48th Regiment were detailed at 8.50 a.m. to join the three companies already at Sha-ho station,\* while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 23rd Regiment were to attack Lin-sheng-pu, if possible in co-operation with the 4th Division.

The left wing at once deployed north of Shu-lin-tzu, where it lay under the fire of the enemy until about 10.30 a.m., when part of the 4th Division came up on the left and a combined movement was made against the common objective, and by noon the firing line was about six hundred yards south of the Russian trenches. Meanwhile, the batteries were keeping up a tremendous duel with the Russian 35th Artillery Brigade, which on this day fired 12,944 rounds, and at a very early hour the reverse to the Xth Corps compelled General Dobrzinski to use up nearly all his reserve. Two and a half battalions of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment were sent from Ying-wo to La-mu-tun, and as the Japanese could also be seen working round towards the right flank, two companies of the same regiment and the composite battalion which represented all that was left of the 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment were placed under Colonel Istomin in Lin-sheng-pu. With the aid of these reinforcements, the Japanese advance was stopped, and the 23rd Regiment began to lose heavily, particularly from the hostile artillery. Two companies were sent forward from the brigade reserve, but before they arrived, the 5th and 8th Companies of the 23rd Regiment, moving up the river bed and along the left bank, appeared suddenly about four hundred yards south-east of Lin-sheng-pu, and opened with volleys against the trenches. In the angle of the Sha Ho to the east of the village there is a slight rise in the ground, dotted with Chinese graves and low bushes, which in the original dispositions had been occupied by two companies of Russian infantry. During the night this advanced post had been abandoned, and the cover it afforded enabled the Japanese to creep up unseen. In the confusion which resulted from this unexpected attack, the remainder of General Koizumi's firing line dashed forward about 2 p.m. and drove back the defenders from their outer line to the village walls. At 2.30 p.m., the left attack, taking advantage of a heavy downpour of rain, tried to get a little closer, but the enemy, reinforced by two battalions,† clung firmly to his ground, even attempting a counter-attack. The fire which had been kept up by the Japanese for several hours had reduced the ammunition to only a few rounds per man, and, but for the timely arrival of a fresh supply, which was brought up by one of the companies from the reserve,‡ the troops would have

\* See p. 124.

† Of the 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment.

‡ The ammunition was carried forward by men who were extended

been compelled to rely solely upon their bayonets. The attack was then renewed with redoubled energy, and at 3.20 p.m. the welcome appearance of the national flag of Japan from the southern and eastern walls indicated to the artillery that the infantry was in the village. Some of the heaviest work of the day followed.

Capture of Lin-sheng-pu.

The Russians defended themselves with their customary valour, and only allowed themselves to be expelled after severe street fighting; but one by one the houses were cleared, and by 4 p.m. the Japanese were in undisputed possession, and engaged in throwing up such shelter as they could to protect them from the artillery fire which was turned upon the village so soon as it was evacuated by the routed infantry. With the capture of Lin-sheng-pu, General Koizumi was able to bring the whole of his infantry to the attack of La-mu-tun, but by this time his supply of artillery ammunition, which had already been once replenished, was completely exhausted. Since early morning the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 48th Regiment had been at Sha-ho station, and a few men had been able to establish themselves some three hundred yards nearer to the Russian position; but the ground was entirely devoid of cover, and soon after Lin-sheng-pu was taken a further advance unsupported by artillery, was found to be impossible. It was not until nearly 7 p.m. that the arrival of more ammunition enabled General Koizumi's guns again to open fire, and by that time it had already been decided to postpone the infantry attack until morning.

Turning once more to the left of this brigade; at 11 p.m., two companies of the 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment and a battalion of the 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment advanced to retake Lin-sheng-pu; but the watchful Japanese waited until they were quite close, and then poured a heavy fire into their ranks. The Russians came on with the utmost bravery, and a few men, it is said, actually forced their way into the village; but after a fierce struggle of forty minutes they were beaten off, leaving over a hundred dead behind them.

One by one the units of the Russian 3rd Division had been absorbed into the firing line, so that it had been unable to take an independent part in this day's operations, but while the fight was raging round Lin-sheng-pu, General Volkov, the commander of the XVIIth Corps was looking for succour to the 6th Siberian Corps on his right. Until the evening of the 13th, this corps had been independent of the Western Force, but so soon as it was placed under his orders, General Bilderling had ordered General Sobolev to move out at dawn to the line Shao-chia-lin-tzu—Ta-liang-tun. By 7 a.m., the troops were in position with the 2nd Brigade of the 72nd Division, under Major-General

to fifteen paces. Each man had two bundles of 180 rounds slung over his shoulder. In this way the fresh supply was taken up to the firing line, distant only a few hundred yards from the enemy, with comparatively small loss.

Baranovski,\* on the right near the former village, and the 2nd Brigade of the 55th Division, under Major-General Laiming,\* on the left, the 1st Brigade was at Kuan-lin-pu. This movement brought General Sobolev into line with the 35th Division on his left, and it had hardly been completed when the following order was received from General Bilderling: "I request your Excellency to begin your advance upon Hung-ling-pu and Ta-tai, and to seize both these villages. The XVIIth Corps has been ordered to assist you with its reserve to occupy Hung-ling-pu. General Dembovski is to hold the area Pao-hsiang-tun, Fu-chia-chuang-tzu, Ta-han-tai, so as to protect your right flank. I beg you to move at once, and to report to me."

In the face of this formidable body, any Japanese advance in the direction of Lin-sheng-pu must clearly expose General Tsukamoto's left, but so much depended upon the capture of that village that the risk had to be taken. To meet the difficulty, a reserve of two battalions† was assembled at Chung-lu-yen-tai, and the 4th Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 48th Regiment were posted at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu; the remaining four battalions moved at 6 a.m. to Chang-liang-pu and San-chia-tzu preparatory to the attack upon Lin-sheng-pu. It soon became evident that, as had been anticipated, the enemy was meditating an offensive movement from the north and north-west, and that until it had been dealt with the capture of Lin-sheng-pu must be left to the 6th Division. Opposite General Tsukamoto's left wing, General Baranovski's brigade with three batteries of artillery, moving in two columns and a reserve, occupied Hsin-tai-tzu and Wu-chang-ying, and appeared likely to overwhelm the single Japanese battalion and the cavalry in Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. Seeing the danger in which the 4th Division was placed, General Akiyama sent to its assistance two squadrons of cavalry, a company of infantry, and two horse artillery guns, and brought the rest of his artillery into action near Hei-lin-tai. Meanwhile, the Russian left column was meeting with considerable opposition and, instead of helping it by driving in the weak force at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu, General Baranovski suspended his advance until General Laiming's brigade should come up into line.‡ After reaching Ta-liang-tun, that brigade was likewise formed up in two columns, with the 219th (Yukhnov) Regiment and three batteries on the right, and the 220th (Yepifan) Regiment and one battery on the left; one batta-

\* Generals Baranovski and Laiming commanded the 72nd and 55th Divisions respectively, but on this occasion took command of the brigade columns.

† 2nd Battalion 37th Regiment, 3rd Battalion 8th Regiment.

‡ While the Russians were preparing their attack the following significant message was sent by General Tsukamoto to the cavalry. "The strength of the enemy in front of the division is not yet well ascertained, but the main body of his troops is formed by the 55th and 72nd Division of 1st Reserve Infantry. Consequently the enemy outnumbers us, yet as his men are untrained and unskilled in tactics I shall not be afraid of him. I believe that our men are quite able to check the advance." The subsequent operations were to prove that his confidence was well founded.

lion from each regiment formed the brigade reserve. These preparations seem to have occupied rather more than an hour, and soon after the advance was resumed the scout detachments reported that Japanese infantry and artillery could be seen to the south. Almost at the same moment a sudden outburst of shrapnel fire, very accurately placed, killed several men of the Yepifan Regiment and compelled it to retire. The whole of the artillery of the 4th Division was then turned against the garrison of Lin-sheng-pu, which was also being bombarded vigorously by the 6th Division. Supported by this concentrated fire the Japanese 37th Regiment was able to gain a considerable amount of ground, and eventually to join hands with General Koizumi's brigade.\* About 11 a.m., the Russians again advanced to the attack, the Yukhnov Regiment being directed upon Wu-chang-ying and the Yepifan upon Chang-liang-pu. Before moving off, the battalions were formed up and deliberately inspected by company and battalion commanders in full view of the Japanese. The mounted officers then dismounted, and the advance began in quick time, without any attempt at extension and as regularly as on a peace parade. After crossing some two hundred or three hundred yards of open ground in this formation, single rank was formed, and the movement was then continued, almost without a shot being fired, to within seven hundred yards of Chang-liang-pu. The whole operation was watched with breathless interest and amazement by the men of the Japanese 8th Regiment, who had no difficulty in repelling, with heavy loss, the exponents of these bygone tactics.

The two battalions in the brigade reserve were then brought forward, and about 2 p.m. the whole Russian line again advanced, apparently in much the same formation as before, only to meet with a like reception. In a few minutes both regiments lost nearly all the officers who had survived the first repulse, and the men, deprived of their leaders, began to waver. Quickly grasping the situation, General Laiming placed himself at the head of the shattered battalions, and led them against the village, but at 3 p.m. he too was wounded and the attack crumbled, though not until the Yukhnov Regiment alone had lost nearly two thousand men. This second disaster sealed the fate of Lin-sheng-pu. The two battalions of the Japanese 37th Regiment, relieved of all anxiety as to the safety of their left flank, swept round the western side of the village and threatened to cut the retreat of the defenders, who were already engaged to south and east. Even then the attempt to capture Chang-liang-pu was not entirely abandoned by the Russians, and help was requisitioned from the general reserve. In response to this request the 286th (Kirsanov) Regiment and a battery were sent up from Shao-chia-lin-tzu, and by 5 p.m. preparations for another effort were complete; but as daylight was beginning to fail, General Sobolev changed his mind, halted his line, and ordered his men to entrench themselves for the night on the ground which they were holding.

While the left brigade of the 6th Siberian Corps was thus

\* See p. 143.



engaged in a contest in which personal courage was found to be a very inadequate substitute for trained intelligence, the right brigade, suffering much less heavily, worked forward until Pao-tzu-yen was occupied and its right flank detachment was close to Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. At that point it was checked by the 1st Battalion of the Japanese 48th Regiment, acting in co-operation with General Akiyama's brigade. The Russians were in greatly superior strength, but as a battalion had been sent to Hung-ling-pu from the army reserve, General Tsukamoto was able to detach three companies of the 8th Regiment to his left flank, and the Japanese position was still further improved when part of the artillery of the right flank was able to turn its fire against General Baranovskii's guns. In this way the Russian advance was checked, and as no support was forthcoming either from General Dembovski or from the cavalry, General Baranovskii ordered a retreat so soon as he realized that the repulse in front of Chang-liang-pu had exposed his own left.

Although the operations of the 6th Siberian Corps had ended in complete discomfiture, they had brought some relief to the rest of the Western Force, and heavy though the loss had been, it was some consolation to General Sobolev to hear from General Bilderling that "Thanks to your forward movement, I have been able to hold the position on the Sha Ho, although the Xth and XVIIth Corps have been compelled to use up all their reserves. I advise you to leave advanced guards in your present positions, and to retire your main body during the night to the line Shao-chia-lin-tzu—Ta-liang-tun, echeloned in rear of the right flank of the XVIIth Corps, and to remain there until I receive further instructions from the commander-in-chief. Keep the closest touch with the XVIIth Corps, and watch your right flank. Report frequently. I shall spend the night at Su-chia-tun." In accordance with this message, General Sobolev took his right column back to Shao-chia-lin-tzu and his left to Kuan-lin-pu and Ta-liang-tun, where it fell in with some companies of the 11th (Pskov) Regiment which had been sent out in support.

Simultaneously with his order for the counter-attack by the 6th Siberian Corps, General Bilderling directed General Dembovski to advance to Ta-han-tai, and instructed General Grekov to transfer his cavalry from the eastern to the western flank of General Dembovski's detachment. The movement was apparently to have begun at daybreak, but reports which came in from patrols of a strong Japanese force at Shen-tan-pu aroused General Dembovski's anxiety as to the safety of the crossing at Ta-wang-kuan-pu. Fearful of being taken in flank, he decided to wait until his right was secured by the cavalry. For some hours, therefore, his troops remained in their bivouacs near Ta-chang-ko, but at 10 a.m., a cautious advance was begun in the direction of Pao-hsiang-tun. The only Japanese force which was available to oppose General Dembovski was the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the greater part of which was already engaged in support of the 4th Division. The villages to the west were held by an almost

General Dembovski's detachment.

insignificant detachment, which had no choice but to retire in front of the vastly superior numbers which were brought against it. The retreat was skilfully conducted, without apparently allowing the Russians to discover the weakness of their enemy. From Fu-chia-chuang-tzu and Li-ta-jen-tun, the Japanese fell back to Ta-ping-chuang and Hu-chia-tun, and in those two villages they continued to protect the left of Marshal Oyama's army until night put a stop to the fighting.

The operations of the 14th October may be briefly summarized as follows. Except at two points, the Japanese, by their renewed attacks, had carried out Marshal Oyama's intention to establish himself on the left bank of the Sha Ho. Only at the village of La-mu-tun and at Putilov Hill and One Tree Hill, the Russians still maintained their hold upon the southern bank. But for the defence of La-mu-tun the village of Sha-ho-pu would have been lost, and the Russian centre would have been completely broken by the Japanese 3rd Division. That this supreme disaster was avoided was due in a considerable measure to the counter-attack by the 6th Siberian Corps which, utterly though it failed, had the effect of delaying the capture of Lin-sheng-pu, and thereby relieving the garrison of La-mu-tun. So much may be granted; but when it is considered that Generals Sobolev, Grekov, and Dembowski were opposed by little more than a brigade of infantry and four regiments of cavalry, it is evident that they might well have been expected to achieve something more decisive.

Great though the Japanese success had been, it was not yet sufficient to satisfy Marshal Oyama, who was already looking to the future, and at 4.30 p.m., the following orders for the 15th were issued from Yen-tai.

- (1) The First, Second, and Fourth Armies have driven the enemy to the north.
- (2) I intend to re-form the Japanese armies on the left bank of the Sha Ho, in order to prepare to advance to the line of the Hun Ho.
- (3) The First Army will re-form south of the line Shang-wa-fang—Hsiu-chia-wen—Pi-chia-wan and reconnoitre towards Mukden. The 12th Division and the Umezawa Brigade should be recalled to Pien-niu-lu-pu, or if possible to Kang-ta-jen-shan, and should reconnoitre towards Fu-shun.
- (4) The Fourth Army to assemble on the line Pu-tsao-a—Chang-ling-tzu, and reconnoitre towards Mukden.
- (5) The Second Army to assemble on the line Sha-ho-pu—Lin-sheng-pu and reconnoitre towards Mukden. A strong detachment to be posted at Kuan-lin-pu to reconnoitre to the west of the Hun Ho.
- (6) The 5th Division, 3rd and 11th *Kobi* Brigades, 1st Artillery Brigade (less one regiment), 4th Regiment Foot Artillery, 2nd Independent Battalion Foot Artillery, and the Siege Artillery Park to return to their respective commands as at the beginning of the battle.
- (7) The head-quarters of the commander-in-chief will be at Yen-tai.

## CHAPTER XLIII.

THE 15TH AND 16TH OCTOBER.—THE FIGHTING ON THE SHA HO.  
THE CAPTURE OF PUTILOV AND ONE TREE HILLS.

(Map V/8.)

By the evening of the 14th October, General Kuropatkin found himself without any reserve, and the losses at Lin-sheng-pu, La-mu-tun, and Sha-ho-pu, as well as the failure of the 6th Siberian Corps at Chang-liang-pu, made it appear by no means improbable that a renewed attempt to break his centre near the railway and main road would be successful. Two methods of meeting this danger would seem to have been open to the Russian commander-in-chief. A vigorous attack by Generals Dembovski and Grekov against the Japanese left might have had the desired effect, but General Kuropatkin preferred the more direct method of throwing up an elaborate system of field defences in front of Pao-chia-a-tzu and collecting a fresh reserve in the neighbourhood of the threatened point. Twenty-two battalions were marching westward from the Eastern Force on the 14th,\* and during the 15th he drew in to his own command the 87th (Neishlot) Regiment from the 22nd Division, three regiments† of the 37th Division which had been so severely handled on the 14th, and three regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps.‡ In this way General Kuropatkin hoped to be able to establish a central reserve of forty-six battalions§ by the night of the 15th, and in the meanwhile General Mau's brigade and the 85th (Viborg) Regiment, were sent to Pao-chia-a-tzu, where they joined the main body of the Xth Corps at 1 p.m. and 8 p.m. respectively. The two battalions of the 124th Regiment which had taken part in Colonel Sivitski's attack upon the Hou-tai hillock were also sent to rejoin their own corps, and they too found their way to Pao-chia-a-tzu. To cover this concentration, the regiments in the front line were instructed that they must on no account leave any of the positions which they still held; but so far as is known the commander-in-chief had no definite plan as to the use to which his reserve was to be put. Indeed he was still, as throughout the battle, very ill informed as to the progress of events. In conformity with this general shifting of troops from the east towards the

\* See p. 130.

† The 145th (Novocherkask), 147th (Samara), and 148th (Caspian) Regiments.

‡ The 9th (Tobolsk), 10th (Omsk) and 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiments.

§ If all these regiments had been complete, the strength of the reserve would have been fifty battalions.

centre of the Russian line, General Stakelberg wished to replace the battalions which he had sent from the 1st and 2nd Siberian Corps to the commander-in-chief's reserve by drawing in five regiments and two batteries of artillery from the 3rd Siberian Corps on his left, but the activity of the Japanese prevented his orders from being carried into effect.\*

Turning to the Japanese, Marshal Oyama clung firmly to his determination not to cross the Sha Ho with his main forces at any point until everything should be in readiness for another general advance, and in the meanwhile to restore his order of battle by gathering in under their proper commanders, so far as was possible, all those units which had been dispersed during the fighting of the previous days. The 3rd *Kobi* Brigade formed the army reserve at San-kuai-shih Shan and the 11th *Kobi* Brigade remained as reserve to the 10th Division; but, in accordance with the general plan, the 5th Division was to return from the First Army to the Fourth, and the 3rd Brigade which was on General Kuroki's right was sent back to the 2nd Division on his left, its place being taken by the 12th Division and the 5th *Kobi* Brigade which were moved up from the south. The Umezawa brigade became the First Army reserve and marched to General Kuroki's head-quarters at Pei-san-chia-tzu. These movements were not completed until the 16th October; but as the serious fighting was entirely confined to the Japanese Second Army and General Kuropatkin's Western Force Marshal Oyama was able to effect his reorganization without interference.

The morning of the 15th brought no relief to the men of the Japanese 3rd Division, who, after one of the hardest days of fighting of the whole war, had spent a sleepless night in Sha-ho-pu. Without food or water they were in no condition to renew the attack, and General Oshima could attempt nothing more than the occupation of the low hills north-east of Ku-chia-tzu, which were held by the outposts of the Russian 86th and 88th Regiments, and for this purpose two battalions of the 18th Regiment were transferred, before daylight, from the left to the right of the Japanese 3rd Division. The 11th Brigade of the 6th Division was still between the Second and Fourth Armies, but as the extent of front to be watched was very great only one battalion† could be detailed to assist in the attack. Soon after 6 a.m., a heavy artillery fire was opened against the Russian advanced battalions, and after about four hours' bombardment the Japanese infantry occupied the enemy's outpost line, but the southern spurs of Putilov Hill‡ and the village of San-tao-kang-tzu were strongly held as a main position. Meanwhile the Russians appeared to be increasing in numbers opposite Sha-ho-pu, and as there was evidently no danger of attack from the

Putilov Hill  
occupied by the  
Japanese.

\* See p. 158.

† 2nd Battalion 45th Regiment.

‡ This hill was not so named until after the fighting on the night of the 16th, but so far as is known there is no other distinctive name for this height.

east General Oshima appealed to the Fourth Army for help. Earlier in the day the Yamada detachment,\* which had been acting under the commander-in-chief, had again been placed under the command of the Fourth Army, and it was now ordered up from Chuang-chia-a-tzu to relieve the 11th Brigade which was gradually assembled at Chiang-pu-tun. Marching at 11 a.m., the Yamada detachment reached Huang-chia-tien soon after 2 p.m., and the advanced guard entered San-tao-kang-tzu at 4.30 p.m. The enemy was then found to be holding a wood about five hundred yards further north, with an artillery position on the western slopes of Putilov Hill. Orders for the attack were at once issued but, possibly owing to the fatigue of the men, no movement was made for some time and very soon afterwards the 10th *Kobi* Brigade and a battalion of mountain artillery from the Fourth Army were placed at the disposal of General Yamada. The mountain guns were soon in action and about 7.30 p.m., the 41st Regiment, eager that the honour of capturing this important height should not be shared by others, moved forward against the Russian trenches. The delay of two hours which might well have added to the difficulty of the task had, in fact, had exactly the opposite effect, since so soon as darkness covered his movements General Novikov had, for some unknown reason, withdrawn all but two battalions to the northern bank of the river. When the Japanese rifle fire broke out two batteries were brought back, but only feeble resistance was offered to the attack of the Japanese 41st Regiment, which captured the hill with a total loss for the whole day's operations of one man killed and twenty-nine wounded. Two guns and two ammunition wagons were abandoned in the retreat. One Tree Hill was however still held by a battalion of the 86th (Wilmanstrand) Regiment and a battalion of 88th (Petrov) Regiment.

So far as the Japanese 3rd Division was concerned the 15th October had rendered the position of the battalions in Sha-ho-pu comparatively secure. By the evening, General Oshima, instead of occupying a more or less triangular position with that village at the apex, exposed to a converging fire from east, north, and west, had brought his right wing up to the river bank in line with his centre, and the Yamada detachment was soon afterwards established upon Putilov Hill. With this improvement in the centre, interest tended to centre more and more upon the struggle for La-mu-tun and the operations further to the west. During the very early hours of the 15th, the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment was sent from the army reserve to join hands with the two battalions of the 48th Regiment at Sha-ho station. These three battalions, aided by any troops which could be spared from Lin-sheng-pu, were to fall upon the garrison of La-mu-tun. The attack was to begin at 6 a.m. but at that hour Lin-sheng-pu was itself heavily attacked by

Russian counter-  
attack against  
Lin-sheng-pu.

\* 41st Regiment, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and a company of engineers. The 2nd Battalion, 10th Artillery Regiment, joined General Yamada at t Fan-chia-tun.

three Russian battalions,\* supported by four batteries of artillery near Ssu-fan-tai. The Russians came on with the utmost gallantry, and two companies forced their way into some of the houses on the western side of the village, while the main attack against the northern face got to within fifteen yards of the walls. According to the Russian accounts a second attack was made at 3 p.m., in the course of which the 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment actually got into the village and was only driven out after desperate fighting in the streets and houses. About 6 p.m., a battalion of the 139th (Morshansk) Regiment came up in support of the attack, which was again renewed only to be again beaten back. The Japanese accounts make no mention of the second of these attacks, and from them it would appear that although the Russians were at one moment not more than a few strides from the defences they were never within measurable distance of ultimate success. Indeed a comparison of the losses† would seem to show that in the attack no more regard was shown either for human life or for modern tactics than had been shown in the manoeuvres of the 6th Siberian Corps on the previous day.

While this counter-attack was in progress the commander of the XVIIth Corps was trying to recall into his second line those units of the 3rd Division which had been sent forward on the 14th as reinforcements to the 35th Division. It had been intended that these troops should take up their old positions before daylight; but this had not been done, and when the movement began in the afternoon it had a most disastrous effect upon the Russian fortunes. In the confusion of battle orders were misinterpreted, and between 3 and 4 p.m., the commander of the 137th (Nyejin) Regiment seeing the survivors of the 9th (Ingermanland) Regiment making their way back towards Ying-wo, left his trenches and followed their example. The evil did not stop there, for Colonel Martuinov, who had resisted all the Japanese efforts to turn him out of La-mu-tun, seeing that his right flank would soon be without support and being uncertain as to what was expected of him, likewise withdrew towards Kao-li-tun.‡ Until this moment the Japanese had been unable to make any real impression upon the defence. At 7.30 a.m., being unable

\* Two battalions 12th (Velikolutsk) Regiment, two companies 140th (Zaraisk) Regiment, two companies 137th (Nyejin) Regiment.

† Japanese losses, 23rd Regiment, 13 killed, 50 wounded; 37th Regiment, 4 killed, 22 wounded. Russian losses, 57 killed, 308 wounded (including 16 officers), 185 missing.

‡ Colonel Martuinov states that his orders were to conform to the movements of the troops on his right, and if they should retire to withdraw behind the 10th (Novoingermanland) Regiment, which was in position south of Han-chia-pu. On the other hand, Captain Zhdanov, on the staff of the XVIIth Corps, states that the order which he delivered was that in case of a retirement being ordered Colonel Martuinov was to act in co-operation with the right section of the defence, and to move round the left flank of the 10th Regiment so as to avoid masking its fire. The misunderstanding would appear to have arisen from the commander of the XVIIth Corps failing to anticipate that the retirement might begin without orders either from himself or from General Dobrzhinski.

to obtain the assistance of more than three companies from the garrison of Lin-sheng-pu, which was fully employed in repelling the Russian attack, three battalions advanced from the direction of Sha-ho station, supported at first by the divisional artillery near Shu-lin-tzu and later by the captured howitzer battery near Chang-hsin-tien and the 4th Regiment of Foot Artillery near San-chia-tzu. By 9 a.m., the infantry reached a point some six hundred yards from the enemy, but by that time the field guns had expended the whole of their ammunition and were unable to lend any further assistance. On the other hand the Russian artillery at Ssu-fan-tai and north-east of La-mu-tun was extremely well served, and played with great effect upon the attacking lines. A fresh supply of shrapnel arrived about 10 a.m., and by midday the 48th Regiment had gained another two hundred yards of ground, but the only means of supplying the firing line with ammunition was by sending up individual men with as many rounds as they could carry. La-mu-tun was now the vital point in the line of battle. Everywhere else the Japanese were successful, and this village alone prevented the Japanese Second Army from gaining the river bank. The force at present available was evidently too weak for the task, and the 11th Brigade had been called back from General Oku's right\* and was already assembling at Chiang-pu-tun. To assist in the attack every available gun was placed under Major-General Saisho, the commander of the artillery of the Second Army, who by 1 p.m. had concentrated the fire of sixteen† batteries, exclusive of the three batteries at Shu-lin-tzu upon this one village. A short time previously an engineer company, treating the enemy's artillery and rifle fire with a contempt which excited the admiration of all who saw the deed, had laid a telephone wire from General Koizumi's head-quarters to Sha-ho station, and had thereby enabled General Okubo, who assumed command of the operations, to direct the movements of both wings of his reunited division. So soon as the 11th Brigade came up from the eastward, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 45th Regiment were deployed in the firing line with the 13th Regiment in support, and by 3 p.m. General Okubo's arrangements were complete. From south-east and south-west the assailants closed in upon the devoted village, and although General Koizumi's men were still taken in flank by the artillery at Ssu-fan-tai, it certainly seems doubtful whether Colonel Martuinov could have held out much longer. It was just at this moment that the retreat began on his right, and a little later the 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment and the garrison of La-mu-tun were streaming back to the second line. Quickly grasping the situation the Japanese assaulting lines raced across the plain; both forces reached the

\* See p. 150.

† 13th Artillery Regiment (six batteries), one captured field gun battery, one captured howitzer battery at Chang-hsin-tien, 1st Battalion 6th Artillery Regiment (three batteries), 4th Regiment Foot Artillery (four batteries) at San-chia-tzu, one captured battery 4-inch guns near Sha-ho station.

village simultaneously at 4.40 p.m., and pressing through it poured a destructive fire from the northern edge into the retreating Russians, who left five hundred dead behind, and in their flight suffered still further from the guns of the 3rd Division which caught them in flank before they could reach a place of safety.

Before there was time to recover from the confusion of the retreat a fresh alarm was created by a report that the Japanese were collecting to south and south-west of La-mu-tun for an attack against the right of the XVIIIth Corps. As there were no reserves at hand to meet the impending danger, the fire of six batteries were turned in the direction of the Japanese concentration. In forty minutes, half of which were spent in observing the effect produced, these forty-eight guns are said to have fired nearly eight thousand rounds\* with results which are claimed to have been brilliant. The Japanese columns vanished, and the beaten infantry was saved by the guns. Since, however, no mention of this incident is made in the reports from the other side, and the Japanese losses, except in the attack upon La-mu-tun, were insignificant, the alarm may possibly have been groundless.

How far Colonel Martuinov may have been to blame for this last disaster to the Russian arms it is impossible to say. His action was severely censured by his chiefs, and it appears certain that in spite of the bombardment to which his troops had been subjected their powers of resistance were not exhausted.† For the greater part of two days they had held the village with stern determination, but at the end the retreat was carried out in such haste that the Japanese 45th Regiment hardly lost a man‡ in the final assault. No doubt his orders were ambiguous, but a real leader would have preferred to interpret them as instructions to hold so important a post until the last possible moment, rather than as authority for leaving it so soon as other troops in the vicinity should happen to give way.

It has been suggested that the best way for General Kuropatkin to secure his position at La-mu-tun, as well as to safeguard his ultimate retreat to Mukden, would have been a vigorous offensive against the Japanese 4th Division and General Akiyama's cavalry. For this purpose the 6th Siberian Corps, General Dembovski's force, and General Grekov's cavalry were all available; but the first named corps had already experienced two reverses, at Lang-tzu-tai on the 12th and Chang-liang-pu on the 14th, which were not likely to be forgotten for some time, and in the absence of definite

\* This would mean that in twenty minutes each gun fired nearly 170 rounds, or more than eight rounds a minute.

† The 138th (Bolkhov) Regiment lost 4 officers and 43 men, the 140th (Zaraïsk) Regiment 8 officers and 217 men; the losses of the battalions of the 124th (Voronej) and 35th (Bryansk) Regiments, which were in La-mu-tun, are not known.

‡ The loss of the 45th Regiment on this day was one man killed and ten wounded, but as one battalion was employed on the right of the Second Army there is some uncertainty as to how many men, if any, were lost in front of La-mu-tun.



orders General Sobolev contented himself with returning a somewhat desultory fire which was directed against his trenches between Shao-chia-lin-tzu and Ta-liang-tun. Between 11 a.m. and noon his view that nothing more was required of him was confirmed by a dispatch from General Bilderling to the following effect:—

“I permit myself to express to you my deep acknowledgment for the timely and energetic support rendered to us yesterday by the 6th Siberian Corps under your command, which made it possible for the Western Force, and particularly the XVIIth Corps, to fight a hot action with the main body of the enemy and to retain all the positions occupied by us.”

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this message, heavy firing to the eastward showed that the XVIIth Corps was again being attacked, and to assist it forty guns were turned in the direction of Lin-sheng-pu, but without producing any great effect. Later in the day, when General Volkov's battalions were compelled to retreat, the 285th (Mtsensk) Regiment was brought from the reserve to Ta-liang-tun, but in other respects neither General Sobolev nor General Tsukamoto made any important change in their dispositions.

Although General Sobolev's inactivity may be accounted for by his unhappy experience on previous occasions, it is difficult to

see any reason, except the absence of strong superior control, for a similar attitude in General Dembovski and Grekov. On the previous evening

the Japanese cavalry had been compelled to fall back, but at daylight General Akiyama sent his only infantry battalion, assisted by some cavalry from the south to attack Li-ta-jen-tun from Ta-ping-chuang. Seeing that the village was held by three battalions of infantry and several scout detachments, supported by two batteries near Fu-chia-chuang-tzu, it is not surprising that the attack should have been unsuccessful. Later in the day two companies of the Japanese 37th Regiment joined General Akiyama from the 4th Division, and although the enemy was evidently too strong to be turned out of Li-ta-jen-tun he was effectually prevented from undertaking any offensive movement except against Han-shan-tai, where a weak detachment of Japanese cavalry repulsed a superior force of the enemy.

Notwithstanding his uniform success at every other point, the strength of the Russian right flank, which threatened to overlap and envelop the Japanese left, caused General Oku some anxiety, and late in the day he sent the 3rd and 6th Cavalry Regiments to strengthen General Akiyama. The villages in the plain east of the Sha Ho lent themselves well to defence, but General Dembovski's troops were fresh and all the conditions would appear to have favoured a vigorous night attack against the Japanese 4th Division. About 6 p.m., however, an order from General Bilderling reached General Dembovski telling him that: “In view of the possibility of the retirement of the Western Force and the 6th Siberian Corps, you are to cover our right flank, and to work in close connexion with the 6th Siberian Corps.” Once more the inducement to safeguard retreat had proved too strong for the

Russian commanders, and General Dembovski, in accordance with his instructions, considered that his first duty was to leave the very advantageous position which he had gained and to fall back to Pao-hsiang-tun and Fu-chia-chuang-tzu, where he would be somewhat closer to the troops on his left, leaving only a weak outpost in Li-ta-jen-tun.

Although General Kuropatkin made but little use of the comparatively strong force of fresh troops on his right flank, Marshal

Oyama's decision not to press on beyond the Sha Ho, at all events for the present, enabled him to carry out his intention of assembling a central

reserve of forty-six battalions, which, however, when collected proved to muster no more than twenty thousand bayonets. Similarly the arrival of General Mau's brigade and two batteries\* at Pao-chia-a-tzu, followed soon afterwards by the 85th (Viborg) Regiment, brought a greatly needed accession of strength to General Sluchevski's Xth corps. By nightfall that commander had drawn up his troops across the Mandarin road, and the strength of the entrenchments had been very greatly increased. The right section, between the village of Kuan-tun and the road, was held by the 2nd Brigade, 31st Division, and two battalions of the 85th (Viborg) Regiment under General Vasilev. East of the road, as far as the village of Shan-kan-tzu which was held by the 33rd (Elets) Regiment, was the 1st Brigade of the 9th Division under General Gershelmann, who also had under his command the 36th (Orel) Regiment in Sha-ho-pu. The remnants of the two battalions of the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment, which had been driven from La-mu-tun, are believed to have rejoined later, and the remaining brigade of the Xth Corps, the 1st of the 31st Division, and the two remaining battalions of the Viborg Regiment were probably in reserve. By these dispositions the Mandarin road and the retreat to Mukden had been secured, but before they were complete they gave rise to correspondence between various commanders, which affords further evidence of the difficulty experienced by General Kuropatkin in keeping himself informed as to the movements of his troops. Early in the morning of the 15th General Sluchevski received a somewhat vaguely worded message from the quartermaster-general of the army saying that the troops of the 1st Corps, "which had taken the Hou-tai hillock," were placed under his command. If it were really the case, as the dispatch suggested, that this important point had been retaken, it was difficult to see how the Japanese were able to remain in Sha-ho-pu; but the form in which the news was conveyed, as a mere parenthesis in the general instructions for the day, was so curious that before taking any action General Sluchevski asked the commander of the 9th Division to procure more trustworthy information. Afterwards, a report came from Colonel Sivitski, who had led the attack on the 14th, saying that he was on One Tree Hill with the 88th Regiment, three battalions of the 86th Regiment, one company of the 87th and one of the 11th Siberian Regiments, and

\* 1st and 7th Batteries 31st Artillery Brigade.

four batteries of the 7th Artillery Brigade, all of which were at the disposal of the Xth Corps, and that his outposts were on the Hou-tai hillock. Still doubtful as to the absolute accuracy of this information, General Sluchevski sent off a staff officer to tell Colonel Sivitski to support the left of the Xth Corps and to take the Japanese in flank if they should advance to the attack. The messenger was also to find out from the commander-in-chief whether the troops of the 1st Corps were placed unreservedly under General Sluchevski, or whether any special task had been allotted to them; and according to General Sluchevski's account, he was to report that "Owing to the great exhaustion and disorganization of the troops after the fight on the 14th, the Xth Corps would not be fit for active employment during the day, but that after the expected arrival of the Mau detachment the general in command expected to be able to maintain his position." General Kuropatkin was found on One Tree Hill, and from the message which was actually delivered he derived the impression that General Sluchevski was contemplating retreat, and promptly replied in writing that "the officer sent by you reports that you have decided to evacuate your position on the Sha Ho.\* I must point out that such a step would involve the retreat of the whole army. If you cannot trust the troops under your command, I recommend you by your personal example to remind them of the flag under which they serve. I will let you have all the reinforcements which can be spared, but there must be no retreat. Your report of yesterday misled me completely, as I gathered that Sha-ho-pu had been recaptured." In reply to General Sluchevski's inquiries, his staff officer was told that the detachment on One Tree Hill was now under General Novikov, and was completely at the disposal of the Xth Corps. To a question as to the truth about the Hou-tai hillock, General Kuropatkin replied that he also had been informed that it had been recovered by the 1st Corps troops; but he added that he had received a similar report as to the recapture of Sha-ho-pu which had led him to direct Colonel Sivitski's attack further to the eastward than he would otherwise have done.†

Although in the morning General Kuropatkin stated very emphatically that there was to be no retreat, in the afternoon reports of a reverse to the XVIIth Corps caused him to modify his decision, and he then wrote to General Sluchevski as follows:—"According to a report which I have received the XVIIth Corps has fallen back a short distance; I leave it to your discretion to do likewise as a temporary measure.

"General Novikov's detachment of seven and a half battalions

\* In the *German Official Account*, Part 5, p. 189, from which this account of the correspondence is taken, it is suggested that General Sluchevski's staff officer may have told General Kuropatkin only of the position at Pao-chia-a-tzu, without mentioning the fact that Sha-ho-pu was still held.

† This misunderstanding probably arose from the fact that while the Japanese captured the southern portion of the village the Russians succeeded in retaining their hold upon the northern portion.

(from the 86th, 87th, 88th, and 11th Regiments) with artillery will secure your left flank.\*

"The height east of Shan-kan-tzu is being occupied; the position on either side of the Sha Ho will be fortified under my directions.

"I have sent twelve battalions to Tu-shan-tun as a general reserve; twenty-two battalions under General Gerngross will be at San-chia-tzu. I intend to attack decisively with these troops to-morrow."

Meanwhile General Sluchevski's staff officer had found General Novikov, who repeated the story of the capture of the Hou-tai hillock; but further investigation showed that the point which the Ist Corps had succeeded in reaching was not that height which was clearly visible from General Novikov's position, but another and less important eminence rather farther to the east. Having thus cleared up the situation to the best of his ability the staff officer appears to have returned to his chief near Pao-chia-a-tzu.

The whole day passed without any important change in the dispositions of the Xth Corps; but such modifications as there were in the general situation favoured the Japanese. Their left had not been attacked; La-mu-tun had been occupied; the position of the 3rd Division at Sha-ho-pu was less precarious, and Putilov Hill had been occupied. General Kuropatkin had, however, some twenty thousand men under his hand, and much might yet depend upon what they were able to do. Although he had not given any definite orders for the 16th, an impression got abroad, apparently owing to his letter to General Sluchevski which has just been quoted, that the reserve which had been accumulated was to be launched on a great counter-attack. Fully convinced that such was the commander-in-chief's intention General Bilderling concluded that his right course was to co-operate with the Western Force, and communicated his plan in a report which reached the commander-in-chief a little before daylight on the 16th. By this time, however, General Kuropatkin had been able to acquaint himself more fully with the position of affairs, and had found so little encouragement that his original scheme had been abandoned. He had always intended that his counter-attack should be dependent upon the power of the Western Force to recover Lin-sheng-pu and Sha-ho-pu, and neither of these objects had been accomplished. The troops destined for the counter-stroke had been assembled, but in every other respect General Kuropatkin had met with disappointment, and his intention for the 16th remained, therefore, very much as it had been on the previous day; namely, the recapture by the Western Force of the villages on the Sha Ho.

Marshal Oyama, on the other hand, regarded his aim as practically accomplished, and had no desire to do more than to hold

\* This arrangement appears to contradict General Kuropatkin's previous statement that General Sluchevski was free to dispose of this detachment as he pleased.

and to make good the ground which he had won. The most dangerous point in his line was the village of Sha-ho-pu, where the situation of the 3rd Division was still far from satisfactory. Whereas, therefore, General Kuropatkin's plan for the 16th, was an attack by his Western Force with a view to a possible general advance later, Marshal Oyama contemplated nothing more than strengthening and improving his position on the southern bank of the Sha Ho.

In accordance with this plan the Japanese First Army had nothing to do except to perfect its entrenchments; but on the extreme right the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, supported by infantry, was sent forward under Prince Kanin to watch the enemy's movements. A hostile force was encountered near Kao-kuan-sai, and driven back to the Kao-tai Ling, where the Russians were found to be in strength estimated at seven squadrons, two battalions of infantry, and a battery of horse artillery. After a desultory fight, which was quite sufficient to show that the retreat had stopped, Prince Kanin broke off the engagement and retired to Kao-kuan-sai. Next day his force was attached to the First Army and ceased to exist as an independent unit; the command was handed over to Major-General Tamura, and Prince Kanin left to join Marshal Oyama's head-quarters at Yen-tai.

This reconnaissance produced an effect upon General Stakelberg's plans which was quite out of proportion to its real importance. In accordance with the widely spread idea that the commander was contemplating another attack, General Stakelberg had called in from the 3rd Siberian Corps five regiments to replace those which had gone to join the commander-in-chief with General Gerngross. With these troops he intended to make a diversion, and to prevent the Japanese from sending any assistance to the points which were to be attacked by the commander-in-chief. However, a report from General Ivanov that a Japanese force had been seen at the Wang-fu Ling, whence it had advanced to the Kao-tai Ling and was threatening the left flank, caused General Stakelberg to cancel his previous orders and to take from General Ivanov only the 6th (Yeniseisk) and 7th (Krasnoyarsk) Regiments leaving the 3rd Siberian Corps intact.

Meanwhile the withdrawal of the 5th Division from General Kuroki's army gave the 2nd Siberian Corps in General Stakelberg's right section an opportunity to recover the hill known as Wai-tou Shan. The importance of this point consisted in its value as an observation post, for from its summit the outposts of either army could overlook the camps and movements of the enemy. When the Japanese 5th Division marched off, only one battalion was left on the hill, and being fully alive to the advantage of retaining it, General Kuroki sent a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Kani to strengthen the defence. The reinforcements\* reached

\* Apparently three battalions and a mountain battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Kani commanded the 29th *Kobi* Regiment.

Chien-liu-huo only to find that they were too late and that the battalion of the 5th Division had been driven back. The reverse had come about as follows. At 1 p.m., all the batteries with the 2nd Siberian Corps had opened upon the single battalion which was holding Wai-tou Shan and, covered by their fire, the scouts of the 2nd (Chita) Regiment, a battalion of the 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment and some six companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment had crossed the river to the attack. The battalion of the 17th East Siberian Regiment failed in an attempt to take a hill to the eastward, but the rest of the force quickly drove the Japanese from Wai-tou Shan, and as Colonel Kani made no counter-attack they remained in undisturbed possession of the height.

Opposite General Mishchenko's brigade and the 4th Siberian Corps no movement took place on this day but, with a view to assisting the 3rd Division on his left, the commander of the Japanese Fourth Army was ordered to continue the attack which had begun with the capture of Putilov Hill. If possible, the Yamada detachment was to cross the river, and was then to wheel westward so as to take the defenders of the northern part of Sha-ho-pu in flank. Between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m., a report reached the staff of the Russian 22nd Division that the Japanese were advancing from the south-east in considerable strength, and were beginning to press back the two battalions which had passed the night on One Tree Hill.\* Six companies† were sent to their support, but as they rounded the eastern slopes of the hill they saw that the enemy was already piercing the centre of the position and enveloping it on both flanks. Surprised and out-maneuvred the Russians fell back hurriedly about three-quarters of a mile, and finally as far as Wu-chia-tun, pursued by artillery fire. The retreat was covered with such devotion by the two battalions of the 88th (Petrov) Regiment that in the 4th Company only two officers and one man remained unwounded.‡ While this attack was in progress the 20th *Kobi* Regiment, helped by flanking fire from Putilov Hill, drove off a few Russian scouts who were still south of the river, and came up into line between the 41st Regiment and the right of the 3rd Division.

The loss of these two low but important hills, which although rising only sixty or eighty feet above the river bed commanded the whole country for a considerable distance to east, north, and south, dealt the final blow to General Kuropatkin's plans for a general attack. The XVIIth Corps could not advance unless its left was protected; but if the Xth Corps were to move forward it would be enfiladed from Putilov Hill. Moreover communication between the Western Force and the 4th Siberian Corps was

\* See p. 150. The strength and composition of the Japanese troops making this attack is not known.

† 2nd Battalion 88th (Petrov) Regiment, 13th and 16th companies 86th Wilmanstrand Regiment.

‡ *German Official Account*, Part 5, p. 193.

menaced, and the commander-in-chief was no longer able to move his troops freely from one part of the field to another. His anxiety as to the future was increased by further news of a different, but hardly less disquieting, nature. The daily states from the Western Force showed that the effective strength of the regiments had diminished to an alarming extent. In the Xth Corps the average strength of a battalion proved to be no more than three hundred and forty men, and in the XVIIth Corps only three hundred and eighty; while the total strength of the hundred and two battalions\* under General Bilderling's command numbered only forty-eight thousand and forty-one bayonets. Several regiments had been formed into single battalions, and even then it was only with the greatest difficulty that officers could be provided.

Taking all the circumstances into consideration General Kuropatkin resolved to concentrate his efforts upon the recapture of Putilov and One Tree Hills. The troops

The assault upon One Tree Hill. nearest to hand were the 86th, 87th, and 88th Regiments of the 22nd Division, but as they had all suffered more or less severely, General Gerngross was instructed to bring up from his own composite corps† as many battalions as he thought necessary and to assume control of the operations. He selected the 19th and 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiments and dispatched them, together with two batteries, under the command of Major-General Putilov to Wu-chia-tun. Their arrival at that village was very opportune, as the 33rd (Elets) Regiment was just retiring from Shan-kan-tzu in front of the 20th *Kobi* Regiment, which was preparing to cross the river and to execute its westward wheel against Sha-ho-pu.

Meanwhile a report had reached General Gerngross that General Novikov had reoccupied One Tree Hill, but as this soon proved to be false he detailed the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to move from Sha-ku-tun through Liu-chiang-tun against the right flank and rear of the position. By 3 p.m. his arrangements were complete. On the right, General Putilov's brigade was to carry the hill which was afterwards named after its commander; in the centre, General Novikov with his three regiments was to attack One Tree Hill; on the left, the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was to envelop the enemy's right.‡

The artillery was to bombard the heights from 5 p.m., but there was to be no movement of the infantry until an hour later, when daylight would be gone. These preparations were watched with some anxiety by General Yamada, who saw that his two regiments were about to be assailed from three directions by greatly superior forces. On his left he had posted the 20th *Kobi* Regiment, and on his right the 41st Regiment. Two batteries of the 14th Artillery Regiment were firing from behind the 20th

\* Including the 6th Siberian Corps and General Dembovski's force. The 217th (Krom.) Regiment which had been brought from Mukden to the 55th Division is included in these figures.

† i.e., the twenty-two battalions withdrawn from the Eastern Force.

‡ At a later stage of the battle the 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiment came up between the Russian centre and left columns.

*Kobi* Regiment against the enemy's guns near Chang-chia-pu-tzu, and a little further to the west three batteries of mountain artillery were supporting the 18th Regiment, of the 3rd Division, part of which had actually crossed to the north bank of the river. In reserve were the 10th and 40th *Kobi* Regiments, but their exact position is unknown.

This sudden concentration of a considerable mass of the enemy had placed General Yamada in a position of great danger; his easy success in the capture of the two hills had led him on until his right flank was completely in the air, while the river which flowed round his front afforded no real protection. A message from the commander of the 3rd Division told him that in view of the threatening aspect of affairs the 18th Regiment was to fall back to Hou-tai, and a request for reinforcements to be sent from the Fourth Army met with the response that none could be spared and that he must retire into line with the Second and Fourth Armies. The comparatively tranquil state of affairs in the east and the reports of the movements of the Russian troops had led Marshal Oyama to believe that an attack in force upon the Second Army was impending, and to meet it he had decided to collect a reserve near the Mandarin road. For this reason the 5th Division, instead of rejoining the Fourth Army on its return from General Kuroki, had been ordered to Wu-li-tai-tzu to come under the orders of the commander-in-chief. General Yamada had, therefore, no hope of assistance, and the situation was momentarily becoming graver. The Russian guns, disregarding the Japanese artillery, were concentrating their fire upon the trenches, and the infantry was crossing the river in batches of four or five men at a time and assembling in some dead ground at the foot of One Tree Hill. Seeing that the enemy was coming on in overwhelming strength General Yamada realized that the only hope of saving his little force lay in retreat; but since to do so by daylight must mean heavy loss he resolved to hold his ground until night and then if possible to slip away in the darkness. His baggage and wounded were already on their way to the rear, and at 6.15 p.m. orders were issued for the retreat. The first troops to go were to be the field artillery, followed by the mountain guns; then the 20th *Kobi* Regiment was to fall back and entrench itself to the south-east of Ku-chia-tzu; finally the 41st Regiment, leaving one company on Putilov Hill, was to retreat to the south of San-tao-kang-tzu and to get into touch with the left of the 10th Division on the hill north of Chang-ling-tzu.

But for a piece of ill fortune for the Japanese these movements might possibly have been carried out successfully. Quite early in the day a few Japanese had entered Sha-ho-tai village on the Russian side of the river, and as a prelude to the real attack General Novikov sent forward five companies of the 87th (Neishlot) Regiment to drive back this advanced post. This was done without difficulty, and at 5 p.m. the Russian scouts followed the retreating enemy and occupied a small hillock on the southern bank. Through some misunderstanding the Russian artillery suddenly directed its fire upon this little party and upon the



village of Sha-ho-tai, with the result that the companies of the Neishlot Regiment began to fall back upon General Novikov's main body. Fearing that a retreat once begun might be difficult to check, the commander of the 88th (Petrov) Regiment ordered an advance and was immediately followed by the 86th (Wilmanstrand) Regiment and the rest of the 87th, three-quarters of an hour before the time fixed for the attack. Sha-ho-tai and the small hillock on the far side were quickly recaptured; but an attempt to rush the assault of One Tree Hill met with a sharp repulse, in which the commanders of all three regiments were wounded, and the assailants fell back in some confusion to the foot of the hill. Meanwhile the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment was moving through Sha-ku-tun and Liu-chiang-tun round General Yamada's right flank. Near the former village the regiment came under artillery fire, but after discarding all unnecessary equipment the march was continued. At Liu-chiang-tun, where the first weak body of the enemy was encountered, the regiment wheeled to the north-westward and deployed for attack with the 2nd Battalion leading, the 3rd Battalion in echelon to the right, and the 1st Battalion in reserve. As the regiment approached One Tree Hill fire was opened by the Japanese; but without a pause the 3rd Battalion dashed at the trenches, while the 2nd Battalion passed round the southern spurs and fell upon the regimental baggage of the 41st Regiment, not a man escaping to carry news of the disaster.

Flushed with this easy success the 2nd Battalion turned against the defenders of the hill, who were already employed with the enemy in front, and suddenly assailed them in flank. The commander of the Japanese 41st Regiment and nearly all the officers were killed or wounded; and when the Russian reserve battalion came up into the firing line the Japanese supports and reserves were simply overwhelmed. Deprived of their leaders, and without any cohesion in their ranks, the men fought desperately, but the numbers against them were too great. A weak counter-attack was repulsed, and in a few moments all was over. Then occurred one of those unfortunate incidents which are so difficult to prevent in night operations. In the darkness and confusion it was impossible to communicate with the other assaulting columns, and the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment began to suffer very heavily from the fire of General Novikov's men. Some part of the hill seems to have been reoccupied by the survivors of the Japanese 41st Regiment, and at 11 p.m. the Russian commander, who was still without information from the troops on his right, even if he was not actually fighting with them, gave orders to retire to Liu-chiang-tun.

At the Putilov Hill the success of the 2nd Brigade of the 5th East Siberian Rifle Division had been even more decisive. So soon as General Putilov heard that the regiments of the 22nd Division had begun their advance he sent his own men to the attack, so that they also were half an hour in advance of the appointed time. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 19th East Siberian Rifle

Putilov Hill.

Regiment led the way, with the 3rd Battalion in support and the 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, which formed the reserve, echeloned in rear of the right flank. At the head of the leading regiment was its commander Colonel Suichevski; and on its left rode Lieutenant-Colonel Zapolski, whose brilliant fighting qualities had led to his appointment as the chief of General Putilov's staff for this desperate venture, a distinction which was to cost him his life. The river was crossed in this formation, and an outlying spur of the enemy's position was scaled without a shot from either side; but when within about four hundred yards of the trenches the Russians were greeted with a terrific outburst of rifle fire. The 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment dashed straight forward with the bayonet, while the 20th East Siberian Rifle Regiment circled round the Japanese left flank, and between the two the 20th *Kobi* Regiment was crushed. The retreat of the Japanese 18th Regiment had been delayed, so that it should coincide with General Yamada's movements, and its right battalion became involved in the general ruin. Nothing could withstand the fury of the Russian assault. In a few moments the Japanese infantry was hurled from its trenches, and nine field and five mountain guns, as well as the two Russian guns which had been captured on the previous day, fell into General Putilov's hands. The fiercest fighting of all took place in the village just below the hill, where the Japanese defended themselves with desperate courage until each house in turn was set on fire. Some men of the 40th *Kobi* Regiment, and possibly some of the 39th, had come up in support, but between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. the fighting was over and the Russians were in complete possession of the hill. But for the inability of the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to follow up its success against the Japanese right flank, for which the central assaulting column was principally responsible, the line of retreat would have been cut; but when the Russians were checked at One Tree Hill the danger of this crowning disaster was removed, and before daylight General Yamada was able to re-form his troops on the line which had been indicated in his order for the retreat, namely, from the hill north of Chang-ling-tzu to the right flank of the 3rd Division near the Hou-tai hillock.

Long after the main body of the Japanese had retired, a few scattered remnants, perhaps equal in strength to a weak battalion, remained on One Tree Hill. Below them, crowded into the low ground between the foot of the hill and the river, was the disordered mass of the 22nd Division and the 11th (Semipalatinsk) Regiment. After their first bloody repulse these troops did not again venture to attack, even when the cheering to the westward should have told them of the success of the right column; and the unfortunate misunderstanding with the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment seems to have added to the confusion. From the many accounts which have appeared it is almost impossible to extract any coherent story of the events of the night, but it seems to be certain that until 11 p.m. General Putilov was under the impression that his columns had been victorious at all points

One Tree Hill  
occupied by the  
Russians.

Then, however, he heard that One Tree Hill was still in Japanese hands and at once gave orders that it must be captured at all costs by 5 a.m. The 86th (Wilmanstrand) and 88th (Petrov) Regiments were terribly disorganized, but with some difficulty a sufficient force was collected by 3 a.m. from the 11th (Semipalatinsk) and the 87th (Neishlot) Regiment. At their approach the few remaining Japanese vanished in the darkness, and by 5 a.m. the victory was complete. When the single tree, from which the hill took one of the many names by which it was known to the troops, was reached, the body of a Russian officer was found, and it was then realized that at some time during the night the left column must have actually reached the summit. On both sides the losses had been heavy, but those of the victor might have been very much less had the staff arrangements for keeping up communication between the various columns been more perfect. The principal sufferers from this cause appear to have been the men of the 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, but it is at least probable that they inflicted some loss upon their comrades of the 22nd Division. In all, the Russian casualties amounted, in killed, wounded, and missing to nearly three thousand men. The Japanese losses are uncertain, but appear to have numbered about a thousand,\* including four officers and one hundred and eighty-four men who were taken prisoners; and in addition, nine field and five mountain guns, as well as the two Russian guns captured on the 15th, were abandoned in the retreat.

To commemorate this bright spot in the gloomy record of the war, the Russians, with the consent of the Tsar, to whom the news was communicated by telegraph, named the western hill after General Putilov, the commander of the successful force, and the eastern after Novgorod, the principal garrison town of the 22nd Division.

The story of this night attack has brought the account of affairs in the centre of the line of battle to the morning of the 17th October, and it is now necessary to go back some twenty hours to the moment at which the commander-in-chief decided again to postpone his grand counter-attack against the villages on the Sha Ho and to concentrate his efforts upon the assault which had been brought to so successful a conclusion. Beginning at daylight on the 16th, the artillery of the Xth Corps kept up a steady bombardment in hourly expectation that the infantry advance would begin, but at 11.15 a.m. an order was received for the Western Force to confine its efforts to strengthening its own positions. Similarly, the commander of the Japanese 3rd Division contented himself for the most part with replying to the fire of the Russian guns. So long as the enemy remained in the northern part of Sha-ho-pu the Japanese position on the southern bank could not be considered satisfactory, but various attempts to drive out the 36th (Orel) Regiment by direct frontal attack had failed, and General Oku decided to try the effect of a turning movement

The Japanese  
3rd Division.

some twenty hours to the moment at which the commander-in-chief decided again to postpone his grand counter-attack against the villages on the

\* These figures include the 18th Regiment.

against the Russian left, in which the 18th Regiment was to be assisted by the Yamada detachment. As already related, this operation at first met with some success\* and Colonel Shitkovski was compelled to evacuate Shan-kan-tzu, which was then occupied by the Japanese. There, however, the advance was checked. General Gershelmann sent two battalions of the 34th (Syev) Regiment from his reserve to his left flank, and when General Putilov's brigade appeared near Wu-chia-tun the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Japanese 18th Regiment retired. The 2nd Battalion was less fortunate, for it was protecting some of General Yamada's guns and until they moved off the infantry could not begin to retreat. The heavy rain had made the tracks into little better than water-courses, and before the guns were away the infantry was caught by the East Siberian Brigade, with the result that the commanding officer and two hundred and fifty men were killed or wounded.

So soon as it had become probable that the 18th Regiment would have to retreat, the 34th Regiment had been moved eastward until it was in touch with the 5th Division which had been brought up to Ku-chia-tzu. Had the Yamada detachment been able to withdraw, as had been intended, without becoming engaged, this precaution would doubtless have provided all the support that was necessary, but the news of its sudden overthrow put so serious a complexion upon the situation that the 38th Regiment from the Second Army reserve was placed at the disposal of the 3rd Division, and General Oku sent word to the commander of the 5th Division that should the circumstances demand he would not hesitate to make use of the division on his own responsibility. This necessity did not arise. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 18th Regiment made their way back in safety, and the luckless 2nd Battalion was rallied near Ku-chia-tzu. Two companies of the 38th Regiment came up on the left of the 18th Regiment, the line of battle of the 3rd Division was restored, and as the Russians did not follow up their success all danger of a general retreat was averted.

Moving to the westward, the postponement of the general attack by the Russian Western Force deprived the operations of the XVIIth Corps, and of the Japanese 6th Division, of any real interest. At first the Russian guns† merely shelled Lin-sheng-pu, La-mu-tun, and Sha-ho station, but later in the day one battery moved to a flank position, whence it was better able to assist the escape of a number of men who had been holding out in the outskirts of the first-named village since the counter-attacks of the previous night. This movement seems to have been accompanied by an infantry demonstration, for the Japanese claim to have repelled another counter-attack; but as there is no mention in the Russian accounts of anything beyond the artillery actions it is impossible to say exactly what happened. In any case the

\* See p. 161.

† The 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th Batteries were to the east of Han-chia-pu; the 6th, 7th, and 8th Batteries east of Su-fan-tai; the 3rd Artillery Brigade was on a position in rear.

incident was without effect upon the general course of the battle, and before nightfall the commander of the Japanese 6th Division was able to reorganize his troops into two wings and a reserve, very much in the formation with which they had begun the battle. The captured field-gun battery then left his command and returned to the reserve of the Second Army.

Although the 6th Siberian Corps and General Dembovski's force had both been placed under General Bilderling during the later stages of the battle, the co-operation of the various commanders still left much to be desired. The operations on the western flank. To simplify the control, General Dembovski had been put under the command of General Sobolev who, on the night of the 15th, was ordered to assist the Xth and XVIIth Corps in their intended attack by again striking at the Japanese left flank. The objective of the blow was to be the village of Chung-lu-yen-tai, and to reach it the 6th Siberian Corps was to come down from the north and north-west, while General Dembovski was to move due west from Fu-chia-chuang-tzu.

With the first sign of daylight the artillery opened fire and, as no intimation that the grand offensive movement had been suspended reached General Sobolev, the infantry attack was prepared. As a first step, the 287th (Kirsanov) and 288th (Kulikov) Regiments with four batteries were to take Wu-chang-ying, which was to be made the starting point for the next stage of the operations. Soon after moving off, this column got into touch with the left battalion of General Dembovski's force, which had been directed against Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. After their bitter lessons in the earlier stages of the battle, the Russians seem to have advanced with the utmost caution, and it was not until the afternoon that they entered Wu-chang-ying, although the opposition encountered was almost negligible. At that point the advance was stopped, as General Sobolev had at last heard of the change in the commander-in-chief's plans. Meanwhile General Dembovski had spent some hours in a vain effort to enter Wan-chia-yuan-tzu; but in spite of great numerical superiority he, with three infantry regiments and a formidable artillery, had been easily held in check by the weak Japanese garrison,\* aided by the 4th and 6th Cavalry Regiments at Ta-tai, and it was not until nearly 4 p.m., that he realized that he alone was persevering in a task which had been abandoned by the commander-in-chief soon after daybreak. Towards evening he began to withdraw to Hsin-tai-tzu, but the retreat seems to have been somewhat unskillfully conducted; for the Japanese, seizing a favourable opportunity, dashed out from the walls behind which they had sheltered all day, and delivered a successful counter-stroke in which they inflicted very heavy loss upon the Russian right flank, while they themselves escaped almost unscathed.†

\* The Japanese troops in this village were 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, two companies 37th Regiment, 1st Battery 4th Artillery Regiment.

† The Japanese accounts, referring to both General Dembovski's force and the 6th Siberian Corps, say that the Russians left 500 dead on the ground. General Dembovski reported his loss as 39 killed, 1,060 wounded.

Although both the 4th and 6th Cavalry Regiments had some share in General Dembovski's defeat they, as well as the whole of General Akiyama's brigade, part of which General Akiyama's reoccupied Li-ta-jen-tun about 8 a.m., were cavalry.

sufficiently fortunate to escape with extremely few casualties on this day, and it is remarkable that the force to which was entrusted the responsible duty of protecting the left wing—for the duties of the cavalry from beginning to end were merely protective—went through one of the greatest battles in history with a loss of three killed and seventeen wounded.\*

This fact is no measure of the importance of General Akiyama's task, but it affords valuable evidence as to the capacity of the enemy by whom he was opposed.

With this last repulse at Wan-chia-yuan-tzu and Wu-chang-ying, the 5th and 6th Siberian Corps disappear from the story of the battle of the Sha Ho. Owing to some extent to errors in the higher commands, the part they had played had been inglorious, but, like General Orlov's brigade at Liao-yang, their repeated failures to produce any effect upon the veteran troops of Japan are conclusive proof of the paramount importance of scientific leadership, thorough training, and high discipline.

\* See Appendix E. One account says, however, that the 9th and 11th Cavalry Regiments had 33 casualties on the 15th; in any case the numbers are quite insignificant.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

## THE LAST DAYS OF THE BATTLE.—WINTER QUARTERS.

(Map V/9.)

THE storming of Putilov Hill during the night of the 16th–17th October marks the real termination of this week of continuous fighting; a fitting end to a great battle. Marshal Oyama regarded his task as accomplished, and the weary Russian troops were incapable of another effort. Some days passed before the sound of rifle and artillery ceased to be heard on the banks of the Sha Ho, and the positions held by the hostile armies underwent certain modifications, but probably the only man in either army who refused to accept the situation was the Russian commander-in-chief. His unfailing optimism, fortified by his one success, still led him to hope that the counter-attack which he had originally planned for the 16th might retrieve his fortunes, and at 9 a.m. on the 17th he warned General Stakelberg to have everything ready for an advance in co-operation with the rest of the army. That officer's reserve had been reduced to about seven battalions only, but the 7th (Krasnoyarsk) Regiment had been called in from General Ivanov,\* and as the Japanese were showing no signs of activity it was considered safe to leave the protection of the eastern flank of the army to the 3rd Siberian Corps and the cavalry, and to collect a body of twelve or fifteen battalions in readiness for the general movement. When these dispositions were complete the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division was near the Kao-tai Ling, and the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division had its left on the heights north of the Wang-fu Ling and its right overlooking the village of Tung-kou. To the west, a composite force of about thirteen battalions† occupied positions as far as the village of Hsiao-yang-tun, and the units of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division were in reserve. In advance of the main line of the Eastern Force six companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, with three scout detachments, and two machine guns held the Wai-tou Shan whence they had a commanding view over the bivouacs of the Japanese First Army. On the right of the Eastern Force, three regiments of the 4th Siberian Corps,‡ the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment, and General Mishchenko's Cavalry Brigade were on the hills near Erh-tao-kou. A great part of the reserve which General Kuropatkin had assembled during the previous day had been detailed for the

\* See p. 158.

† 6th (Yeniseisk), 7th (Krasnoyarsk) Regiments, 17th East Siberian Rifle Regiment. One battalion 2nd (Chita) Regiment, and part of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment.

‡ The 5th (Irkutsk), 8th (Tomsk), and 12th (Barnaul) Regiments.

garrison of Putilov and Novgorod Hills; but nine regiments, of which four were at Huang-shan\* and five were at Tu-shan-tun and San-chia-tzu,† remained under the commander-in-chief's own hand. The specially organized force for the defence of the captured heights was under General Gerngross and consisted of the 19th, 20th, 33rd, and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiments, the 86th (Wilmanstrand), 88th (Petrov), and the 213th (Orovai) Regiments.

For some reason no intimation of the success of General Putilov's attack reached General Sluchevski; but at daylight it was seen that the commanding hills, so lately in Japanese hands, were again occupied by Russian troops. Cheered by this welcome sight Colonel Volchanovski led the 1st Brigade of the 9th Division and two battalions of the 121st (Penza) Regiment across the river. Part of General Putilov's brigade, flushed with victory, was already moving down the southern slopes of Putilov Hill towards San-tao-kang-tzu, and the two forces advanced together against the right of the Japanese 3rd Division. The Japanese had been granted some hours in which to recover from their reverse of the previous night, but everything seemed favourable for the offensive movement which had been prepared twenty-four hours previously. In momentary expectation of some definite instructions from the commander-in-chief, General Sluchevski made every arrangement for another attack upon Sha-ho-pu. The 1st Division of the 9th Artillery Brigade came into action east of Pao-chia-a-tzu, two battalions of the 35th (Bryansk) Regiment were sent to support the troops south of the river, and the reserves were brought nearer to the front line. The actual assault was entrusted to the 36th (Orel) Regiment.

At 9.30 a.m., when the attack was about to begin, an order from the commander-in-chief, which had been sent off at 11.40 p.m. on the 16th, nearly ten hours earlier, reached General Sluchevski through the commander of the Western Force. This message contained General Kuropatkin's instructions for the 17th; General Dembovski's force, the 6th Siberian Corps, and the XVIIth Corps were to hold their ground, the Xth Corps was to occupy Sha-ho-pu; while the 1st Corps was to attack the same village and the Hou-tai hillock from the east. For the preparation of the attack the 4th Siberian Corps was to hand over two mortar batteries to the Xth Corps, one to the XVIIth Corps, and two to the 6th Siberian Corps; while the 1st Corps batteries were to come into action with common shell. This reference to the artillery preparation seems to have been seized upon by General Sluchevski as a reason for delay; and as the mortar batteries from the 4th Siberian Corps did not reach him until the evening the attack was postponed for another day, and the operations were confined to a bombardment to which the Japanese replied with high-explosive shell.

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\* The 87th (Neishlot), 145th (Novocherkask), 147th (Samara), and 148th (Caspian).

† The 9th (Tobolsk), 10th (Omsk), 11th (Semipalatinsk), 34th and 35th East Siberian Rifle Regiments.



Meanwhile the troops which had recrossed the river had become involved in a sharp fight with the Japanese 3rd Division. At first they had gained some advantage and had captured a few prisoners; but when expecting some support from the remainder of the corps they found themselves deserted. So far as is known there is no full account of the fighting,\* but as the Japanese 6th Regiment lost thirty killed and a hundred and eighty-nine wounded it must certainly have been severe. No report of the difficulty in which his left wing was entangled reached General Sluchevski, and no relief was forthcoming, but in the afternoon an order came from General Kuropatkin to withdraw all the troops of the Xth Corps which were south of the river, so that the field of fire should be perfectly free for the batteries of the 1st Corps which had been got into position near Shan-kan-tzu and Putilov Hill. As usual, the movement could not be begun until after dark, but the Russians do not seem to have had any difficulty in getting away, and long before morning the whole of General Sluchevski's corps, except a few men in the southern part of Shan-kan-tzu, was again north of the river. Rain fell in torrents, and when morning dawned the Xth Corps was still awaiting the oft-deferred order to attack in anticipation of which the reserves had passed the night under arms.† The mortar batteries were to prepare the way, but in the darkness one had missed its road and at daylight found itself within seven hundred yards of the Japanese trenches near Sha-ho-pu. So sodden was the ground that the guns could not be moved, and the battery was overwhelmed by the rifles of the infantry without being able to fire a shot in reply.

In consequence of this mishap the attack was postponed once more; the reserves marched back to their bivouacs; and the bombardment was begun afresh. Soon afterwards an order from the commander-in-chief fixed the hour of the assault at 3 p.m.; but when General Sluchevski insisted that without a thorough rest his exhausted men were quite unfit to carry out an attack with any prospect of success General Kuropatkin at length gave way, and consented to grant his troops some days of repose before again undertaking any offensive movement. At the same time he abandoned the attack by the XVIIth Corps upon Lin-sheng-pu, which had been bombarded for some hours, almost without result, by the 1st East Siberian Mortar Battery. This decision was greeted with something approaching acclamation; and in this way the battle, which had raged for more than a week over a front of nearly forty miles, came to a curiously inconclusive end.

During the day the 6th Siberian Corps disengaged itself from

\* The best account of the operations of the Xth Corps on this day is in von Tettau's *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei*, Vol. II, p. 156 *et seq.* He is followed closely in the *German Official Account*, and very little other information is available.

† Russian accounts state that during the night the Japanese made several unsuccessful attempts to recover Novgorod and Putilov Hills. Japanese accounts make no mention of any such effort.

the enemy and took post on the right of the XVIIth Corps between Kuan-lin-pu and Ssu-fan-tai, with General Dembovski's force to the north-west near Hsiao-su-chia-pu; Generals Grekov and Kossakovski were still further to the west but their exact stations are not known. From about midday the whole Russian army was engaged in strengthening positions, but for some days longer the idea of offensive action was kept up and on the morning of the 19th the following memorandum, which gives General Kuropatkin's views on the general situation, was issued to the troops\* :—

"The series of engagements which have lately taken place have confirmed our assumptions regarding the distribution of the Japanese troops. Oku's army, in strength about sixty battalions and thirty squadrons, is on the left flank and is opposed to our 5th and 6th Siberian Corps, the XVIIth Corps, and part of the Xth Corps. In the centre are the 5th and 10th Divisions of Nodzu's army, strength about thirty-two battalions, opposed by the Xth Corps and Gerngross's detachment.† Further to the east, in the direction of the Yen-tai mines and Erh-tao-kou, is Kuroki's army of three divisions and several *Kobi* Brigades; of these, one or two infantry divisions, with the same number of *Kobi* Brigades, are opposing detachments under General Zarubaiev and Stakelberg; still further to the east two *Kobi* brigades are opposing General Rennenkampf near Pien-niu-lu-pu. One or two divisions of Kuroki's army are formed as an army reserve and are north of the Yen-tai mines. This reserve may be used either against our left flank or against our centre.

"The 1st, 9th, and 11th Divisions are in front of Port Arthur.

"As regards the 7th and 8th Divisions we have no trustworthy information; probably one or both are at Liao-yang.

"Prisoners affirm that the Japanese have lost heavily in the late engagements, and that the companies are a long way short of their full strength. The Japanese army is suffering from a dearth of supplies and from the cold nights. During the fighting of the 16th October, three regiments of the 5th and 10th Divisions were annihilated; and in addition to heavy casualties in killed and wounded they lost fourteen field guns and a machine gun. Judging from the condition of the prisoners this bloody fight has exercised a staggering effect upon the Japanese. We will hope to give them many more such lessons in the future. We are at the present moment slightly superior to them in numbers, and we have gained great experience in battle. We must take advantage of this reverse. It should be made clear to the troops that further efforts are required of them in order to relieve Port Arthur, and to prevent the enemy from gaining time to make good their losses."

In dispatches from His Majesty the Tsar, dated 23rd and

\* von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei* Vol. II, Appendix 24.

† i.e., the troops on Putilov and Novgorod Hills. See p. 169.

26th October, 1904, General Kuropatkin was informed that he had been appointed to the supreme command of all the forces in the Far East; henceforth he was free from control by the Viceroy, but notwithstanding the promise for the future contained in his memorandum of the 19th General Kuropatkin soon found that his army was in no condition to take advantage of its solitary success,

The end of the battle. and that he would be obliged to grant his enemy leisure to refill his ranks and to replenish his stores. The impossibility of making another great effort was apparent to every one, and the

commander-in-chief resigned himself to the idea of a period of inactivity while awaiting further reinforcements from Europe. Similarly, the Japanese were quite prepared to suspend hostilities for a time. They had found that although they could win battles their numbers were not sufficient to enable them to achieve decisive victory, and so long as their enemy made no move they were content to await the fall of Port Arthur and the release of General Nogi's army. In this spirit the two forces went into winter quarters, and began to prepare the lines on the Sha Ho which they were to occupy, with but little variation, until the end of February, 1905. For four months, broken only by General Mishchenko's raid in January, 1905, and the battle of Hei-kou-tai towards the end of that month, the two armies were to face one another from positions which were separated at the most by four miles and at the nearest points by no more than three hundred yards.

To the east of the 6th Siberian Corps, whose position has already been given, the main position of the XVIIth Corps ran from Ssu-fan-tai to Kuan-tun, whence the Xth Corps carried on the line to Shan-kan-tzu, where it came into touch with the right of General Gerngross's detachment on Putilov and Novgorod Hills.

The front of the position was covered by cavalry, presumably belonging to General Grekov's (Orenburg) Cossack Brigade and to the 4th (Don) Cossack Division which reached Mukden on the 20th October and was attached to the 6th Siberian Corps. On the night of the 19th-20th, the Japanese not wishing to hold a salient point in close proximity to the enemy, evacuated Sha-ho-pu, which was then occupied by the 36th (Orel) Regiment. The main body of the 1st Corps and the 9th East Siberian Rifle Division formed the general reserve of the army; but the regiments of the former force were a good deal scattered.\* The 4th Siberian

\* At Liu-fan-tun, as reserve to General Gerngross :—

86th (Wilmanstrand), 88th (Petrov) Regiments, five batteries 7th Artillery Brigade, one sapper company.

With the Xth Corps :—

85th (Viborg) Regiment and one battery.

Behind the 4th Siberian Corps, on the road to Huang-shan :—

87th (Neishlot) Regiment.

At San-chia-tzu :—

145th (Novocherkask), 148th (Caspian) Regiments, 43rd Artillery Brigade (less one battery), one sapper company.

Corps had been rejoined by 9th (Tobolsk) and 10th Omsk Regiments and was on the Erh-tao-kou hills covered by General Mishchenko's cavalry and the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment at Feng-chi-pu. The right of the Eastern Force was extended until it rested upon the village of Liu-chien-hu-tun, and on the 24th October the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division was brought westward, by General Kuropatkin's orders, to Tu-shan-tun where it arrived on the 26th. As the 9th East Siberian Division was still at Lo-hsiu-sai-tun, the 1st Siberian Corps was then complete except for the two regiments with General Gerngross.\*

The 3rd Siberian Corps began the construction of a fortified position from Pien-niu-lu-pu to the Kao-tai Ling with its left flank protected by General Samsonov's cavalry. Still further to the eastward General Rennenkampf took post at Ching-ho-cheng† and near San-lung-yu,† while Colonel Madritov was moved out to his old position on the extreme left of the whole army. Until the 27th, the six companies of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment held the detached post on Wai-tou Shan, but General Kuroki had decided some days previously that he could no longer allow his movements to be overlooked and his camps to be commanded. During the night of the 26th, twenty-eight Japanese guns were got into positions whence, from south-east, south, and south-west they brought a converging fire upon the Russian trenches. It is said that Colonel Lipovetz Popovich, who was responsible for the defence of this isolated post, had frequently represented to his superiors the impossibility of holding it with the force at his disposal, and had asked that at least one battery might be given to him, as without it he would be so completely at the mercy of the Japanese artillery that an infantry attack would hardly be necessary. No notice seems to have been taken of the views he expressed, and on the morning of the 27th he had the melancholy satisfaction of seeing them confirmed almost literally. The Japanese bombardment was slow and deliberate, but, being undisturbed, very accurate. For nearly five hours not a single infantryman showed himself, but at 1 p.m., when the trenches were already almost untenable, the 29th *Kobi* and 1st Guard *Kobi* Regiments began to move forward. The defenders stoutly contested every foot of ground, but were driven steadily back towards the temple with which the

At Liu-chiang-tun :—

Two battalions 147th (Samara) Regiment.

At Sha-ku-tun :—

Two battalions 147th (Samara) Regiment.

With the 4th Siberian Corps :—

146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment and one battery.

At Ta-tzu-pu :—

7th Siberian Cossack Regiment, 3rd Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery.

Unaccounted for :—

2nd Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery, one sapper company.

*German Official Account,*

Part 5, p. 210.

\* 33rd and 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiments. See p. 169.

† Strategic Map 5.

hill is crowned. By 3.30 p.m., almost every man on the Russian side had been engaged. For another hour the unequal struggle continued, until at 4.30 p.m. Colonel Lipovetz Popovich gave orders for the survivors to retreat to a wood at the foot of the hill, whence they eventually fell back upon the main position. In this affair the Russian losses were eleven officers out of thirteen killed or wounded, fifty-six men killed, and three hundred and sixty-six wounded; a very large proportion of the total force engaged. The Japanese had four officers killed and seven wounded, fifty-two men killed and a hundred and twenty-seven wounded.\* Two maxim guns, one of which had been smashed by a shell, and a hundred and fifty-seven rifles, went to swell the immense quantities of material which had been captured in the main battle.

The capture of Wai-tou Shan was the last movement of any importance for many weeks, and when this hill was again in Japanese hands the line held by Marshal Oyama's armies ran as follows:—

*First Army.*—Hill east of Shang-shih-chiao-tzu—Hsia-ping-tai-tzu—Wai-tou Shan—Ta-ying-shou-tun.

*Fourth Army.*—From the left of the First Army—Chang-ling-tzu—Ku-chia-tzu.

*Second Army.*—From the left of the Fourth Army—Kan-chia-la-tzu—La-mu-tun—Lin-sheng-pu—Chang-liang-pu—Wan-chia-yuan-tzu.

*General Akiyama's Cavalry.*—Ta-ping-chuang—Li-ta-jen-tun—Shen-tan-pu—Hei-kou-tai—Niu-chu†—Ma-ma-chieh.†

Marshal Oyama's quarters were at Yen-tai, where also the 8th Division and a *Kobi* brigade of six battalions had been assembled by the 30th October.

Thence one *Kobi* battalion was sent to Hsiao-pei-ho† on the Hun Ho, and the divisional cavalry, which was of no service at head-quarters, was, with the exception of a small detachment, added to General Akiyama's force.

The Japanese defences were simple in character. At the villages they consisted of a breastwork constructed with earth

The Japanese lines. taken from a deeply dug trench, and furnished with head-cover; while between the villages were strong shelter trenches of low command. In

front, at distances varying from twenty to eighty yards, was a line of barbed or telegraph wire entanglement, *abattis*, or *chevaux de frise*, wire being interlaced to render the last two obstacles difficult of removal or passage. The guns were placed in pits behind or between the villages, and alternative positions were prepared whence frontal or enfilade fire could be employed at will. The troops allotted to the defence of each section lived in bombproof shelters close behind the defensive line, and so excellent were the arrangements for fuel, food, and clothing that despite the rigour of Manchurian nights they suffered but little, if any,

\* These losses are not included in Appendix E.

† Strategical Map 5.

discomfort.\* Wood was fortunately abundant, and no difficulty was found in fitting up the artillery emplacements and infantry trenches with splinterproofs and convenient ammunition stores.

The Russian defences were far more elaborate, and were, moreover, devoid of that air of comfort and cleanliness which pervaded the Japanese lines. All along the front an immense amount of labour was expended upon shelter trenches, battery emplacements, and defensive posts—Putilov Hill was especially strongly fortified and isolated points, particularly Liu-chiang-tun and Sha-ku-tun, which were held by the 1st Corps, almost became small fortresses. Not satisfied, however, with one strong line well covered by efficient obstacles the Russians created a veritable labyrinth of redoubts, mines, and *trous-de-loup*, and constructed miles of deep approaches. Indeed it may be said that the works of both sides exemplify, in a singular manner, the military characteristics of the two nations. Those of the Russians built solely for defence, their many lines encouraging the inclination to retire; those of the Japanese mere starting points for another forward movement.

The results of the battle which produced the strange spectacle of two vast armies separated by no great natural obstacles, with their outposts in places less than a hundred yards apart, yet unable to make another effort, are difficult to estimate. In men and material the Russian losses had been vastly greater than those of the Japanese. In reports which were received in Tokio on the 22nd and 23rd October, 1904, Marshal Oyama states that he had captured 45 guns, 27 ammunition wagons, 5,474 rifles, 78,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and 6,920 rounds of artillery ammunition, in addition to tents, clothing, and supplies. More than seven hundred prisoners had been taken, and the Russian losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 1,021 officers and 39,748 men.†

Against these figures the Japanese casualties were 3,951 killed and 16,394 wounded,‡ while in material their only loss was fourteen guns taken by the Russians on Putilov Hill.

When we come to examine other aspects of the battle we see that neither commander had succeeded in achieving the object which he set before himself at the outset, but that while the

\* This state was not reached until sufficient time had passed to allow for the perfection of arrangements. The description is taken principally from *Reports from British Officers*, Vol. II, p. 19. Strictly speaking it applies only to the Japanese Second Army, but may be taken as typical of the whole line.

† Owing to the fact that numbers of men rejoined their regiments after being reported missing it is difficult to arrive at an exact statement of the casualties, but the above figures are believed to be correct. Another account gives the following detail :—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Officers...	191	866	34	1,091
Men ...	4,870	29,676	5,836	40,382

‡ For detail see Appendix E.

Russian failure had been complete and disastrous; the Japanese had been merely forced to content themselves with something less than that for which they had at one time hoped. At the beginning of October the relief of Port Arthur was still the object of General Kuropatkin's solicitude, and his immediate intention, as stated in his orders of the 28th September, was to gain possession of the right bank of the Tai-tzu. At the end of the battle the attempt to reach the Tai-tzu had collapsed hopelessly, and the relief of Port Arthur was further off than ever. The only consolation which General Kuropatkin could find was that at the end of the operations his left corps had been pushed twenty miles south of Fu-shun, where it was in a position to protect his left flank against a turning movement directed upon Tieh-ling. The position of Fu-shun\* with regard to Tieh-ling was indeed not unlike that of Pen-hsi-hu with regard to Mukden, and, as during the earlier stages of the campaign, the safety of his line of communication was the first consideration in the eyes of the Russian commander-in-chief.

Like his rival, Marshal Oyama had failed to carry out his intention as expressed in his orders of the 10th October. The Second Army had been compelled to stop short of the Sha-ho-pu—Kuan-lin-pu line which had been its allotted goal, and no portion of the Russian army had been driven away from its communications with the north. Although the results were altogether in favour of Japan, this battle must be regarded as to some extent indecisive; but if the material results were disappointing to the Japanese, the blow to the Russian *moral* had been tremendous. After months of continuous retreat, culminating in the overthrow at Liao-yang, General Kuropatkin's army had recovered its self-confidence in a manner which was truly remarkable, and the news that it was to be led against its hitherto victorious foe raised its enthusiasm to a high pitch. For a few days the only subject of conversation was the coming victory; but when the advance began confidence gave place to vacillation, and the moral effect of the final defeat was so great that at least one foreign witness, well qualified to speak, considered that in the battle of the Sha Ho the Russians suffered the heaviest reverse of the campaign.† The men knew that they had gone where they had been led, and that their blood had been poured out without stint; but all to no purpose, and henceforth the belief began to grow that battle could have but one end.

\* The coal mines at Fu-shun were very valuable for the working of the railway.

† von Tettau, *Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandchurei*, Vol. II, p. 167.

## APPENDIX A.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN'S ORDERS TO THE MANCHURIAN  
ARMY, 28TH SEPTEMBER, 1904.

SECRET.

*Orders.*

To the troops of the Manchurian Army (reference, 4 verst map, edition No. 2, corrected and completed to 22nd September, 1904, and 20 verst map).

No. 8.

MUKDEN,  
28th September, 1904.  
(6 p.m.)

The advanced troops of the enemy occupy the line of the villages Chang-tan—Ta-tung-shan-pu—Shan-wo-pu—Hsia-liu-ho-tzu—Chang-chi-sai.

On the flanks have been discovered: *on the right flank*, the presence of inconsiderable forces of the enemy on the left bank of the River Liao Ho, on the line of the villages Ta-wan—Ma-ma-chieh, and *on the left flank* about one brigade of infantry opposite the Ta Ling height.

The main forces of the enemy are grouped as follows:—

About 2 divisions are echeloned along the line Shen-tan-pu—Hou-ko-chen-pao.

About 4 divisions are to be found in the rayon of the villages Chang-tai-tzu—Sha-ho-tun—Liao-yang.

About two divisions on the Yen-tai heights.

About 2 divisions are echeloned on the line Pien-niu-lu-pu—Pen-hsi-hu.

The enemy is fortifying the positions:—

(1) On the line of the villages Shang-kang-tzu—Chang-tai-tzu, the heights to the south of the village Ying-cheng-tzu, on the line of the villages Liu-lin-kou—Chien-tao, the heights near the Yen-tai mines, and the hill to the north of Huang-pu.

(2) North of the village of Pien-niu-lu-pu, and to the south-west of the latter in the direction of the village of Nan-shan-pu.

In rear of the *first* position they are fortifying the heights between the villages of Mu-chang\*—Hsi-kuan-tun.

In rear of the *second* position—the positions at the village of Shang-ping-tai-tzu.

I order the Manchurian Army entrusted to my command to advance and to attack the enemy in whatever position he may be

\* Strategical Map 5.

(4725)

M



occupying, having as the main object, to gain possession of the right bank of the River Tai-tzu Ho.

(1) *Western Force.*

General of Cavalry, Baron Bilderling.

Xth Army Corps	...	...	{ 32 battalions, 88 guns. 6 squadrons, 1 sapper bat- talion.
XVIIth Army Corps	...	...	{ 32 battalions, 96 guns. 12 squadrons, 1 sapper battalion.
11th and 12th Orenburg Cos- sack Regiments	...	...	12 squadrons.
Ural Cossack Brigade	...	...	10 "
11th Horse Battery	...	...	6 horse guns.
64 battalions, 184 guns, 40 squadrons, 6 horse guns, 2 sapper battalions.			

To concentrate on the line of the Sha Ho for an ultimate advance along both sides of the railway between the Hun Ho and the road Mukden—Huang-ni-kan—Pan-tzu-sai—Liu-fan-tun—Pu-tsao-a—Ta-kou—the Yen-tai hills; this road is only to be occupied by outposts, since it has been apportioned for the march of the General Reserve.

On the first day of the march advanced guards to remain on the positions occupied by them at the present time. The main force of the Xth and XVIIth Army Corps to occupy the line of the villages Ta-su-chia-pu—Su-chia-tun station—Hsiao-yang-erh-tun—Pan-tzu-sai.

On the second day of the march advanced guards to occupy the line of the villages Chien-liu-tang-kou—Hung-pao-shan—Hsiao-ying-shou-tun, and to entrench on this line. The main force to occupy the line of the villages Lin-sheng-pu—Sha-ho-pu—Liu-fan-tun, and to entrench that position.

(2) *Eastern Force.*

Lieutenant-General Baron Stakelberg.

1st Siberian Army Corps	...	...	{ 24 battalions, 16 machine guns, 56 Q.F. guns, 10 squadrons, 4 horse moun- tain guns, 1 sapper bat- talion.
2nd Siberian Army Corps*	...	...	{ 17 battalions, 8 machine guns, 32 Q.F. guns, 2 squadrons, 1 sapper battalion.

\* The following are included in the composition of this Army Corps :— 213th (Orovai) Regiment, four battalions; 2nd (Chita) Infantry Regiment, one battalion; and 29th Artillery Brigade, eight guns.

3rd Siberian Army Corps*	...	{ 32 battalions, 8 machine guns, 42 Q.F. guns, 16 mountain guns, 6 mortars, 7 squadrons, 2 horse mountain guns, 1 sapper battalion.
Siberian Cossack Division	...	15 squadrons.
20th Horse Battery	...	6 guns.

Total 73 battalions, 32 machine guns, 130 Q.F. guns, 16 mountain guns, 6 mortars, 34 squadrons, 6 horse guns, 6 horse mountain guns, 3 sapper battalions.

To concentrate on the line of the villages Pa-chia-tzu—Fei-tsun-pu—Tai-chia-miao-tzu in order to attack the enemy's position from the front and right flanks.

The rayon of the advance will be bounded by the roads :—

(1) Fu-shun†—Ta-erh-huo†—Ying-shou-pu-tzu†—Pa-chia-tzu—Kao-kuan-sai—Sau-chia-tzu, and

(2) Fu-ling—Pai-yeh-shan-tzu—Feng-chi-pu—Pien-niu-lu-pu—Pen-hsi-hu, including both these roads.

On the first day of the march, to occupy with the main force, the line of the villages Shih-hui-chiang†—Yang-tao-tzu, screening itself by the advanced guards already sent forward.

On the second day of the march, to occupy with the main force the line of the villages Pa-chia-tzu—Fei-tsun-pu—Tai-chia-miao-tzu, after having sent advanced troops on the line Wang-fu Ling ridge—Hou-lu-tzu-kou—Ying-pan—Liu-ta-ping-kou.

The main object of the operations of the Eastern Force will be to take possession of the enemy's positions at Pien-niu-lu-pu.

### (3) *General Reserve.*

#### (a) Lieutenant-General Zarubaiev.

4th Siberian Army Corps	...	{ 24 battalions, 48 Q.F. guns, 5 squadrons, 1 sapper battalion.
2nd, 3rd, and 4th Siberian Artillery Divisions	...	{ 44 old pattern screw guns.
5th Mortar Regiment (3 battalions) and 1st and 2nd Siberian Mortar Battalions	...	{ 30 mortars.

Total 24 battalions, 48 Q.F. guns, 44 screw guns, 30 mortars, 5 squadrons, 1 sapper battalion.

(a) On the first day of the march to concentrate in the rayon between Mukden and the Hun Ho, east of the Mandarin road.

On the second day of the march, following across the bridges

\* The following were included in the composition of this Army Corps :— 6th (Yeniseisk) Regiment, four battalions ; 7th (Krasnoyarsk) Regiment, four battalions ; 2nd Verkhne-Udinsk Cossack Regiment, one sotnia.

† See Strategic Map 5.

near the village of Huang-ni-kan, to concentrate in the rayon of the villages Liu-kuan-tun—Ying-cheng-tzu—Tung-ling.\*

(b) Adjutant-General Baron Meiendorf.

1st Army Corps. ... 32 battalions, 96 guns, 4 sotnias,  
1 sapper battalion.

3rd and 4th Trans- }  
Baikal Cossack Bat- } 12 guns.  
teries ... }

Total 32 battalions, 96 guns, 12 horse guns, 4 squadrons,  
1 sapper battalion.

On the first day of the march, to concentrate between Mukden and the Hun Ho, west of the Mandarin road. On the second day of the march, crossing the bridges on the Mandarin road and opposite the village of Chiao-ho, to concentrate in the rayon of the villages Sang-lin-tzu—Shang-sheng-kou-tzu—Ying-pan.

(c) His Excellency Major-General Mishchenko.

Independent Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade { 11 squadrons and  
6 horse guns.

6th Horse Mountain Battery of Frontier

Guards ... .. 2 guns.

Total 11 squadrons, 6 horse guns, and 2 horse mountain guns.

On the occupation by the advanced guards of the Western Force, of the line of the villages Chien-liu-tang-kou—Hung-pao-shan—Hsiao-ying-shou-tun, to concentrate at the village of Liu-fan-tun.

(4) *Protection of the flanks.*

Right flank. Lieutenant-General Dembovski.

215th Buzuluk Infantry Regiment ... 4 battalions.

216th Insar Regiment ... .. 2 "

284th Chembar Regiment ... .. 4 "

28th Artillery Brigade ... .. 18 guns.

1st Argun Cossack Regiment ... .. 4 squadrons.

Independent Caucasian Cossack Brigade... 12 "

4th Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery ... 6 guns.

5th East Siberian Sapper Battalion ... 1 battalion.

East Siberian Pontoon Battalion ... .. 1 "

Total 10 battalions, 18 guns, 6 horse guns, 16 squadrons,  
1 sapper battalion, 1 pontoon battalion.

To safeguard the right flank of the army. On the first day of the march, to concentrate at the village of Fan-chien-tai, sending forward an advanced guard to Chang-chia-fang. On the second day of the march, to cross to the village of Ho-chia-chang-tzu, sending an advanced guard to the village of Chang-tan.

\* Or Shih-chia-sai according to the German translation.

The subsequent duty for this force will be to gain possession of the crossing at Chang-tan, where a bridge will be built and covered by a double bridge-head on both banks of the Hun Ho.

Major-General Kossakovski.

281st Drissa Infantry Regiment ...	...	4 battalions.
4th Verkhne-Udinsk Regiment ...	...	2 "
28th Artillery Brigade ...	...	8 guns.
4th Siberian Artillery Division ...	...	4 "
Amur Cossack Regiment ...	...	3 squadrons.
Frontier Guards ...	...	{ 2 companies. 4 guns. 6 squadrons.

Total  $6\frac{1}{2}$  battalions, 16 guns, 9 squadrons.

To safeguard the extreme right flank, defending the line of the Liao Ho. To advance along the left bank of the Liao Ho, keeping to the high ground and in touch with the force under Lieutenant-General Dembovski.\*

As this force advances the necessary detachments must be dropped for the defence of the line of the Liao Ho, south of Shih-fou-ssu.

The left flank. Lieutenant-General Rennenkampf.

214th Mokshan Infantry Regiment ...	...	4 battalions.
282nd Chernoyar Infantry Regiment ...	...	4 "
283rd Bugulmin Regiment ...	...	3 "
1st Strietensk Regiment ...	...	1 battalion.
2nd Chita Infantry Regiment ...	...	1 "
26th Artillery Brigade ...	...	24 guns.
Frontier Guards ...	...	2 "
2nd Brigade Trans-Baikal Cossack Division	...	12 squadrons.
1st Argun Cossack Regiment ...	...	2 "
Amur Cossack Regiment ...	...	2 "
4th Horse Mountain Battery Frontier	...	...
Guards ...	...	4 guns.
5th East Siberian Sapper Battalion ...	...	1 company.

Total 13 battalions, 26 guns, 4 horse mountain guns 16 squadrons, 1 sapper company.

To safeguard the left flank of the army conforming to its movements. The detachments in the direction of Ma-chun-tan and the Ta Ling, to form part of this force and to advance to the line Mi-cha—Hsiao-hsi-erh.†

Colonel Madritov.

1st Strietensk Regiment ...	...	1 battalion.
Mounted Scouts 1st and 15th East Siberian	...	...
Rifle Regiments ...	...	2 detachments.

\* On the Liao Ho, about twenty-two miles north by east from Mukden. See Strategical Map 5.

† See Strategical Map 5.

Ussuri Cossack Regiment ...	...	...	1 squadron.
Caucasian Volunteers ...	...	...	1 „
Frontier Guards ...	...	...	2 guns.

Total 1 battalion, 2 detachments, 2 squadrons, 2 guns.

To protect the extreme left flank of the army, and to advance in the direction Ta-ping-ting-shan\*—Cheng-chang\*—Sai-ma-chi,\* keeping in touch with the force under Lieutenant-General Rennen-kampf.

(5) *Protection of the rear.*

6th Siberian Army Corps ...	32 battalions, 96 guns.
	6 squadrons, 1 sapper battalion.

To echelon between Mukden and Tieh-ling in accordance with special orders.

(6) A supplementary order will be issued with reference to the date of the advance.

(7) The baggage trains of the 2nd category will move half a day's march, and those of the 3rd category one day's march in rear of the columns, by routes which will be detailed by the commanders of forces.

(8) The distribution of the Flying Artillery Park Brigades will be under the orders of the corps commanders.

(9) Reports will be sent to the head of the main body of the 4th Siberian Corps, which will follow the route—Mukden—Huang-ni-kan—Liu-kuan-tun—Pan-tzu-sai—Erh-tao-kou.

(10) Substitutes for command: Lieutenant-General Sakharov, Adjutant-General Baron Meiendorf.

(Signed) KUROPATKIN,  
*General-Adjutant, Commanding-in-Chief.*

SAKHAROV,  
*Lieutenant-General, Chief of the Staff.*

\* See Strategical Map 5.

## APPENDIX B.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN'S ORDERS TO THE MANCHURIAN  
ARMY, 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1904.*Order*

To the troops of the Manchurian Army.

No. 9.

MUKDEN,  
30th September, 1904.

To supplement Army Order No. 8, dated 28th September.

*As Commander of the Western Force.*—I appoint the commander of the XVIIth Army Corps, General of Cavalry, Bilderling.*As Chief of the Staff of the Western Force.*—The chief of the staff of the XVIIth Army Corps, Major-General Thiesenhausen.*As Commander of the Eastern Force.*—I appoint the commander of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Stakelberg.*As Chief of the Staff of the Eastern Force.*—The chief of the staff of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, Major-General von der Brinken.

For the temporary command of the troops of the different corps, I appoint:

*XVIIth Army Corps.*—Lieutenant-General Volkov, appointed in my orders to be a member of the Military Council.*1st Siberian Army Corps.*—The commander of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division, Lieutenant-General Gerngross.

As temporary Chiefs of the Staff, I appoint:

*XVIIth Army Corps.*—Colonel Dragomirov.*1st Siberian Army Corps.*—Colonel Gurko.KUROPATKIN, Gen.-Adj.,  
Commander-in-Chief.



APAN.  
-MARS!

Maj. Gene  
he St

13 Guard *Kobi* Brigade.  
Major-General Umezawa.

14 Guard *Kobi* Regiment.  
nad. ■ ■

Ho Guard *Kobi* Regiment.  
egin ■ ■

■ 4th *Kobi* Regiment.

egin ■ ■

■ d Cavalry, 1 squadron.

At ■

ent. *Kobi* Battery, 6 guns.

ent, Engineer Company.  
11th g ■

Tw  
(on.

Art the right of the Guard  
*Kobi* Brigade, as garrison  
f Pen-hsi-hu.

1st Battalion 39th *Kobi*  
Regiment.

2nd Cavalry Brigade.  
Major-General Prince Kanin.

15th Cavalry Regiment.

■■■■

16th Cavalry Regiment.

■■■■

Machine guns (6).

igat  
Ok

Regi Brigade ... ..  
Pen-hsi-hu ... ..  
... ..  
Regi ... ..  
... ..  
ama's Detachment ... ..  
ye ... ..  
Regi ... ..  
Total ... ..

Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.	Machine guns.	Engineer Battalions.
0	8	0	6	0
1	0	0	0	0
46	11	126	0	3
24	6	108	6	2
34	9	152	0	3
2	14	6	6	0
21	0	84	0	0
128	48	476	18	8







16th Oct.		17th
K.	W.	K.
—	1	
1	—	
2	9	
—	1	
—	—	
—	—	1
—	—	—
73	237	
8	4	
30	7	
—	—	
—	—	
31	—	
—	—	
—	—	
—	—	
—	—	
—	—	

oring

16th Oct.		17th Oct.		18th Oct.		19th Oct.		20th Oct.		Total.	
K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	K.	W.	Killed.	Wounded.
—	1	1	2	—	6	1	2	—	2	358	1,345
1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	639	2,758
2	9	1	7	5	7	—	6	—	—	327	1,297
—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	195	685
—	—	2	8	1	7	—	—	—	—	89	320
										1,608	6,405
—	—	182	191	—	—	1	5	—	—	335	855
—	1	—	10	—	—	—	1	—	1	334	1,216
—	—	4	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	34
										675	2,105
73	237	59	282	14	68	7	28	1	25	724	3,187
8	44	21	107	—	20	—	8	2	33	246	1,241
30	75	5	35	1	20	2	13	3	1	335	1,839
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	48	1	51
										1,306	6,318
—	1	6	5	1	3	1	1	1	6	18	105
31	150	2	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	135	475
—	—	2	3	2	1	—	—	—	—	192	869
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	13	62
										358	1,511
—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	1	9
—	2	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	8
										3	17
—	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	29
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	9

GRAND TOTAL\* .... 3,951 16,394

bringing up the total of the Japanese losses in battle during the fourteen days to

27



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